University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

ScholarWorks@UARK
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
5-2013

Liberal Arts Colleges During the Great Recession: Examining
Organizational Adaptation and Institutional Change
Ashlie Junot Hilbun
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the Higher Education Commons, and the Higher Education Administration Commons

Citation
Hilbun, A. J. (2013). Liberal Arts Colleges During the Great Recession: Examining Organizational
Adaptation and Institutional Change. Graduate Theses and Dissertations Retrieved from
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/798

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more
information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.

LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGES DURING THE GREAT RECESSION:
EXAMINING ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGES DURING THE GREAT RECESSION:
EXAMINING ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Education in Higher Education

By

Ashlie Junot Hilbun
Centenary College of Louisiana
Bachelor of Arts in Psychology, 2006
Tulane University
Master of Social Work, 2007

May 2013
University of Arkansas

	
  
	
  

ABSTRACT
Liberal arts colleges strived to adapt to environmental shifts at the turn of the twenty-first
century and remain relevant in American society while the Great Recession of 2007 compounded
their challenges and created new fiscal and enrollment burdens, which forced these institutions to
confront paradigm-changing circumstances. In an effort to advance the historical perspective of
liberal arts colleges and expand the organizational adaptation research base, the current study
aimed to understand how private liberal arts colleges adapted during the Great Recession of 2007
by examining institutional changes at three private liberal arts colleges and their effects on the
institutions’ operations. To fulfill this purpose, the study was guided by four research questions
that studied the nature of the environmental pressures during the recession, the adaptive
strategies employed to combat pressures, the effects of those strategies on the institutions’
operations, and institutional constituencies’ perceptions of these strategies. This multiple-case
study analyzed data from 3 liberal arts colleges located in the southeastern region of the United
States, which included 30 participant interviews, public and private documents, and
observational field notes. The findings were presented in 2 parts - a descriptive case record of
each institution and a cross-case comparative analysis of the study’s themes as they related to the
study’s research questions. The findings focused on the challenges of decreased endowments and
increased enrollment pressures; described an array of institutional adaptive strategies
implemented in areas of fiscal management, academics, athletics, personnel, fundraising, and
enrollment; discussed the changing operations of the role of the board, administrative approaches
to leadership and decision-making, and faculty involvement in organizational adaptation; and
analyzed perceptions of change that linked organizational effectiveness to leadership and
institutional identity. The study’s themes were examined within the context of Cameron’s (1984)

	
  
	
  

and Birnbaum’s (1988) organizational adaptation frameworks, which included the population
ecology, life cycles, resource dependence, symbolic action, and cybernetics models. Finally,
recommendations for future research, policy, and practice focused on issues of self-governance
and institutional identity. The study’s investigation of the modern liberal arts college adaptation
highlighted the prominence of both the external environment and institutional factors in its story
of survival.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
For decades, researchers have examined the relationship between higher education and
the larger economic context and sociopolitical landscape. As a cornerstone institution in society,
higher education’s purpose, operations, and effectiveness have led to philosophical debate
among faculty, administrators, students, policymakers, legislators, and the general public. These
debates are more complex than ever as a result of a rapidly changing economy, an increasingly
stratified and disengaged democracy, and the decentralized growth and diversification of higher
education. In an era defined by the need for advanced education more than any era before it,
higher education in the United States still faces significant hurdles to providing broad-based,
quality education while maintaining its mission and survival.
The liberal arts college and its education claim the distinction as the oldest form of higher
education in the United States, born with the founding of Harvard College in 1636. Since its
inception, researchers have demonstrated the educational effectiveness of liberal arts education
and liberal arts colleges by pointing to several different experience and outcome measures.
However, while the liberal arts college was the dominant institutional form of higher education
for more than 200 years, the turn of the 20th century brought significant economic and societal
changes that created new challenges for the liberal arts college model. These changes have tested
the resilience of America’s liberal arts colleges, forcing them to adapt to meet societal needs
while simultaneously striving, and sometimes struggling, to uphold their missions and purposes.
With continual decline in both number and enrollment sizes of liberal arts institutions alongside
the significant growth of other higher education institutional types since the turn of the 20th
century, it is of particular importance to examine the evolution of liberal arts colleges’ adaptation
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and their prospect of survival, especially with regard to the most recent and significant economic
shifts in America. Therefore, the current study aimed to understand how private liberal arts
colleges adapted during the Great Recession of 2007 by examining institutional changes at three
private liberal arts colleges and their effects on the institutions’ operations. Understanding the
most recent external environmental pressures on liberal arts colleges and the institutions’
adaptations informs organizational practice and broadens the existing body of higher education
research.
Context of the Research Problem
At the center of higher education discussions is a philosophical examination of the
purpose of higher education. What should higher education be teaching, and what should its
students be learning? The answer to these questions inevitably determines a great deal about the
mission of higher education and the nature of its curriculum, support, and operations. In a
general sense, higher education in the United States has often been dichotomized into two
platforms: liberal education and vocational education. While the dichotomy oversimplifies
ideologies, it highlights two somewhat opposing and prominent views among researchers and
practitioners.
Liberal education proponents have long argued that this distinctive educational approach
was the world’s and the United States’ oldest and purest form of education, providing an
education that teaches students how to think and learn by focusing on analytical skill more than
content mastery (Goddard, 1986; Horowitz, 2005; Oakley, 2005; Simpson, 1980). The basic
premise of liberal education asserted that discipline-specific content was an important
component to education, but mastery of inquiry, critical thinking, synthesis, rhetoric and public
discourse, and the acquisition of an eager and open mind were the hallmarks of lifelong and
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transformative education (Aloi, Gardner, & Lusher, 2003; Casement, 1999; Ehrlich & Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2007; Lears, 2003; Weingartner, 2007).
Maldonado, Lacey, and Thompson (2007) described the liberal arts educational process as an
immersive educational experience that forced people to take a position and connect academic
content to realistic contexts. Maldonado et al. (2007) argued that this negotiation of intellect and
reality allowed students to integrate their educations with their lives. These early American
teaching methods paralleled Middle Ages educational practices that exposed students to the
“quadrivium” and to the “trivium,” and addressed more than the need for job preparation. This
type of learning experience included aims of leadership cultivation, a sense of social
responsibility, and the development of the whole person (Jalbert, 2009; King, Brown, Lindsay &
Vanhecke, 2007; Matthews, 1977; O’Sullivan, 2009; Simpson, 1980). While liberal education
did not specifically focus on job preparation, proponents argued that the education process
inevitably qualified individuals to be critically thoughtful and driven employees in a vast array of
fields (Daly, 1992; Granger, 1974; Tierney, 1980; Weingartner, 2007).
Historically, liberal arts colleges embraced liberal education more zealously than any
other institutional type in higher education. Consequently, this commitment shaped several
aspects of the liberal arts college, many of which are highlighted in higher education research
and listed here: small institutional and enrollment size; residential environment; primary
commitment to teaching with full-time faculty who hold PhDs in their fields; low faculty-student
ratio and high faculty-student interaction; emphasis on student participation in civic and
volunteer engagements; prominence of traditional liberal curricula including literature, history,
philosophy, and religion; and a central focus on an integrated educational experience (Cech,
1999; Chickering & Gamson, 1987; Ekman, 2005; Hersh, 1999; Horowitz, 2005; Lang, 1999;
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Oakley, 2005). Many researchers argued that, by virtue of these distinct features, liberal arts
colleges provided a model for all education, especially in the twenty-first century (Chickering &
Gamson, 1987; Hersh, 1999; Kuh, 2005). Specifically, Hersh (1999) argued, “When it comes to
creating the optimum educational environment in which to produce the profoundly liberating
education required to redress our larger cultural conditions, not to mention the requirements of
future employment and democratic civic engagement, liberal arts colleges emerge clearly as the
model to embrace” (p. 181). Similarly, Horowitz (2005) argued that while vocational education
was “important to a career, the liberal arts college was important to life” (p. 421).
A Shift in Prominence
While liberal education and the liberal arts college thrived for much of the 17th, 18th, and
19th centuries in the United States, vocational education and the public university popularized at
the turn of the 20th century and the liberal arts colleges, especially less-known and smaller ones,
gradually lost their prominence and became increasingly vulnerable to failure (Breneman, 1994;
Gilbert, 1995; Zammuto, 1984). Historians estimated that at the turn of the 20th century, nearly
70% of undergraduates in the United States attended liberal arts colleges, and the vast majority
of institutions were classified as liberal arts colleges (Hersh, 1999). But, by the mid-1950s,
liberal arts colleges made up only 40% of all higher education and educated only 25% of the
nation’s total undergraduate population. These statistics continued to fall into the 1970s when
liberal arts colleges made up only 25% of institutions and educated only 8% of the student
population (Oakley, 2005).
Then in 2000, Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching restructured
institutional criteria for liberal arts classification. In order to be defined as a “Baccalaureate
College-Liberal Arts,” an institution had to award at least 50% of its degrees in traditional liberal
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arts, which included “English language and literature/letters; foreign languages and literatures;
biological sciences or life sciences; mathematics; philosophy and religion; physical sciences;
psychology; social sciences and history; visual and performing arts; area, ethnic, and cultural
studies; liberal arts and sciences, general studies, and humanities; and multi or interdisciplinary
studies” (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2001, p. 12). Within these
parameters, Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching classified 228 institutions as
liberal arts institutions, or 5.8% of the entire higher education institutional picture in 2000. These
institutions enrolled roughly 2.5% of the total undergraduate enrollment in the United States
(Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2001). Ten years later, Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching once again revamped their classification system to
focus on institutional type, size, and focus, eliminating the term “liberal arts” altogether. Today,
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching classifies most traditional liberal arts
colleges as “Baccalaureate Colleges--Arts & Sciences” (Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching, 2010). These declining trends in liberal arts colleges were the result
of a combination of loss of popularity in liberal arts curriculum; the closure, merging, and
transition of focus at liberal arts colleges; and increased enrollments and institutional
diversification in the wider landscape of higher education.
Research discussed this shift from liberal education to vocational education within the
context of widespread economic and sociopolitical change during the 20th century, demonstrating
the power of the external environment on institutions of higher education. The “democratization”
of higher education in the 1940s and 1950s through the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act,
breakthroughs in the civil rights movement, and the proliferation of community colleges led to
increased accessibility and enrollments in higher education, but also led to a wider range of
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student proficiency levels, redefining academic rigor and quality in education (Daly, 1992; Early,
2009; Rudolph, 1990). By the 1960s, a persistent demand for higher education led to institutional
expansion and rising costs. Large public universities became the most cost-effective option
offering expanded reputation, curricular and extracurricular opportunities, and networking on a
larger scale than the liberal arts college. The 1970s, an era defined by rebellion against
institutional power and advocacy for individual freedom, saw a fading of core education
requirements highlighting a focus on student choice. These changes, some argued, negatively
affected the quality of education and exaggerated focus on disciplinary knowledge (Brown,
2011; Goddard, 1986; Stern & Gaudiani, 1994). Others argued that these changes also infused
liberal arts colleges with new social and political platforms (Early, 2009). By the 1980s, the
market was severely constrained by an economic slump. The exodus of the baby boomer
generation from higher education into the market forced employers to dig deeper into their
employee resources to fill jobs, and knowledge and technology were changing at a faster-rate
than ever before in American history (Daly, 1992). Students were interested most in education
that taught skills aimed at a specific career path. Significantly higher salaries in technical fields
positively reinforced this focus, especially amidst higher education costs and growing student
loan debt (Goddard, 1986).
In general, significant technological change and the pervasiveness of the American
economy in education combined with the increased accessibility of higher education created a
widespread perception that vocational education best prepared the middle-class student for the
market (Tierney, 1980). As a result, students transitioned from valuing liberal education and the
liberal arts college to focusing on college degrees as a path to career preparation by way of the
larger university and the more affordable community college. But Hersh (1999) argued that
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increased popularity of vocationalism, and consequently the big university, had negative effects
for students. He wrote that the “modern student-consumer model” encouraged lax admissions,
easier grading requirements, higher dependency on graduate assistants, and large enrollments or,
as he called it, “impersonal mass schooling” (Hersh, 1999, p. 180). These new challenges, he and
Casement (1999) argued, presented significant hurdles to effectively teaching students critical
skills in literacy and writing and would eventually negatively impact the country’s economic
edge and political identity (Hersh, 1999). Lears (2003) defined this shift as an over-focus of
“American vocationalism and anti-intellectualism” that created “a fundamental conflict in the
university’s mission between furthering the pursuit of truth and serving the needs of the
established power” (p. 23). Brown (2011) also argued that this concentration on specialization
served to reinforce the status quo, especially the socioeconomic dimension of society. This
“corporatization” of higher education was based on two poorly established premises: first, that
students were well-informed consumers, and second, that faculty had no independent value to
add to the overly structured educational process (Lears, 2003, p. 23).
Continued Relevance for Liberal Arts
Even among these historic economic and technological changes and calls for a new focus
on progressively specialized education, a significant amount of research suggested that liberal
arts education was more valuable in postmodern America than ever before and was indeed quite
relevant (Goddard, 1986; Rhodes, 2010). More specifically, liberal arts advocates made two
connected arguments: first, the new environmental context called for liberally educated
individuals and two, liberally educated individuals were shown to be intellectually and socially
prepared for the workplace and the world.
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By the 1970s, researchers acknowledged the increased diversity and frequency of jobs
Americans were expected to hold during their careers, highlighting the importance of teaching
individuals how to learn and adapt to new tasks and new environments (Daly, 1992; Granger,
1974; Rhodes, 2010; Tierney, 1980). Yet, Casement (1999) and Hersh (1997) analyzed surveys
that showed college students had surprisingly low levels of general knowledge with employees
also insisting that college graduates learned too little in their degree programs. Signaling his
concern, James Ferguson, chairman and chief executive officer of General Foods Corporation,
made these comments at an Association of American Colleges meeting in 1983: “Modern
education has become so highly specialized that many college graduates are no longer capable of
looking beyond their own areas of expertise” (Unger, 1985, p. 32). Hersh (1999) reiterated the
point when he argued that a “a nation of individuals who cannot read or write well, with no sense
of the major human questions, who cannot think critically or show interest in learning, and who
are unable to act responsibly in a diverse democratic society will be ill-equipped to compete in
any new world order” (p. 180).
In light of these market concerns, Casement (1999) framed liberal arts education as both
practical and utilitarian – an education that equipped individuals with “cultural literacy,”
allowing them to critically analyze a situation and understand its context and meaning (p. 93). To
further substantiate these assertions, researchers cited a number of surveys and employer studies,
which supported liberal education as a method of career preparation that developed valuable soft
skills (Daly, 1992; Goddard, 1986; Hersh, 1997; Unger, 1985). Corporations like Chase
Manhattan Bank, General Motors, Morgan Stanley, and American Telephone and Telegraph all
reported that liberal arts graduates made up a significant portion of their employee base and that,
in certain instances, were promoted faster into management positions than their professionally
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degreed counterparts (Beck, 1981; Daly, 1992; Goddard, 1986; Hersh, 1997; Unger, 1985).
Finally, researchers also indicated that liberally educated graduates perceived their degrees as
highly relevant and effective to their careers (Ridley & Gallaer, 1993).
Beyond success in the workplace, several research studies and surveys made arguments
for the academic effectiveness of liberal education. Winter and McClelland (1981) surveyed and
tested freshmen, seniors, and graduates at 10 institutions and concluded that the liberal arts
curriculum prepared students more effectively than vocational education when analyzed by
measures of achievement motivation, self-definition, psychological adaptation to the
environment, and leadership motivation. In addition, students who attended liberal arts colleges,
as compared to other types of institutions, disproportionately succeeded in graduate school
(Cech, 1999). Other studies showed that students who attended liberal arts colleges engaged in
practices that were empirically linked to educational success and perceived their experience as
positive and effective (Pascarella, Cruce, Wolniak, & Blaich, 2004; The Annapolis Group,
2011). Pascarella et al. (2004) concluded that liberal arts colleges fostered a broader range of 19
measures of effective learning practices in undergraduate education than other institutional types;
these measures included faculty-student interactions, faculty feedback, and quality of teaching.
Comparably, The Annapolis Group (2011), a group of 130 top liberal arts colleges in the country
with missions based in liberal arts education, published an alumni research report in 2011 that
showed a higher percentage of their alumni graduated in four years, lived on campus for most of
their college years, were satisfied with their education, and thought they benefited from highquality faculty and small classes than graduates from any other institutional type. Many of these
factors are also indicators of academic success (The Annapolis Group, 2011).
The New Context of the Twenty-first Century
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At the turn of the twenty-first century, the United States’ economic and sociopolitical
landscape once again shifted dramatically; shifts accentuated even more by the Great Recession
of 2007 (Association of American Colleges and Universities [AACU], 2007). Indeed, there is
once again a new reality for higher education and liberal arts colleges. The production-based
economy of the past has quickly given way to an economy that is based in knowledge,
information, and communication. Technological innovation, the digital age, and globalization
continue to change the way the economy operates (AACU, 2007; Gedye, Fender, & Chalkley,
2004). In addition, American society has lost its civic momentum, signaled by a shift in several
activities: a decrease in volunteerism, a growing inability to engage in public discourse, the
decreased propensity to vote, and the increasing stratification of wealth in American democracy
(Jacobs & Skocpol, 2005).
In addition, many higher education trends during the last century become more extreme
in the 2000s. A 2003 University of California, Los Angeles study revealed that the majority of
students listed “the ability to get a better job as a ‘very important’ factor in the decision to go to
college,” compared to 35 years ago when 86% of students reported “develop a meaningful
philosophy of life” as their primary reason (Diconti, 2004, p. 168). This continued shift in
perception combined with the demands of the economy has further increased the vocational
focus on campuses across the nation. Yet, many employers continue to protest that graduates are
not prepared for the market and lack necessary written and oral communication skills, the
capacity for lifelong learning, and skills needed to engage in effective teamwork. These
employers want workers who can explore and acquire knowledge in many areas within the field
(Aloi et al., 2003). The economy has reached an unprecedented level of sophistication, but
researchers have argued that technology alone cannot solve its problems; logical, problem-
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solving, capable and educated individuals will solve America’s problems and propel it to a new
stage (Dudka, 2006). In addition, higher education is more vulnerable than ever before,
depending heavily on the government and students and parents for revenue while operating in a
market with significant institutional competition. As a result, universities and colleges seek to be
as marketable as possible, which often equates to providing high-demand professional majors
and content-focused courses that teach specific job skills.
Finally, there are a few notable and new overarching themes in higher education as a
result of changing circumstances in the twenty-first century, especially in post-recession times.
First, there has never been a bigger demand for higher education, but declining educational
attainment levels have created a significant hurdle to higher education success (AACU, 2007).
Second, new funding streams in higher education are now primarily generated from tuition
dollars (Desrochers & Wellman, 2011). Third, current financial pressures are acting to solidify
the inequity among institutions; more specifically, private non-profit institutions have
significantly increased their spending per student while public institutions have not kept pace.
And finally, public institutions are educating the vast majority of students in the twenty-first
century; between 1999 and 2009, public institutions educated 80% of the United States’
undergraduate enrollment while private institutions saw little growth (Desrochers & Wellman,
2011).
As students’ perceptions of education becomes more specific, employers’ expectations
become more expansive, all the while higher education wrestles with how to prepare a diverse
student enrollment for the challenges of employment and still provide a high level of liberal
education (AACU, 2007; Bok 2006). Matthews (2010) reiterated this point: “As postsecondary
education’s role in society and the economy grows in importance, it’s critical we define what is
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meant by a high-quality education” (p. 5). These themes and other challenges in higher education
have become even more apparent during the recent Great Recession of 2007.
The Great Recession of 2007 and Its Effects on Higher Education
The 2007 to 2009 economic recession in the United States was one of the significant
downturns in American history. Following a smaller recession in late 2001, the mid-2000s were
characterized by sustained real estate growth and job growth in the education, healthcare, and
service industries. However, many individuals took advantage of increased home equity credit
limits and by 2007, the housing market collapsed due to increased foreclosure and delinquent
financing. A fragile economy was even more negatively affected by the 2008 United States
financial market crisis (Dore & Singh, 2012; Goodman & Mance, 2011; Kowal, Snyders,
Lombardozzi, & Borgie, 2009). By the fall of 2008, global oil prices doubled and credit markets
tightened lending practices, creating a national economic freeze. The recession cost America
almost 9 million jobs, many concentrated in the construction and financial industries. Goodman
and Mance (2011) labeled the Great Recession of 2007 the “deepest employment downturn since
the end of World War II” (p. 9).
In its aftermath, researchers projected that the recession allowed the economy to
accelerate an already rapid transition to a new knowledge-based economy by eliminating jobs en
masse that will likely never return, but will rather be replaced with more sophisticated positions
that will require a postsecondary degree (Carnevale et al., 2010). It is projected that within the
next 20 years, 80% of jobs will be cerebral while only 20% will be manual, a near complete
reversal from 1920 (Aloi et al., 2003). Additionally, by the time America is expected to fully
rebound from the recession in 2018, it is expected that 63% of the 46 million newly created jobs
will require a college degree (Carnevale et al., 2010). The driving force behind the disparity
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between jobs and qualified labor is a fundamental shift in America’s economy base (Gedye et al.,
2004). Once again, the research indicated that it is no longer sufficient to teach employees basic
skills that will be used for several decades for the same position. Instead, the new demands of the
market require more jobs be filled with highly educated employees who can maneuver their way
through complicated job changes.
While the economic recession further accentuated the significant need for higher
education with liberal aims, it also significantly constrained higher education institutions’
operations. Public institutions were most affected by significant cuts in state appropriations while
private institutions experienced poor performing endowments, constrained finances, and
enrollment hardships (Chabotar, 2009; Worley, 2008). While enrollments increased more in
2008 than any other year since the 1970s, small institutions actually sustained enrollment losses
or had only minimal gains (Desrochers & Wellman, 2011). Even further, Chabotar (2009) argued
that enrollments at most of these smaller institutions remained somewhat stable, mainly as a
result of public institutions limiting enrollments and classes and implementing tuition increases,
making private institutions more competitive than usual. However, generally speaking,
institutions across the board became more dependent on tuition during the Great Recession of
2007, a dependency that has huge implications especially in an era defined by increased
accessibility to higher education. Both public and private institutions responded to the recession
by raising tuition by an average of 4.5% in 2009 (Chabotar, 2009). While private institutions
were responsible for the biggest hikes in tuition, many also provided heightened levels of
institutional financial aid, limiting the actual net tuition increase. This increase in aid was an
absolute necessity for many small, private schools to maintain their enrollment numbers.
Endowments, a source of revenue particularly important to private institutions, were also
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significantly affected by the recession. On average, higher education endowments had a negative
return of 19% in 2008 (Chabotar, 2009). The hardest hit institutions were those with endowments
larger than 100 million dollars and those that depended on their endowment to supplement the
operating budget. Many institutions sought long-term debt increases to compensate for the
financial losses while others increased fundraising efforts with hopes of mitigating losses by
securing additional private giving. However, fundraising was also negatively impacted by the
recession. During 2008, charitable giving in the United States declined by almost 6%, while
private giving to higher education institutions fell by 12%; both declines marked historic lows
(Chabotar, 2009). As a result of restricted revenues, institutions focused on limiting expenditures
to reduce deficits. Staffing expenditures became the primary concern since compensation
typically made up the largest portion of institutions’ overall budgets. Of the 300 colleges
surveyed by the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU) in
2009, 53.5% of institutions froze salaries, 46.8% froze new hiring, 19% laid off staff, and 7%
laid off faculty, mostly through attrition (Chabotar, 2009). Overall, Chabotar (2009) identified
the most vulnerable institutions as those where net tuition accounted for more than 70% of the
institution’s operating revenue and where endowment spent rates were more than 5% of annual
endowment earnings, based on 12- to 20-quarter rolling average.
Institutions responded in a variety of ways to the Great Recession of 2007. Some
implemented “fundamental changes in mission, programs, and services” (Chabotar, 2009, p. 9).
More specifically, some institutions evaluated program cuts and modifications in terms of their
relevancy to the institutions’ mission, performance, and potential. Others established new
consortia to augment existing operations. Some examined new and existing staff positions
through strategic, cost-benefit analyses. Other institutions implemented new public relations
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techniques including social media and mobile applications. Smaller institutions especially
increased marketing to highlight the benefits of a larger investment in a smaller school,
demonstrating high graduation rates and learning outcomes in terms of intellectual and career
skills. Some institutions established more strategic and targeted financial assistance programs,
and some increased scholarship funding through private support. And finally, some institutions
increased fundraising staffs especially for the purpose of raising private annual operating funds.
Statement of the Research Problem
The process of adapting to external environmental pressures is particularly challenging
and significant for liberal arts colleges. As mentioned, the diminishment of true liberal arts
colleges and education parallel the long-term changes in the United States’ economy and society.
Liberal arts education and liberal arts colleges are “eroding from all sides” and many agree with
Brown (2011) and regard them as an “expensive and outmoded relic” (p. 22). Yet, many
researchers and employers see liberal arts education and general education as a requirement for a
competitive economy and a democratic society (AACU, 2007; Bok 2006; Carnevale et al., 2010;
Matthews, 2010). In the wake of the Great Recession of 2007, many liberal arts colleges are
struggling to remain operational and seek ways to adapt to the external context while abiding by
their institutional missions (Chabotar, 2010). This effort to adapt and respond and be flexible,
many researchers asserted, is a distinguishing feature of liberal arts colleges and one of the
primary reasons these institutions have continued to exist (Horowitz, 2005; Simpson, 1980;
Stone, 2004; Taves, 1998). The question then becomes if and how liberal arts colleges can adapt
to the most recent and significant changes in the United States economy, specifically regarding
the Great Recession of 2007.
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While there is limited scholarly research examining how liberal arts colleges, especially
the smaller and more financially vulnerable schools, adapted to changing external circumstances
during the last decade, the topic was a popular focus in mainstream media (Chabotar, 2010).
During and after the Great Recession of 2007, several media sources featured stories about
liberal arts institutions that sought to survive and adapt to new external circumstances. Many of
these institutions were characterized by significant enrollment decreases, investment losses, and
curriculum changes (Biemiller, 2011; Carlson, 2012; Corral & Patai, 2008; Delbanco, 2012;
Flemming & Schantz, 2010; Selingo, 2012; Stone, 2004).
The coverage on Antioch College was perhaps the most featured struggling college
during this time period. Antioch College closed in 2008 amidst financial exigency, which
provoked intense alumni and faculty protests. The closing was ultimately mediated through legal
channels and both the administration and faculty issued formal reports disputing the
circumstances surrounding the institution’s failure. Eventually, a third-party negotiated the
selling of Antioch College to a small group of committed faculty and alumni. The school
reopened in 2011 with bare-boned operations and enrollments and a new vision for the future.
Among the many issues that faced Antioch were the proliferation of satellite outreach campuses
that generated significant revenue but led to the decentralization of the main campus, dropping
enrollments, increasing deficits, and violent student uprisings that led to negative national
publicity (Goldfarb, 2007; Zannoni, Ehrenberg, Fichtenbaum, & Storti, 2010).
Antioch was one example of several colleges that faced difficult realities in the last
decade (Biemiller, 2011; Carlson, 2012; Corral & Patai, 2008; Delbanco, 2012; Flemming &
Schantz, 2010; Selingo, 2012, Stone, 2004). The lack of scholarly research focused on these
colleges’ adaptation to the Great Recession of 2007 is of great significance to higher education
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research. Researchers have established that higher education is a healthier system when it
maintains its institutional diversity (AACU, 2007; Zammuto, 1984). The decrease in liberal arts
colleges consequently reduced diversity in the system. Additionally, many researchers have
argued that liberal arts colleges are models for all of education, and that the education they
provide is essential for the nation to maintain an economic edge and a democratic society
(AACU, 2007; Hersh, 1999). Finally, understanding the adaptation of liberal arts colleges during
the 2007 recession provides the next chapter of research in the long history of liberal arts
colleges’ survival story.
Purpose of the Study
The current study’s purpose was to understand how private liberal arts colleges adapted
during the Great Recession of 2007 by examining institutional changes at three private liberal
arts colleges and their effects on the institutions’ operations. The study gave specific attention to
liberal arts colleges located in the southeastern region of the United States. According to the
National Bureau of Economic Research, the United States’ economy peaked in December of
2007, ending an era of significant expansion and marking the beginning of an 18-month
recession. The Great Recession of 2007 was longer than any other recession since World War II
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010). Therefore, the current study’s examination of
liberal arts colleges focused specifically on pressures and adaptive strategies these institutions
experienced in the last decade. Additionally, in an effort to examine the broad nature of
challenge and adaptive strategies at liberal arts colleges, the current study focused on three
institutions that were similar in terms of classification and religious affiliation, but varied widely
with regard to the level of pressure exerted on them by the recession and the nature of their
adaptation. It is important to note that while two institutions remained operational during and
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after the recession, one case institution in the current study ceased to exist in 2011 after
succumbing to administrative and financial struggles. Understanding the most recent external
environmental pressures on liberal arts colleges and the institutions’ adaptations informed
institutional practice and the historical perspective of liberal arts colleges in the United States.
Research Questions
To fulfill the current study’s purpose, the following specific research questions guided the
study.
1. What external environmental pressures influenced the liberal arts colleges during the
Great Recession of 2007?
2. What adaptive strategies did the liberal arts colleges employ to respond to the external
environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007?
3. How did the adaptive strategies employed by the liberal arts colleges to respond to the
external environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007 affect their
operations?
4. How did institutional constituents perceive the adaptive strategies employed by the
liberal arts colleges to respond to the external environmental pressures during the Great
Recession of 2007?
Definition of Terms
The key terms essential to the current study included the following:
For the purposes of the current study adaptive strategies were considered synonymous
with “organizational adaptation,” defined by Cameron (1984) as “modifications or alterations in
the organization or its components in order to adjust to changes in the external environment” (p.
123).
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An economic recession is an extended period of reduced economic production and
heightened unemployment (Chabotar, 2009).
An external environmental pressure is a fluctuation in the exterior setting that disrupts
the equilibrium or creates an “imbalanced condition” in the organization (Cameron, 1984, p.
123).
The Great Recession of 2007 was labeled as the “deepest employment downturn since
the end of World War II” and officially began in December of 2007 and ended in June of 2009
(Goodman and Mance, 2011, p. 9). The recession was particularly impactful because it included
both a prolonged, weakened labor market combined with a sharp downturn in the financial
market in 2008.
A liberal arts college refers to a higher education institution that awards at least half of
its degrees in liberal arts disciplines (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching,
2001). In addition, it is typically residential, enrolls almost exclusively full-time students
between 18 and 24 years old, limits enrollment to approximately 2,500 students, and offers
approximately 20 majors (Breneman, 1994).
The liberal arts disciplines include the “English language and literature/letters; foreign
languages and literatures; biological sciences or life sciences; mathematics; philosophy and
religion; physical sciences; psychology; social sciences and history; visual and performing arts;
area, ethnic, and cultural studies; liberal arts and sciences, general studies, and humanities; and
multi or interdisciplinary studies” (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2001,
p. 12).
A liberal education is “an education that enlarges and disciplines the mind and makes it
master of its own powers, irrespective of the particular business or profession one may follow
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(“Liberal Education,” 2009).
Delimitations and Limitations
I necessarily imposed limitations on the scope of the current study in order to achieve the
identified purpose. The current study was limited to three liberal arts colleges selected because of
their institutional characteristics, their location, and their varied adaptation during the Great
Recession of 2007. The case institutions included participants identified by either myself or by
other participants in the study to be well-informed institutional constituents. Additionally, the
data collection focused on external pressures and adaptive strategies and was limited to the most
recent decade of changes and adjustments at each case institution.
Additionally, the nature of the current study’s research design inherently presented the
following limitations, which were acknowledged and addressed throughout the research process.
Because the study focused on three liberal arts colleges, the findings were not innately
transferable to other types of institutions or other settings, but served to inform other institutions
and practitioners about the adaptation of liberal arts colleges.
Additionally, the findings of the study were, in part, developed from the perceptions of
participants, which created several limitations to the study. First, many of the current study’s
participants were employees at the case institutions that were amidst change. Their perceptions
and their statements were vulnerable to social desirability bias and limited disclosure. Next,
interview time constraints limited the breadth and depth of topics I discussed with participants.
Furthermore, due to geographic and schedule constraints, some participants’ interviews were
conducted by phone, and one participant’s interview was not digitally recorded as a result of a
device malfunction.
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In terms of document collection, my data sources were limited to public information and
the willingness of participants to provide me with important private historical documents.
Document analysis was much more in-depth for the closed case institution than for the two
operating institutions. Additionally, the documents participants at the operating case institutions
provided to me were typically excerpted, limiting my ability to examine the document in its
entirety or within its initial context.
Additionally, in terms of reporting findings, the current study did not specifically disclose
the identity of each participant. Even more, the study specifically sought to protect the identity of
participants by identifying participants only by their role and case institution, and at times,
withholding the description of a participant associated with a direct quotation in the study’s
findings.
Theoretical Framework
Cameron (1984) defined organization adaptation as “modifications or alterations in the
organization or its components in order to adjust to changes in the external environment” (p.
123). Organizational adaptation, conceptualized as an organization’s response to a disruption in
the external environment, differed from organizational development, which Cameron (1984)
defined as planned change motivated from inside the organization. Cameron’s (1984) research
identified four, organizational adaptation theoretical frameworks, each located on a continuum
and anchored by the level of importance each theory gave to the roles of the external
environment and internal organizational factors. Cameron (1984) argued that higher education
institutions in the postindustrial era, especially liberal arts colleges, were required to utilize all
four approaches to navigate the increasingly complex pressures of the external environment.
Population Ecology Model
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Cameron (1984) credited Aldrich (1979) with the conceptualization of the population
ecology model of organizational adaptation, and identified it as the model that gave the most
prominence to the role of the external environment in organizational adaptation. According to
Cameron (1984), Aldrich’s (1979) population ecology model attributed organizational survival
to the natural evolutionary development of characteristics that fit the environment rather than
internal action. Cameron (1984) argued that this model focused on population-level analysis of
long-term changes affecting organizations.
Aldrich (1979) first conceptualized population ecology by extending the principles of the
biological theory of natural selection to organization adaptation within their environments. The
model accepted the premise that organizations’ survival depended primarily on responding to
external environmental pressures caused by the nature and distribution of resources.
Organizations, operating under specific constraints that limit their actions and structures, aimed
to support a niche in the environment, which was made up of a “distinct combination of
resources and constraints that combine to support a specific organizational form” (p. 28). The
organizational forms that met the specific environmental criteria of a niche were in turn selected
to survive. Again, Aldrich’s (1979) model focused on analysis at the population level, using
organizational forms instead of individual organizations in the discussion, although the model
defined organizations as systems loosely “coupled” that had the “capability of changing their
activities and components” (p. 28).
The population ecology model, in an overarching sense, established the principle that
organizations naturally moved towards alignment with their environment, regardless of whether
this created a better or worse organization. The framework conceptualized a value-free analysis
of organizational adaptation, explaining only that organizations survived by increasing their
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fitness in their environment through a three-stage process of variation, selection, and retention
(Aldrich, 1979).
Variation between and within organizations provided materials that allowed the
environment to select organizational forms or structures that matched specific environmental
criteria. Once selected, mechanisms retained the selected organizational form or structure to
ensure its survival. This three-stage process –variation, selection, retention - often resulted in the
creation of new organizational forms, elimination of old ones, or modification of current
organizations, all with the aim of closer matching environmental criteria and needs (Aldrich,
1979).
Aldrich (1979) identified several types of variation between and within organizations.
Variation, defined as the organizational response to a stimulus, was the provocation for selection.
The model assumed that variation could be planned or unplanned and could come from within
the organization (i.e. management, restructuring, growth), from the external environment (i.e.
technology advances, change in social values), or could have existed between organizations,
especially when new organizations were introduced or when existing organizations changed their
structure. However, Aldrich (1979) argued that because organizations were heavily constrained,
and the external environment pressures were so prevalent, many organizations were capable of
only limited self-adaptation through strategic decision-making and were powerless against their
environment. Instead, most variation was the result of external circumstances.
Regardless of the source of variation, variation provided the opportunity for selection to
occur. Selection, which allowed organizations or aspects of organizations that met environmental
criteria to survive and eliminated others, could occur in three ways: selection or elimination of a
whole organization dependent on its ability to fit a niche, selection or elimination of specific
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organizational structures or activities, and retention of organizational structures or activities
within an organization over time. Aldrich’s (1979) model indicated that some organizations were
protected from the selection process by virtue of their position within an environment, such as
government protections of schools, hospitals, and large corporations. In addition, Aldrich (1979)
indicated that internal factors, such as high communication and cohesiveness, potentially
protected an organization from the selection process.
In the model’s final stage, selected organizational forms or structures were protected for
long-term preservation. Successful retention occurred through clear communication of
knowledge and records, standardization of an organization’s beliefs, values, and structures, and
power centralization. Aldrich (1979) also argued that retention was made stronger and variation
weaker when organizations perceived variations as especially risky or costly or both.
Through these three stages – variation, selection and retention – organizations evolved
and refined their operations to more closely match a specific niche dictated by the external
environment. According to Aldrich (1979) and Cameron (1984), an organization’s ability to
evolve and become more environmentally fit ultimately determined its survivability.
Consequently, this externally focused perspective highlighted meeting environmental needs as an
organization’s paramount concern.
Life Cycles Model
Cameron (1984) discussed the life cycles model framework of organizational adaptation
as a model that, similar to the population ecology model, emphasized the evolutionary adaptation
of organizations and the powerful role of the environment, but also acknowledged the internal
power of an organization to change its course of evolution. In general, this group of models
framed organizational adaptation as a four-stage process - entrepreneurial, collectivity,
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formalization and control, and structure elaboration and adaptation - through which, without
intervention, every organization moved. Movement through each stage depended on the
organization ability to overcome specific environmental challenges. While these challenges were
the same for all organizations, each organization determined its response and consequently the
rate and way it moved through these stages. Cameron (1984) argued that two specific aspects
made life cycles models less “deterministic” or automatic than the population ecology model (p.
127). First, organizations determined the speed of their overall development, and second, as
organizations matured and traveled through all four stages, they could begin the four-stage
process again as result of new environmental disruptions.
Quinn and Cameron (1983) reviewed nine life cycles models (Adizes, 1979; Downs,
1967; Greiner, 1972; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Kimberly, 1979; Lippitt & Schmidt, 1967; Lyden,
1975; Scott, 1971; Torbert, 1974) and provided a comprehensive framework for understanding
organizational adaptation. All nine models suggested similar patterns of actions and strategies
that predicted a specific track of development among organizations and their structures.
Quinn and Cameron (1983) identified these four life stages as the entrepreneurial stage,
the collectivity stage, the formalization and control stage, and the structure elaboration and
adaptation stage. The entrepreneurial stage characterized organizations that were focused on
niche development and were highly informal and creative. During this stage, organizations
engaged in early innovation and creativity and formed their niche. While little management
existed during this stage, the organization was highly involved in sharing ideas and acquiring
knowledge and resources. Quinn and Cameron’s (1983) entrepreneurial stage combined Adizes’s
(1979) courtship stage, described as a stage when an organization’s members created vision;
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Kimberly’s (1979) first stage, described as a time of ideology development and resource
acquisition; and Torbert’s (1974) fantasies stage.
In Quinn and Cameron’s (1983) collectivity stage, organizations focused on cultivating a
high level of investment, commitment, and unity among its members. During this stage,
information communication helped build rapport among members and the organization’s mission
and purpose were developed. Quinn and Cameron’s (1983) collectivity stage encompassed
Down’s (1967) rapid growth stage, Greiner’s (1972) creativity stage, Torbert’s (1974)
investment and determination stage, and Katz and Kahn’s (1978) primitive system stage.
In the third stage identified by Quinn and Cameron (1983), the formalization and control
stage, organizations focused on creating formal structures that solidified the norms and rules of
the organization. As Quinn and Cameron (1983) described it, the organization was focused on
stability and control, giving special attention to creating more efficient processes. This stage was
also described by Down’s (1967) deceleration stage, Lippitt and Schmitt’s (1967) youth stage,
Greiner’s (1972) direction stage, Torbert’s (1974) experiments stage, and Katz and Kahn’s
(1978) stable organization stage.
In the final structure elaboration and adaptation stage, Quinn and Cameron (1983)
identified organizations focused on decentralization of processes and on adapting to create
opportunities for additional growth. This stage reflected Lippitt and Schmidt’s (1967) maturity
stage; Greiner’s (1972) delegation, coordination, and collaboration stages; Torbert’s (1974)
openly chosen structure, foundational community, and liberating disciplines stages; and Katz and
Kahn’s (1978) elaborative supportive structures stage.
While Quinn and Cameron’s (1983) four-stage model assumed that all organizations
moved through these stages, it did not frame stages in terms of time. At each stage, the
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organization’s perspective and understanding of the changes and its actions were contingent on
how it perceived solutions to universal environmental challenges.
Resource Dependence Model
Cameron (1984) also identified the resource dependence model on the organizational
adaptation continuum. The resource dependence model postulated that organizational factors
rather than environmental pressures were the most prevalent factors affecting organizational
adaptation. Both the resource dependence model and the symbolic action model, to be discussed
in the following section, presumed that “organizations are not assumed to be at the mercy of an
immutable environment; rather, they can act and influence their environment” (Cameron, 1984,
p. 127). Cameron (1984) identified resource dependence model as one of several strategic choice
models that contextualized organizational adaptation in its environment but structured it within
the power of organizational action.
In the resource dependence model, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) conceptualized
organizational adaptation and survival as contingent on the organization’s ability to secure and
retain resources. According to this perspective, an organization acted within its environment and
with other organizations to acquire resources and control the distribution of resources; this
process created stress on the organization when excessive demand or limited supply of the
resource increased competition. An organization’s power was determined by its ability to secure
resources and control resources that it or other organizations needed. And survival was
determined by an organization’s ability to operate in its environment and negotiate resource
acquisition with other organizations. Consequently, organizations were principally focused on
securing resources.
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Since organizations depended on the environment for resources, an essential principle of
the resource dependence model asserted that organizational behavior must be examined in the
context of its environment. Even more, the model asserted that an organization’s environment
was not a singular objective experience; rather it was created through the organization’s
perception and interpretation of its surroundings and situation. In other words, an understanding
of how the organization interacted and assigned meaning to its environment was important when
examining organizational adaptation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Just as an organization made evaluations about its environment, the external environment
also evaluated the organization. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) defined this external assessment of
an organization’s performance as meeting the demands of its environment as organizational
effectiveness. By framing organizational effectiveness as an external judgment, Pfeffer and
Salancik’s (1978) resource dependence model made the question of organizational effectiveness
a “sociopolitical question” and “both an assessment of the usefulness of what is being done and
of the resources that are being consumed by the organization” (p. 11).
An organization’s capabilities to secure resources, maintain control over its actions, and
achieve organizational effectiveness were impacted by several external environmental realities in
this model. First, organizations operated under specific constraints, which restricted an
organization’s range of possible behaviors and potentially inhibited its ability to adapt.
Constraints included “physical realities, social influence, information and cognitive capacity, or
personal preference” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 15). Organizational constraints helped explain
the limited variation between organizations. Since virtually every organization was constrained,
only incremental adaptive measures were typically implemented, resulting in limited variation.
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Another factor influencing organizational adaptation was an organization’s level of
interdependency with other organizations. Interdependency occurred when an organization was
not fully independently capable of obtaining its resources. Interdependency was symbiotic,
which created benefits for both organizations simultaneously; or competitive, which created a
benefit for one organization at the expense of another; or both symbiotic and competitive.
Interdependency was either equal or unequal. Similarly, an organization’s level of dependence
was a consequence of the control and discretion it had over resources and the level of importance
of those resources to the organization. As a result, dependent organizations were often strongly
influenced by other organizations that controlled the resources they needed. Control of resources
was defined by actual possession, discretion over allocation or use, or by authority to regulate
access to or use of the resource (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
As part of the resource dependence model, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) listed several
conditions that outlined an organization’s likelihood to “comply with control attempts” (p. 44).
An organization was more likely to comply with a demand if one or more of the following
conditions were true: the organization understood the demand, the organization received a
resource from the demander, the resource the organization received from the demander was
critical to the organization’s operation and alternative resources were not available, the
organization did not control its own resources, the demander’s attempts to control the
organization did not conflict with other organizational demands, and the organization sought to
survive. An organization’s dependence on specific resources and interactions with other
organizations that exhibited different levels of power and control dictated its level of dependency
and affected its ability to secure and sustain resources, which was a key to survival (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978).
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In addition to these external realities, the resource dependence model of organizational
adaptation gave a significant focus to the power of managerial and internal organizational action.
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued, “constraints are not predestined or irreversible” (p. 18). In
fact, they argued that many of these constraints were the result of past decision-making, which
suggested that the context of an organization was often defined by the organization itself.
Managers were tasked with making sense of this context and acting to shape it while also
managing internal decisions about organizational interests, information, dependences, and
constraints. Ultimately, these decisions aimed toward legitimizing the organization in the
external context by balancing a desire for total organizational control and reducing the
unpredictability of securing resources.
More specifically, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) identified the managerial role of an
organization as a prime factor contributing to an organization’s ability to secure resources and
maintain control in its environment. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) listed three roles of a manager
in organization: symbolic, responsive, and discretionary. The symbolic role of a manager was
fulfilled when a manager served as a symbol for the organization and personalized its purpose
and activity. A symbolic role of a manger had a significant effect when the symbolism created
increased members’ perceptions of control and organizational stability. Second, the responsive
role of a manager was satisfied when a manager successfully aligned the organization’s activities
and structures with the demands and needs of the external environment. And finally, the
discretionary role of a manger was fulfilled when the manager extended his or her responsive
role, and not only responded, but also altered the environmental context in which it existed to
better fit the activities and structures of the organization. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)
acknowledged that an organization’s size was an important factor when considering how much
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the last managerial role would actually affect organizational adaptation. In a general sense, these
three roles were not mutually exclusive; rather, managers were often required to fulfill all three
roles interchangeably to maintain a successful organization.
Symbolic Action Model
Finally, Cameron (1984) identified the symbolic action model as the model that most
highlighted internal organizational factors as the prevalent factors affecting organizational
adaptation. The model, as presented by Pfeffer (1981), was based on a cognitive approach that
presumed an organization’s reality was socially constructed. The model centralized the role of
generating, upholding, and in some cases, changing, shared meanings as the primary mechanism
for organizational adaptation. With this assumption, the critical task for organizations was to
create shared meanings and organizational identity through symbolic actions, which included
language, rituals, and culture. By creating shared meaning, organizational leadership justified
and explained organization activity among its members, which increased commitment and
participation. In addition, by creating shared meaning that aligned with the wider social values
and expectations, organizational leadership legitimized the organization in the wider external
environment. Consequently, the symbolic action model assumed the premise that organizations
ensured their survival by creating consensus of shared meaning and reconciling it when it
interacted and competed with the other organizations and their shared meanings (Cameron,
1984).
The model also accepted the premise that organizations were made up of individuals who
maintained a set of values and expectations and who had a need to understand the world around
them. Further, individuals sought to establish stability and predictability through their actions,
which gave them a sense of power and motivated them to contribute to and act in the system.
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The model also accepted that individuals understand that certain constraints on the organization
will inhibit certain action, but that individuals sought to limit constraints. As a result of these
premises, organizations were more than just their resources or constraints; they were systems of
shared meanings that explained their resources and constraints to their internal members and
external contexts. Thus, they had the power to adapt to their environment and shape it (Cameron,
1984).
The symbolic action model differed from strategic action models because it contended
that meaning was more relevant than specific action. In fact, Pfeffer (1981) argued, “actions
themselves are principally the result of fundamental resource interdependencies and other
environment imperatives confronting the organizations” (p. 5). These relationships largely,
although not exclusively, predicted action. However, the significant power of effect lied with
symbolic actions that assigned value and meaning to the actions themselves. These symbolic
actions communicated critical information to internal members and external constituencies who
assigned meaning to the organization and influenced its survival through their commitment and
investment.
In summary, Cameron (1984) added that the symbolic action model assumed that each
organization, as a prerequisite of survival had, “an interest in seeing its definition of reality
accepted in to the larger social context” (p. 26). By using strategies of adaptation that included
assigning meaning to historical events, using rituals, creating or modifying physical space, and
coining simple phrases that demonstrated overarching values and principles, organizational
leadership guided internal members and external constituents to reach consensus on an
organization’s identity and purpose, accepting it into the environment and working to preserve its
existence.
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Cameron (1984) argued that all four approaches were necessary for institutions to achieve
a level of adaptation that meets the future demands of the external environment, driven mainly
by economic and sociopolitical forces. The population ecology approach, which acknowledged
the pervasiveness of the environment on the organization, demonstrated the critical need for
institution to be attuned to the needs of the environment. The life cycles model outlined a general
path of evolutionary development for the organization and provided a framework for
organizational planning. This model also allowed for discretion regarding how organizations
responded to the environmental precipitators at each stage. The resource dependence model and
other strategic choice approaches, still acknowledged the pervasiveness of the environment, but
highlighted the organizational power to adapt through using information to make deliberate
choices about its structures and actions. And finally, the symbolic action approach, guided
organizations to focus specifically on the shared meaning attached to organizational action and
structure as a key strategy for survival.
Cybernetics Model
In addition to Cameron’s (1984) four models of organizational adaptation, Birnbaum
(1988) applied organizational adaptation models to university and college operations and created
a more theoretical-practical hybrid guide to organizational adaptation. His work aimed at aiding
administrators and leaders in thinking deeper and more diversely about their organizations and
how to improve their institutions and their organizational performance.
In a general sense, he argued that any kind of social system were largely “symbolic” and
“exist because we believe in them” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 1). Echoing Cameron’s (1984) premise
of shared meaning in the symbolic action model, Birnbaum (1988) established that “the
important thing about colleges and universities is not the choices that administrators are
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presumed to make but the agreement people reach about the nature of reality” (Birnbaum, 1988,
p. 2). He furthered this argument by examining the dualism of control and power in higher
education and the multiplicity of institutional missions as universities and colleges become more
“diverse, fragmented, specialized, and connected with other social systems.” He said, “the
problem is not that institutions cannot identify their goal but rather they simultaneously embrace
a large number of conflicting goals” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 11). Within this context of dualism of
authority and unclear goals, he argued that leadership was even more difficult in higher
education settings than in other organizational and business settings.
To further illuminate the study of organizational adaptation within higher education,
Birnbaum (1988) integrated several models in his review and suggested that universities and
colleges address organizational adaptation as “cybernetic organizations” (p. 177). In short, he
said that organizations responded to criticism and regulated themselves through “self-correcting
mechanisms that monitor organizational functions and provide attention cues, or negative
feedback, to participants when things are not going well” (p. 179). Self-correction was dependent
on organizations’ views of themselves and their reality. Within the organizations, groups
established rules, or constraints, for each other and subsystems created protocols that
standardized operations. Additionally, organizational members prioritized these constraints and
standards, which essentially defined an organization’s goals and activities. For Birnbaum (1988),
this process was a zero-sum game, with the importance of one goal essentially limiting the focus
of another.
In terms of adaptation and change, Birnbaum (1988) argued that when factors within
organizations reached objectionable levels, subunits sought solutions, and if a particular solution
worked, the organization retained the strategy. However, like the population ecology model,
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Birnbaum (1988) acknowledged that an organization’s stability was largely dependent on its
established norms, making change quite difficult to implement.
Additionally, changes to subunits often created reverberating, and often unintended,
effects for other subunits. Birnbaum (1988) defined the degree to which a change in one subunit
directly affected another subunit as the level of coupling – “tight” or “loose” (p. 35). Coupling
depended on both the degree to which subunits had common variables and the degree to which
those variables were important to the subunit. Birnbaum (1988) described benefits and
drawbacks for both types of coupling. More specifically, loosely coupled organizations allowed
for more decentralized and independent subunits with more focused operations, which
potentially allowed organizations to be more responsive to the external environment, while
tightly coupled organizations were setup to be more efficient and maintained a higher level of
shared meaning. Further, in relation to environmental changes, Birnbaum (1988) predicted that
“a major change in any subsystem, or in the environment, can be expected to have a marked
effect on any other subsystem to which is relatively tightly coupled and a weaker or less
predictable effect if there is loose coupling” (p. 41).
Finally, Birnbaum (1988) defined effective leadership in cybernetic organizations as
leaders who closely monitored and corrected institutional operations in an ongoing process and
facilitated “subtle interventions, rather than engage[d] in dramatic attempts to radically change
institutional functioning” (p. 197). However, he provided two exceptions that called for a more
commanding approach; first, if the institution experienced a sudden disruption caused by the
external environment, or second, if the organization did not maintain an acceptable level of
performance and no established subunit could fix it (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 198). Still, Birnbaum
(1988) reiterated, “administrators must be careful not to overcorrect” (p. 199).
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Chapter Summary
Liberal arts colleges, America’s longest existing education institutions, faced new
environmental pressures in the twenty-first century that challenged their niche, their mission,
their operations, and their survival. College constituencies sought to employ adaptive strategies
that allowed these institutions to respond to the environmental pressures caused or exacerbated
by the changing economy and the Great Recession of 2007 while also allowing the institutions to
maintain its identity and operations. The current study’s purpose was to understand how private
liberal arts colleges adapted during the Great Recession of 2007 by examining institutional
changes at three private liberal arts colleges and their effects on the institutions’ operations. The
study gave specific attention to liberal arts colleges located in the southeastern region of the
United States. By framing this examination within the broader liberal arts college historical
context and by applying the theoretical frameworks outlined by Cameron (1984) and Birnbaum
(1988) in this chapter, the current study intended to provide new insight into the organizational
adaptation of these institutions.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The breadth and depth of scholarly research relevant to the current study indicated the
significance of the research topic. A thorough review of the most prevalent literature in the field
served to inform the current study’s purpose. In order to ensure a methodical analysis and
concise presentation of the research, the following chapter is organized into several subsections
that highlight the themes within liberal arts college research that were pertinent to the current
study. The review begins with a historical overview of liberal arts colleges and their declining
trends during the last century; continues with an examination of challenges that these institutions
faced, including financial, operational, perceptual, and demand obstacles; and concludes with a
review of adaptive strategies employed by liberal arts colleges, which emphasized the role of
identity and mission, religion, external factors, and internal leadership in organizational
adaptation.
I located the sources used in Chapter II by accessing several online academic databases Ebsco Academic Premier, Journal Storage, ProQuest Direct, and Education Resources
Information Center - through the University of Arkansas Libraries’ website. The initial database
search used the following search terms: (liberal education) AND (adapta*) OR (surviv*) AND
(higher education), and was limited to peer-reviewed articles. Additionally, I conducted a
broader search using the following search terms: (humanistic education) AND (higher
education), also limited to peer-reviewed articles. I reviewed all article abstracts for relevance to
the study, which I alone determined. In addition to these database searches, I conducted a
University of Arkansas Libraries catalog search, using the search term (liberal arts). Again, I
determined the relevance of each source based on a review of its abstract and table of contents.
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Finally, I followed source leads discovered through reading citations and reference lists of
initially secured sources.
A Brief History of the Small, Private Liberal Arts College
Higher education in the United States began with the establishment of the American
liberal arts college. For nearly 200 years following the opening of Harvard College in 1636,
America’s first educational institution, the country embraced liberal arts education as the
education model for its society. And even later, when new institutional types and educational
approaches emerged in the 19th century, liberal arts remained an American ornament. Today,
many researchers have argued that liberal arts colleges are models for all of education and that
the education they provide is essential for the nation to maintain an economic edge and a
democratic society (AACU, 2007; Hersh, 1999). Still, the rapid advancement of America’s
economy has challenged America’s liberal arts college to keep itself relevant, requiring it to
constantly adapt and remold itself to meet societal needs while striving to uphold its mission and
purpose. Era after era, these colleges have attempted to provide education measured on
intellectual growth and development of moral principle with subordinated regard for cultivating
economic power or mobility.
Schmidt’s (1957) book, The Liberal Arts College, recounted the birth of the liberal
learning tradition that began with the October 28, 1636 Massachusetts Bay Colony court ruling
that allocated funds towards a college for its people. Most of Harvard’s founders were educated
at Cambridge in England, an institution that embraced the English liberal arts tradition, which
focused on Puritan teaching in a residential learning community geared towards clergy
education. Though the colonists closely identified with this tradition, they also had an
understanding of other European approaches to education, among them, the ancient Roman and
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Greek elitist tradition of classics study and the European university traditions. Together, their
understanding of these approaches along with their aspirations for a new and free society created
a distinctive vision among America’s leaders, something wholly new and different (Schmidt,
1957).
Thelin’s (2004) account outlined the new parameters colonists set for Harvard and many
other succeeding institutions, including the self-governing and independent college unit, which
was much different from England’s approach that required colleges to depend on a university
charter’s authority. Early American leaders also formed an external board to govern the
institution rather than following the English approach that gave the faculty ruling power. Finally,
instead of upholding the European principles of the university and specialized study, the
American curriculum focused on residential, liberal learning. This new form of education was
indeed uniquely American. As Thelin (2004) wrote, “…the American colleges of the colonial era
were remarkable and complex, a hybrid of legacies, transplants, deliberate plans, and unintended
adaptations” (p. 11). Harvard, the first American college, connected the old and the new, and
allowed colonists to retain tradition while establishing its own approach to education. For more
than 60 years, Harvard operated as America’s first and only higher education institution.
Eventually Yale and the College of William and Mary were established at the turn of the
18th century followed by College of Philadelphia, the College of New Jersey, King’s College, the
College of Rhode Island, Queen’s College, and Dartmouth College. Thelin (2004) described
these early colonial colleges as institutions with a dependency on both public and private funding
sources, low-paid faculty who served several functions, small enrollments made up of elitist
students, and flexible admissions and retention expectations. The colonial commitment to
funding education was sincere but lacking; taxes and subsidies helped fund operations, but they
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were very modest, especially when compared to European education appropriations.
Consequently, tuition and donations played a much larger role for the American institution,
introducing new challenges to this distinctive educational model (Thelin, 2004). In addition,
though many early colleges were established by Protestant denominations that were motivated to
settle colleges as a mechanism for charity and to earn God’s favor, churches were rarely able to
promise sustainable funding. Instead, they maintained an administrative commitment to low
tuition and provided financial aid for poor and high-achieving students (Thelin, 2004). Early
curriculum was broad-based and included oratory and debate and a focus on classics, science,
and Christian virtue. Students engaged in discussions and debates with mentors inside and
outside the college creating an ongoing learning experience (Thelin, 2004). And finally, with no
formal primary or secondary education system in early America, admissions requirements to
these colleges were flexible with little emphasis given to completing degree programs, even
though graduation was one of the colony’s most noteworthy events.
By the mid-1750s, the reputation of the college temporarily lost its relevance and became
known as distant and elite, taking on a more secularized reputation. But by 1770, republicanism
and political rhetoric became popular to American life and central to the American college,
making liberal arts relevant once again. As Thelin (2004) wrote, college was viewed in this era
as an “insurance policy” for society, working to educate a reserve of leaders who could think,
read, and write well (p. 26). Thelin (2004) argued that it proved to be a successful approach;
numerous Harvard graduates helped lead the American Revolution.
Schmidt (1957) suggested that colleges did not become full-fledged universities during
this time because they lacked the resources to do so; others argued it was a decision made on the
basis of tradition and educational philosophy. Whatever the case, for more than 100 years,
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American education embraced a liberal arts college tradition. And while the colleges’ impact was
limited, serving a very small percentage of the population, Rudolph (1990) claimed that they
provided an important stabilizing factor, creating “a sense of unity” where “there might
otherwise be aimlessness and uncontrolled diversity” (p. 13).
Following the American Revolution, the number, types, enrollments, and impact of
colleges grew significantly. Social and economic advances, increase in church and piety, little
regulation, and a culture characterized by growth and progress encouraged the founding of new
colleges nationwide. The new national government had no money and was in no position to
dictate a centralized education plan so it left the structure and management of higher education
up to state and local communities. In the spirit of a young and brave country riding on the winds
of newly found freedom, communities established colleges with great energy, but without a
centralized, consistent, controlled approach (Schmidt, 1957).
While these institutions widely varied, they did share a few common characteristics. It
seemed as if financial authority and decision-making responsibilities belonged both to everyone
and to no one at these institutions. Colleges, though chartered by communities, operated as a
private-public hybrid that depended on business, government and politicians, churches, alumni,
trustees, and individual households to make ends meet. And when any of these stakeholders
invested in the college, their investment usually came with the expectation of having a voice at
the table, which often complicated the college’s mission and operations. The formal
establishment of the board of trustees served to meet these expectations and keep the community
invested in colleges nationwide (Schmidt, 1957).
Churches also played an important role in the establishment and growth of dozens of
institutions in the 1800s. The church’s interest in founding colleges dated back to the
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Reformation when education was seen as a way to secure members, promote social justice, and
promote denominational community presence. The church influenced institutions in many ways ministers often served as administrative leaders, many charters were church-affiliated, and as late
as 1850, a quarter of many prestigious institutions’ alumni went into the ministry (Schmidt,
1957). Some institutions, like Yale, were even founded by one denomination to ensure that
another denomination did not corrupt young minds at a neighboring institution. And finally, the
degree to which colleges mandated religious practice on campus varied and was usually a
consequence of the era’s social and political mood. For instance, during the Great Awakening,
the bible was the most important book in the academic curriculum, but in pre- and postRevolutionary times, patriotism trumped piety, and by the early 19th century, secularism led to a
permanent shift in the college that limited institutional religious practice (Schmidt, 1957).
Thelin’s (2004) account of the “college-building era” described the enormity of growth
during this period (p. 41). Schmidt (1957) also noted that higher education was a microcosm of
the larger society, expanding rapidly with a great sense of optimism. The number of institutions
grew from 11 in 1790 to 240 in 1869. Perhaps to the detriment of the traditional American liberal
arts college, the era saw a significant diversification of institutional types that included hilltop
colleges, denominational colleges, technical and professional schools, and the military and naval
academies. This proliferation of higher education was seen as a mechanism for achieving a
vision of increased access to college. As the president of Amherst noted early in the 19th century,
these colleges were meant to create a place where “the rich and poor not only meet together, but
they commence their intellectual struggle under the full knowledge of the fact that no hereditary
dignity or interested wealth…can entitle to special privileges and honors, nor repress the
aspirations of genius” (Schmidt, 1957, p. 18).
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It is worth noting, that historians debated the sustainability of this era’s growth. Schmidt
(1957) characterized this era as one with high mortality rates. He reported that half of the
institutions that opened between 1770 and 1860 eventually failed. Burke (1982) and McLachlan
(1978), on the other hand, both disputed the findings, citing research that indicated an
institutional survival rate of approximately 80%. Thelin (2004) argued that these small colleges
were resilient and adaptable and that the hype of the 1950s and 1960s surrounding the decline of
liberal arts colleges colored Schmidt’s (1957) and others’ findings. In either case, one thing is
not debated: this expansion era of American higher education increased competition for small,
private liberal arts colleges nationwide. Newly established institutions, embedded in
communities nationwide, took on distinct identities that led to the great diversification of higher
education institutional type and approach.
With more diverse approaches to higher education and a changing economic landscape,
conversations about educational purpose and curriculum reform became a major debate in the
early 1800s. As a result, a document produced by the Yale Corporation in 1828 that assessed the
curriculum of the college for which they held the charter, Yale College, articulated their case for
retaining a liberal arts curriculum. The report was credited with maintaining liberal arts
education dominance for another 30 years, and today is revered as one of the most significant
historical documents in the history of American higher education (Pak, 2008; Rudolph, 1990;
Schmidt, 1957).
Liberal educators, at least those who contributed to the Yale Report (1828), asserted that
professional education was only a partial education and was not meant to be the focus of higher
education. Instead, higher education’s purpose was to focus on the areas of study not learned
elsewhere, on teaching students the process of learning, and on principles that were common to
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all professions and to life. They argued that while education was not focused on preparing
students for professional careers it was completely useful to any professional career. Learning
the underlying laws of life, the theories of man, and the craft of communicating were essential to
everyone. In addition, the report reaffirmed the belief that higher education should be accessible
by more than the privileged few and that specialized education is a noble venture for those who
seek education beyond four years of college (Yale Report, 1828).
While the Yale Report (1828) reinforced the principles of liberal arts education, the
middle and late 19th century marked a phase of transition away from liberal education in
American education. The 1862 and 1890 Morrill Acts, which established and funded state land
grant institutions for the purpose of expanding agriculture and mechanical arts, demonstrated a
new national priority (Rudolph, 1990). In 1885, Charles William Eliot, then-president of Harvard
University, advocated for student choice in curriculum decisions, coining the popular term
“elective” (The Elective System, 1885). And finally, the American university movement began
with the opening of Cornell University in 1869 and Johns Hopkins University in 1876. These
bigger and more complex institutions of learning focused on providing an array of majors and
courses, graduate education and professional schools, practical knowledge in science, and more
and better facilities. These developments shifted the trajectory of higher education towards an
increased focus on vocationalism and practical application (Thelin, 2004). For the first time in a
century, the traditional American liberal arts college was challenged. Schmidt (1957) described
this change as a time when “American opinion and money would no longer support one brand of
higher education” (p. 58).
The birth of the 20th century swung the pendulum toward the university, as it became the
dominant institution in the higher education world. Schmidt (1957) pointed to a continued
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sophistication of the economy as well as movement towards secularism and anti-intellectualism
as the forces behind the pendulum swing. In addition, enrollment grew 4 times as fast as the
nation’s population growth rate between 1879 and 1910 (Schmidt, 1957). With more students
and more money, institutions expanded. With established public schools and graduate schools,
admissions to universities and colleges became more standardized and so did the procedures and
policies that governed academics and faculty, which formalized academic freedom, credit hours,
and course catalogs. Universities placed special emphasis on developing graduate and
professional education, enhancing student services and facilities, increasing major offerings, and
eliminating traditions of mandated study time and mealtime, which created more time for
extracurricular activities. At colleges, religiosity and in loco parentis were tamed, and the
president’s role became more externally focused and less of a multipurpose internal headmaster.
Schmidt (1957) described this trend as an “expansion of size, standardization of practices,
diversification of functions, and multiplication of extracurricular activities” (p. 182). And while
the liberal arts and vocational curriculum debate was re-popularized in historically black colleges
and universities by Booker T. Washington and W.E.B Dubois, the conversation did not continue
with the same zeal it had earlier in the century. Many simply believed that the private, small
liberal arts college would not survive (Schmidt, 1957).
Leslie (2011) also elaborated on university expansion and professionalized education in
the late 1800s, providing somewhat of a different perspective. She argued that as medical and
law schools in America standardized practices during this era, students moved away from
apprenticeships and proprietary education and towards a liberal arts education that mixed
intellectual variety in the first two years with specialization in the last two. By the 1900s,
graduate schools required or at least strongly suggested that students attain an undergraduate
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degree before admission. Leslie (2011) argued that this shift took place both because colleges,
and particularly liberal arts education, had a favorable reputation at the time, and scientific
advances created a new respect for scientific expertise and licensing. In short, going to college
had become a rite of passage. Similarly, by 1900, most seminaries required at least a year of
college with almost half requiring degree. By 1915, 80% of seminaries listed one year of college
or more as an admission requirement (Leslie, 2011). By World War I, college science or a
bachelor’s degree was required for some medical schools. Finally, by 1940, most law schools
had also come into line with this approach.
But Rudolph (1990) pointed to the World War I and World War II eras as uncertain times
for higher education. The market collapsed, enrollments were inconsistent, and the youth were
critical of the world, as they knew it. It appeared that higher education lost its direction, a critical
view that allowed new ideas to be considered more than times before. John Dewey’s theoretical
framework for experiential learning was finally given attention during this period. In an
unpredictable world, education that linked to experience and the wider society made sense to
many. Dewey’s (1921) work, Democracy and Education, encouraged the development of
interdisciplinary studies such as American Civilization and American Studies that investigated
the interconnectedness of human society. Rudolph (1990) wrote about this era and argued that,
for the first time, higher education took note that “the world lay in chaos perhaps exactly because
there were too many specialists, too many scientists, too many engineers, and not enough men
prepared to think widely and wisely, prepared to consider subtleties, connections, the whole
fabric of emotions, institutions, decisions, values, and traditions that defined the modern man”
(p. 470).
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Beginning in the 1920s and continuing throughout World War II, America committed
itself to making education a social and financial mobility resource for the majority of Americans.
This commitment, along with a public attraction to the charm of college and increased wealth in
America, helped establish growing enrollments in higher education. Enrollment climbed from
5% to 15% between 1917 and 1937 (Thelin, 2004). More notably, the most dramatic era of
growth came after World War II with the implementation of several federal policies that together
democratized higher education. The Serviceman’s Readjustment Act, signed by President
Roosevelt in 1944, helped the nation shift from wartime to peacetime by providing veterans and
their families with employment and educational opportunity. As part of the plan, veterans were
entitled to attend college using government aid; an entitlement that more than 7 million veterans
embraced. The legislation benefited higher education by opening the doors wider and eliminating
the perception and reality that college was meant for the wealthy, but it also created great
challenges for the institutions. Many universities doubled their enrollment within three years,
creating enormous financial and facility pressure. In addition, government aid was directed
primarily towards vocationally-focused programs causing curriculum priorities to be largely
determined by the government and its funding (Thelin, 2004).
Additionally, the President’s Commission Report 1947 – Higher Education for
Democracy (1947), released at the direction of President Truman, provided an outline of higher
education’s broadest objectives and most difficult challenges during this time period as evaluated
by a specially appointed presidential panel of educators and national leaders. The report remains
one of the most influential documents in higher education in the 20th century and served to
increase the role of the federal government in higher education (President’s Commission Report
1947 - Higher Education for Democracy, 1947).
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Heralding the advancement of democracy as the chief role of education, the commission
highlighted, first and foremost, the institution’s social role in preparing citizens for participation
in American government. This social role included two paramount responsibilities: first, the
report boldly stated that higher education should be made available to everyone and that
removing barriers that deny access should be a priority, and second, the report addressed the
responsibility for higher education to keep up with the current needs and rapid changes of the
country and ensure that education remained applicable to the average American citizen
(President’s Commission Report 1947 - Higher Education for Democracy, 1947).
As the report forecasted, the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were decades of enormous growth
in higher education; enrollments skyrocketed from 2 million students in 1945 to 11 million
students in 1975 (Thelin, 2004). The number of community colleges tripled from 1950 to 1970,
and by the 1980s, two-year colleges accounted for 40% of college enrollments (Reuben &
Perkins, 2007). In addition to the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act and the President’s
Commission Report, the federal government made sweeping changes to higher education
characterized by equal opportunity legislation including the 1964 Civil Rights Act; the 1965
Higher Education Act; the establishment of Pell Grants; the enacting of Title IX, which banned
federal funding from schools that practiced discrimination on the basis of race or sex; and United
States Supreme Court rulings that upheld affirmative action in admissions policies (Reuben &
Perkins, 2007). The “more than forty-fold” increase in state expenditures for higher education
during the three decades after the report’s release further indicated that, at least for a time, the
federal and state government acknowledged their responsibility to fund these democratic aims of
education (Reuben & Perkins, 2007, p. 269).
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Breneman (1994) stated that the second half of the 20th century was one of the most
shaping eras in history for higher education, especially for liberal arts colleges. The 1960s golden
years of higher education saw institutions nationwide experience significant growth in
enrollment, revenue, and expenditures, and even many small and private liberal arts colleges
operated with a surplus. However, the landscape drastically changed within a few short years.
Enrollments dropped as a result of baby boomers entering the workforce and exiting higher
education; both the number and types of institutions grew with many larger institutions
establishing small honors colleges that mimicked private liberal arts colleges and creating new
competition; and even though revenue dropped with enrollments, expenditures remained at a
consistently high level. In short, costs continued to rise and tuition, the primary revenue
generator at liberal arts colleges, hit a ceiling marked by what the prospective student was
willing or able to pay. To make matters worse, the economy stuttered, inflation hit double-digits,
unemployment rose, and energy costs increased. Quickly, schools found themselves operating in
the red. These challenges had an especially dire effect on liberal arts colleges. Private liberal arts
colleges’ budgets depended primarily on tuition dollars, which decreased significantly when
enrollment dropped and endowments suffered. As a result, private colleges provided more
institutional aid to students to encourage them to enroll, which further increased budget
expenditures (Breneman, 1994).
Similarly, Thelin (2004) described the 1970s as an era in higher education characterized
by a decline in confidence, lack of planning, inconclusive findings about the nature and condition
of higher education, overextended budgets, proliferation of programming, declining enrollments
due to demographic shifts, increased federal oversight, decreased federal aid, stagflation, and a
loss of instructional distinction resulting from institutions trying to be all things to all people.
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There was a noticeable shift in student demand with many flocking to professional and
vocational programs and perceiving a college education as a career preparation credential. In
short, though American higher education was more expansive and accessible than ever, it was
also a “troubled giant” (Thelin, 2004, p. 318). By 1971, the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching labeled this new era, the “new depression of higher education”
characterized by a new phenomenon: “the cost-income squeeze” (Cheit, 1971, p. 1).
With the help of strong fiscal policies and the 1972 Education Amendments that
expanded student aid through Pell Grants, work-study, and federal student loans, higher
education experienced a renewed energy and small liberal arts colleges were given an extra
boost. In addition, enrollment projections did not drop as significantly as originally believed. In
fact, they eventually rebounded during the 1980s creating additional revenue. Though enrollment
increases in private liberal arts colleges were modest at best, public institutions were forced to
raise tuition as a result of decreased state appropriations, which made private education more
competitive. And overall, the value of the college degree increased dramatically between 1970
and 1986 (Breneman, 1994). As a result of the turbulent economy and the unpredictability of
other revenue sources, higher education grew its marketing and fundraising practices during this
era and focused on honing in on its niche. For private liberal arts colleges, most revenue areas endowments, private giving, and tuition - all increased during this decade. However, researchers
noted the increased role of the federal government in education, even private education, as the
one major tradeoff for all the progress during this decade.
A Historical Decline in Liberal Arts Colleges
Against this backdrop of American higher education history, researchers noted the
decline in liberal arts education throughout the 20th and twenty-first centuries, both in enrollment
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numbers and percentages as well as in numbers of small, private liberal arts colleges.
Specifically, Zammuto (1985) and Breneman (1994) examined trends in liberal arts colleges’
survivability, including institutional rates of decline and transition.
First, Zammuto’s (1985) study investigated the question: “Are the liberal arts
endangered?” After several years of financial and enrollment challenges, Zammuto’s (1985)
study assessed if liberal arts colleges were surviving. Using two separate institutional data sets,
one from 1970-71 (2,881 institutions) and one from 1980-1981 (3,266 institutions), Zammuto
(1985) divided institutions into one of three categories: liberal arts institutions, categorized by
awarding 80% or more of their degrees in liberal arts; comprehensive institutions, categorized by
awarding between 21% and 79% of their degrees in liberal arts; or professional institutions,
categorized by awarding 20% or less of their degrees in liberal arts. While Zammuto (1985)
acknowledged that the selected parameters were arbitrary, research indicated that changing these
parameters by 5% or 10% did not significantly change the results. In addition to program
emphasis, Zammuto (1985) classified institutions by institutional control (public or private),
levels of highest degree offered (two-year, bachelors, or graduate), and enrollment size (small,
1000 or less; medium, between 1001 and 2500; or large, 2500 or more).
Zammuto’s (1985) findings indicated that the most significant growth during the 1970s
occurred in professional institutions; these institutions increased from 25.6% in 1970-1971 to
37.2% in 1980-1981 while the number of liberal arts colleges decreased from 18.9% to 10.5%.
Also during this period, more liberal arts colleges merged, closed, or transitioned to professional
schools than new liberal arts colleges opened, leading Zammuto (1985) to conclude that the
decade was characterized by an overall attrition of liberal arts institutions. Of the 507 institutions
Zammuto (1985) classified as liberal arts institutions in 1970-1971, 37 transitioned into a
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different program emphasis while 69 failed, which was defined as “closure, merger with another
institution, or by no longer meeting the criteria for inclusion by the Higher Education General
Information Survey (HEGIS) Universe,” by 1980-1981.
While this was obviously meaningful to the liberal arts sector of higher education,
Zammuto (1985) argued that the decrease in presence of liberal arts colleges also affected all of
higher education. Zammuto (1985) argued that a diversity of institutional types in higher
education protected the entire sector against failure in turbulent times of decline. In short,
diversity was insurance, and in this case, the more evenly institutions were dispersed over
possible institutional types, the more balanced, the more diverse, the stronger the overall system
was, especially when the external environment threatened operations. To further analyze the
diversity of the field, Zammuto (1985) used his classification system based on percentage of
liberal arts degrees awarded, institutional control, levels of highest degree offered, and
enrollment size; and identified 108 possible institutional types, 36 of which were classified as
liberal arts institutions.
Zammuto’s (1985) examination of the frequency distributions of these institutional types
led him to conclude that, both in terms of all higher education institutions and specifically for
liberal arts institutions, there was an unequal distribution of institutional types and limited
diversity in the system. In both data sets, one from 1970-71 and one from 1980-1981,
approximately half of all liberal arts institutions were clustered in three of its 36 institutional
types and approximately half of all higher education institutions were clustered in nine of the
total 108 institutional types. While Zammuto (1985) argued that the distribution of liberal arts
colleges remained relatively stable between 1970 and 1980, indicating that liberal arts colleges
were not dying at an alarming rate, he also argued that the limited diversity of the entire higher
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education system presented a threat to the sector. Zammuto (1985) argued that diversifying
higher education increased the overall resilience of the entire higher education field. Thus, the
entire system was better off for it if it protected and preserved liberal arts institutions.
Ten years after Zammuto’s (1985) study, Breneman (1994) gave special attention to the
survivability of small, private liberal arts colleges during the second half of the 20th century in
his widely cited work, Liberal Arts Colleges: Thriving, Surviving, Endangered?. Breneman
(1994) examined the popular perception that liberal arts colleges were dying and, over time,
would be eliminated at a faster rate than other types of institutions due to their increased
financial pressures and limited market. His comprehensive work was the first of its kind. Using
data from College Board, National Center for Higher Education Management Systems, Williams
Project on the Economics of Higher Education, Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching’s classification system, and 12 liberal arts college on-site visits, Breneman (1994)
sought to detect trends in liberal arts colleges and their adaptability during significant market
fluctuation.
Breneman (1994) first examined the 1987 Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching’s list of classified liberal arts colleges, which included two subcategories. Liberal Arts
I colleges were generally highly selective institutions that awarded primarily undergraduate
degrees with more than half of them in arts and sciences, and Liberal Arts II colleges were
generally less selective colleges that awarded primarily undergraduate degrees with less than half
of these degrees in arts and sciences. Breneman (1994) argued that genuine liberal arts colleges
should award no less than 40% of their degrees in liberal arts fields, and in the first phase of his
study, imposed this restriction on the list of 540 Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching-classified liberal arts institutions.
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Of these 540 institutions, Breneman (1994) found that 314 Liberal Arts II colleges and
five Liberal Arts I colleges did not meet the 40% liberal arts degree conferment restriction.
Additionally, he found that Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching-classified
Liberal Arts I colleges’ professional degree conferment had increased from 11% to 24% between
1972 to 1988 while Liberal Arts II colleges increased their professional degree conferment from
41% to 64% during the same time frame. While the shift from liberal arts towards professional
degrees occurred in both subdivisions, it was more pronounced among the less selective Liberal
Arts II schools.
Simply stated, by the early 1990s, there were only 200 liberal arts colleges that awarded
less than 60% of their degrees in professional fields and there were less than 90 colleges that
awarded less than 25% of their degrees in professional areas. Breneman (1994) concluded that
many of these institutions transitioned into professional schools during the 1970s and 1980s to
meet student demands and maintain enrollment while still posturing themselves as liberal arts
colleges, allowing them to escape a public makeover that might have hurt their reputations. He
argued that many of these Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching-classified
liberal arts schools were really baccalaureate degree granting institutions, forecasting the 2005
revamp of the Carnegie Classification.
Breneman (1994) defined liberal arts colleges in both an educational and economic sense.
Educationally, liberal arts colleges awarded bachelor-level degrees, were residential mainly
enrolling full-time, traditional-aged college students, and limited the number of majors to 25
fields in the arts, humanities, language, social sciences and physical sciences. Enrollment in
these institutions was usually between 800 and 1800 students. From an economic standpoint,
Breneman (1994) described the liberal arts institution as one that was typically private and
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maintained balanced cost-revenue models. These institutions did not receive institutional federal
or state appropriated funds, and primarily depended on tuition, endowment earnings, and annual
fundraising for revenue. Costs and tuition were typically high and often exceeded the public
option as a result of providing personalized education that required extensive labor and physical
resources.
Additionally, Breneman (1994) stated that liberal arts colleges typically provided
unfunded student aid out of their institutional budget to serve one of two diverging needs. First,
highly selective liberal arts colleges, as measured by the ratio of the number of admitted students
to the number of applicants, typically used unfunded student aid as a way to diversify the student
body and provide opportunities to students who were not capable of paying part or all of tuition.
These schools had enough demand to require all students to pay full price and still fill its
enrollment slots, but they prioritized diversity as an initiative worthy of institutional funding. On
the other hand, less selective liberal arts institutions used unfunded student aid to attract enough
students to meet their enrollment targets. As a result of these strategies, gross tuition was not a
meaningful measurement of operational revenue for these institutions; rather net-tuition, which
equated to the advertised price less institutional aid, was the primary indicator used when
assessing an institution’s financial status (Breneman, 1994). Breneman (1994) argued that it was
important to understand liberal arts colleges from both an educational and economic perspective
since the pressures to provide more or different curriculum offerings and to expand student
services were both educational and economic in nature.
With these operational characteristics in mind and with consideration of his preliminary
analysis, Breneman (1994) narrowed the focus of his study to 212 institutions that he determined
were best aligned with the definition of a true liberal arts college. All 212 institutions were
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baccalaureate-level Liberal Arts I colleges that had enrollments greater than 300 students. He
used three measures to gauge the overall financial and enrollment strength of each institution: net
tuition for each full-time equivalent student, endowment for each full-time equivalent student,
and ratio of acceptances to applications. In a general sense, he found that religious-affiliated
colleges, though surviving, did so at a revenue level far below their peer institutions that were
not affiliated with a religious organization. Further, he found that wealthier schools were
growing revenue sources far more rapidly than less wealthy schools. Once Breneman (1994)
ranked the colleges in order of overall institutional strength, he divided the rankings into 10 tiers,
and selected institutions from each tier, oversampling the middle-ranked groups, to create a list
of 12 case institutions that were then analyzed more in depth in the study’s second phase.
The second phase of Breneman’s (1994) study included site visits at all 12 identified
liberal arts colleges in an effort to ascertain how these institutions were planning for the future.
Breneman (1994) spent one day on each campus, interviewing the president and cabinet-level
administrators and using historical and institutional documents to validate interviews. He
identified eight themes that emerged: enrollments and students, management and finance,
faculty, academic programs, development, planning, trustees, and government policies.
In terms of enrollment, Breneman (1994) reported that most schools were concerned with
meeting enrollment targets, overcoming increased price resistance from students and parents, and
were enrolling fewer minorities than ideal. Several schools had expanded programming to target
nontraditional students to increase the applicant pool, but still many could not recruit the number
of paying students they desired, with most campuses subsidizing up to half of its enrolled
students with institutions aid. A few institutions experimented with enrollment management
services that focused on strategically asking students where they wanted to go to school and
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targeting students based on their responses. For instance, officials at Wittenberg realized that
most students who ranked the institution as their first choice typically enrolled. So, they sent
high school seniors postcards asking them to rank their college choices and then focused
exclusively on those who ranked Wittenberg as their first choice (Breneman, 1994).
Additionally, Breneman (1994) found that nine of the 12 institutions in the study were
operating with a deficit. Responses to the deficit were focused mostly on cutting costs such as
staff reductions through attrition and elimination. However, most schools were already operating
with little opportunity to cut costs. Others relied on increased endowment payouts, deferred
maintenance, and sought government funds through special projects. Additionally, Breneman
(1994) concluded that the main financial challenge for these colleges was their ability to manage
the link between tuition, institutional financial aid, and enrollments. Some colleges attempted to
cap financial aid as a fixed percentage of the budget without considering more strategic and
discrete ways to apply funds as an incentive for enrollment. Finally, Breneman (1994) noted the
prominence given to visionary and forceful leadership and argued that small liberal arts college’s
most powerful advantage is their small autonomous structure that “gives the college a
nimbleness and ability to move quickly and decisively in new directions, an early source of
strength” (p. 101).
Additionally, Breneman (1994) concluded that small liberal arts colleges were still
effectively recruiting quality faculty, many of whom were liberal arts college graduates. In terms
of curriculum, the most common expansion to academic programming focused on international
studies. As another theme among case institutions, fundraising was identified as a significant
new professionalized force at each institution with all 12 institutions either in the midst of,
concluding, or planning a major campaign. And while Breneman (1994) argued that capital
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campaigns often produced the best institutional planning opportunities, he found that in the
strategic planning arena, “there were no striking or original approaches to this task” among
institutions (p. 110).
In terms of leadership, Breneman (1994) did not find one president who acknowledged
lack of thoughtful planning in his or her administration, but many discussed the shortcomings of
the previous administrations. Breneman (1994) also found that the president’s relationship with
the board was perceived by presidents as an important relationship to maintain and boards were
the primary source of pressure for keeping tuition low. In terms of government policies, all 12
institutions seemed to own their futures, hardly discussing in the study’s interviews how the
federal government could help them. In short, Breneman (1994) suggested the overarching
problems for small liberal arts colleges were their pricing strategies, investment performance,
and a lack of funding increases from federal and state governments.
Financial and Operational Challenges
Research in the twenty-first century that focused on liberal arts colleges built on
Breneman’s study and expanded explanations of the increased modern era challenges facing
these institutions. In 2003, at the American Council of Learned Societies’ conference, Liberal
Arts Colleges in American Higher Education: Challenges and Opportunities, several researchers
examined the new challenges that this specific sector of higher education faced and would face
in future decades (Benston, 2005; Ekman, 2005; Kaufman, 2005; Kuh, 2005; Lapovsky, 2005;
McPherson, 2005; Myers, 2005; Oakley, 2005). Together, they outlined the comprehensive need
for liberal arts colleges to find ways to adapt and remain relevant in the new millennium.
Lapovsky (2005) specifically examined economic challenges facing liberal arts colleges
in the twenty-first century. She, like Breneman (1994), drew the distinction between highly
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selective liberal arts colleges and a much larger group of respectable but less prestigious liberal
arts institutions. Lapovsky (2005) identified those highly selective, well-endowed liberal arts
colleges as the fifty “medallion” colleges in the United States, easily identified by top ranking on
U.S. News & World Report’s National Liberal Arts College Rankings list (p. 50). She argued
that these medallion institutions were fortunately positioned to charge high tuition and still
attract high quality students, and were protected by large endowments. The remainder, “nonmedallion” institutions were unable to fill their classrooms with 100% full tuition-paying
students. According to Lapovsky (2005), these “non-medallion” institutions were the institutions
that truly faced a real question of survival.
Additionally, Lapovsky (2005) highlighted three specific challenges facing liberal arts
institutions in the twenty-first century: demographic shifts, demand declines, and institutional
pricing strategies. First, the demographic shift experienced in the early 2000s indicated
significant and continued growth in both the Hispanic and African American populations, two
minorities that were not historically a major constituency in private liberal arts colleges. With the
Hispanic population growing 20% in the first decade of the twenty-first century and the African
American population growing more than 10%, higher education, especially liberal arts colleges,
face the challenge of educating a large percentage of minority students in future decades, many
of whom are first-generation students and will not be able to afford published tuition prices.
Additionally, Lapovsky (2005) argued that the demand for a liberal arts degree has
declined. The historical transition of parent and student perceptions from a liberally focused to a
vocationally needed advanced education led to a significantly decreased demand for the liberal
arts college. The decreased demand, along with the steep expenses associated with providing an
intimate learning environment, made a liberal education an expensive product (Breneman, 1994;
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Gilbert, 1995). Conversely, options for cutting costs often conflicted with the mission of the
institution; adding adjuncts, combining classes, and limiting student life all have cost-cutting
benefits, but force institutions to stop short of living up to their liberal arts college charge
(Breneman, 1994). Yet, other non-profit and for-profit colleges and universities continued to cut
costs and provide mass education at a much cheaper price, and gained appeal among the fastest
growing college going demographics in the country, including minorities and nontraditional
students (Lapovsky, 2005).
But perhaps the most alarming challenge of all facing liberal arts colleges in the twentyfirst century continued to deal with the pricing strategy and the relationship of tuition, aid, and
enrollment. According to Hubbell and Lapovsky and Hubbell (2003), the National Association of
College and University Business Officers (NACUBO), an organization that, since 1990, has
annually surveyed all four-year accredited, independent institutions regarding tuition practices,
showed that every single participant institution (N=193) increased its tuition discount rate
sometime between 1990 and 2002. Hubbell and Lapovsky and Hubbell (2003) specifically noted
that the 13-year data set (1990-2002) of 106 small colleges (<850 students) with low tuition
(<$21,000 per year) and 54 small colleges with high tuition (>$21,000 per year) indicated that
small colleges with low tuition rates increased tuition discounting from 27.8% in 1990 to 42.4%
in 2002 while small colleges with high tuition increased tuition discounting from 28.7% in 1990
to 38.8% in 2002. Their findings also indicated that, for the majority of these institutions,
administrations increased financial aid faster than tuition, resulting in negative revenue growth
(Hubbell and Lapovsky, 2003). Hubbell and Lapovsky and Hubbell (2003) argued that the shift
towards increased tuition discounting was due to the decrease in financial aid provided by the
government and the heightened competition to attract students. Still, many schools managed to
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increase net tuition (gross tuition less institutional discount), which provided additional revenue.
NACUBO findings indicated that small colleges with low tuition increased net tuition by 59.6%
during this 13-year span while small colleges with high tuition institutions increased by 61.6%.
Interestingly, tuition not only served as a revenue stream for these institutions, but was
also an indicator, for better or worse, of the value of degree. Therefore, institutions adapted to
these challenges by raising tuition to increase its reputation, but also widely distributed specific
information that listed the institution’s requirements for guaranteed student financial aid. This
strategy protected the institution’s reputation while also encouraging students to apply for
admission knowing their chances of securing significant financial aid (Lapovsky, 2005). As a
supplemental finding, Lapovsky (2005) examined institutional endowment size and tuition
discount and found no relationship between the two. Lapovsky’s (2005) chief conclusion
regarding the NACUBO findings warned that trends in price discounting were unsustainable and
many institutions were not maximizing tuition discounting to increase revenue through targeted
recruitment and enrollment.
To elaborate further on the challenges facing liberal arts colleges regarding tuition
discounting, Kaufman (2005) contrasted Breneman’s (1994) and the NACUBO’s definitions of
tuition discount rates, and explained why the difference was important. Hubbell and Lapovsky
and Hubbell (2003) and Lapovsky (2005) reported the NACUBO tuition discount rate as the total
institutional financial aid divided by gross tuition revenue whereas Breneman (1994) calculated
the discount rate as the total of unrestricted or unfunded institutional aid divided by gross tuition
revenue. Kaufman (2005) argued that Breneman’s (1994) exclusion of restricted or funded
institutional financial aid creates a lower and misleading discount rate. As a result, Kaufman
(2005) agreed with NACUBO’s and Lapovsky’s (2005) findings and argued that financial aid, as
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a percentage of tuition, remained constant between 1990 and 2002, while the average discount
rate rose during this time in small colleges.
In addition, Kaufman (2005) elaborated on the distinction between medallion and nonmedallion liberal arts colleges, and showed that prestige was even tiered within these, creating an
echelon of ultra elitist and wealthy institutions in the top level of medallion institutions. Using
data from the 2002 U.S. News & World Report’s Top 49 Liberal Arts Colleges, Kaufman (2005)
found that wealthiest schools within this tier spent significantly more per student, but did not
charge a significantly higher net tuition due to pressures to keep tuition low and provide financial
aid. As a result, full paying students receive greater assistance at these ultra elitist institutions.
Even though wealthier schools provided bigger discounts, their overall assets, including
endowments, were much greater than less wealthy institutions. Consequently, they continued to
gain in wealth, which created an even wider gap of inequity between these schools (Kaufman,
2005).
And finally, McPherson (2005) argued that this particularly steep unequal distribution of
wealth in higher education, and in the liberal arts college arena, sets up the potential to create
significant inequity in education delivery and could restrict students to specific types of
opportunities. Institutions protected by large endowments were able to use tactics including
generous aid packages; high tuition, which often indicated quality; and restricted access to put
other institutions out of competition for students, especially high performing ones. Overall,
students from wealthy backgrounds benefited from these circumstances and maintained a
significant benefit to access in wealthier institutions. McPherson (2005) argued that the one
strategy capable of eliminating this inequity in liberal arts colleges was encouraging wealthy
institutions to admit more students from low-income backgrounds, which many started doing as

	
  

62	
  

a strategy for increasing student. By top medallion schools increasing socioeconomic diversity in
their enrollments, these institutions consequently redistributed wealthy students to other
institutions, who then built enrollments, increased net tuition revenue, and increased the
likelihood of institutional survival.
Challenges of Perception and Demand
Aside from the financial and operational challenges facing liberal arts colleges, Hersh
(1997) outlined the perception challenges that faced liberal arts colleges. Hersh’s (1997) analysis
of a national survey of public attitudes towards higher education indicated that multiple
constituencies surveyed perceived liberal arts colleges to be unimportant and ineffective. Hersh’s
(1997) survey results separated respondents into one of five groups: college-bound high school
juniors and seniors, parents of college-bound high school juniors and seniors, chief executive
officers and human resources officers, high school and college faculty and administrators, and
recent higher education graduates. The study asked questions related to the importance and
purpose of going to college, university and college effectiveness, and the characteristics of
liberal arts education. The results indicated that very few people perceived learning for learning’s
sake as an important aspect of higher education. Rather, career skills ranked at the top of the list,
although parents (42%) and students (35%) ranked this aspect as most important more frequently
than business executives (31%) and faculty (20%) did. Even more alarming for liberal arts
colleges, according to Hersh (1997), only 27% of parents and 14% of students surveyed reported
being very familiar with liberal arts education as compared to 70% of faculty and 54% of
business executives. And as studies previously demonstrated, while the overwhelming majority
of parents and students believed the most important reasons for a student to go to college was to
prepare for a career and increase earning potential, only 37% of business executives agreed.
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Among suggested improvements, business executives rated more emphasis on oral and written
communication skills (92%) and more internship and work-study programs (87%) as their topranked recommendations. Hersh’s (1997) conclusions centered on the need for liberal arts
colleges to demonstrate their value in a more effective way, especially to parents and students.
Kuh (2005) supplemented Hersh’s (1997) findings by citing both the University of
Iowa’s and the Center of Inquiry in the Liberal Arts at Wabash College’s studies that found
several positive effects of liberal arts college education on its graduates. Additionally, Kuh
(2005) drew conclusions from National Student Survey of Engagement (NSSE) data, which
included nearly 430,000 student responses from 730 four-year colleges and universities since
2002, including 55% of all liberal arts colleges in the country. As Kuh (2005) stated, these data
sets indicated that students were more likely to actively engage in more aspects of their
education at a small, private institution, which ultimately increased the likelihood of academic
success. For instance, liberal arts college students were more likely to engage with librarians and
seek help with resources, work with faculty members on research projects, perform community
service, study a foreign language and travel abroad than students at other institution types. Kuh
(2005) also concluded, “On all five NSSE clusters of effective educational practice and other
measures, liberal arts colleges score consistently higher than any other type of institution;” these
clusters included academic challenge, active and collaborative learning, faculty-student
interaction, enriching educational experiences, and supportive campus environments (p. 125).
Yet, for all the established benefits, liberal arts colleges struggled to articulate their contribution
to higher education and continued to decline in number and importance, which led Kuh (2005) to
conclude that the primary problem facing these institutions was one of perception.
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Ekman (2005) also argued that National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) student
demographic and experience data, analyzed by the NAICU in Twelve Facts That May Surprise
You About America’s Private Colleges and Universities, indicated that private colleges
maintained higher completion rates for students across the board than their public counterparts.
Ekman (2005) concluded that both students with very strong high school transcripts and test
scores as well as students with weaker academic records were more likely to have a successful
student experience and graduate from private institutions than public ones. Furthermore, students
with characteristics that were traditionally identified as high risk factors to degree completion –
low-income or minority status, married, have children – were more likely to succeed in private
colleges than at public institutions (Ekman, 2005).
History and Strategy of Liberal Arts College Adaptation
In addition to the overview of challenges facing liberal arts colleges, a share of the
research relevant to the survivability of liberal arts colleges focused on aspects of organizational
adaptation specifically related to this institutional type. Several articles highlighted the role of
identity and mission, religion, external pressures, and internal organizational factors, especially
presidential leadership in the adaptive strategies of liberal arts colleges.
The Role of Identity and Mission
Breneman (1994) and Zammuto (1984) argued that changing a liberal arts college’s
programmatic mission constituted institutional failure. The research was mixed, however, with
some researchers agreeing with Breneman (1994) and Zammuto (1984), while others provided
different interpretations (Benston, 2005; Delucchi, 2000; Kanigel, 1986; Lang, 1999; Myers,
2005; Rodgers & Jackson, 2011; Stimpert, 2004; Tedder, 2010). In either case, researchers
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seemed to agree that an institution’s mission and identity played a role in organizational
adaptation.
More specifically, Kanigel (1986) researched the plausibility of liberal arts institutions
adapting their mission and curriculum in the 1980s to meet the needs of an increasingly
specialized economy and a shrinking student applicant pool. He argued that liberal education
needed to include technology to remain relevant. He presented several examples of institutions
that designed new technology-based courses while still using a liberal arts approach. At Vassar
College, an introductory course in scientific inquiry required students to compare popular media
coverage of scientific research advances with the original journal research. Another course,
Studies in Technological Creativity, surveyed the links between “artistic, scientific, and
technological creativity” (Kanigel, 1986, p. 22). Williams College’s Technology and Culture
course traced the evolution of technology throughout different cultures, and its Computer in
Society course focused on how technology impacted a society and people’s role within it. These
courses both equipped students with technological skills and also taught them about technology’s
effects and humanistic impact in the world. As Kanigel (1986) indicated, a liberal arts education
cannot prepare an individual to be a well-rounded and thoughtful contributor to society without
teaching them something about technology. Kanigel (1986) argued that adaptations to the
curriculum like these were central to liberal arts colleges’ successful integration into modern
America and to their demonstration of relevance to the new college student.
Delucchi’s (2000) research added a new dimension to research focused on adapting
missions. He concluded that many university and college mission statements did not align with
their actual program areas and activities and that such a misalignment was considered purposeful
and adaptive. The purpose of his study was to determine the extent that liberal arts colleges’
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mission statements were decoupled from major area of degrees awarded and to identify
organizational characteristics the had a relationship with decoupling. Specifically, his study
focused on the frequency of liberal arts claims in higher education, the extent to which these
claims were consistent or inconsistent with major areas of degree awarding, and the
organizational features most associated with whether an institution remained consistent or
inconsistent in their claims and practice. He used data from Person’s Guide to Four-Year
Colleges (1993) and analyzed 779 college and university profiles, categorizing them as liberal
arts, professional, or combined, based on their mission statements. He then determined the
percentage of liberal arts degrees each institution awarded, dividing them by institutions that
awarded 60% or more and less than 60% of liberal arts degrees. He controlled for institution size
and geographic location.
In this study, Delucchi (2000) defined decoupling as “an organizational response to the
legitimacy/efficiency dilemma” (p. 159). Essentially, this strategy allowed an organization to
conform to the environment with established standards and formal structures while maintaining
flexibility in its operations and activities. He also stated that highly institutionalized
organizations were typically defined by vague outputs that were difficult to quantify and by
activities that were assessed through conflicting criteria, creating a grey area that allowed them
to say one thing and do another. In this situation, mission statements represented a range of
plausible justifications for the institution, maintaining a broad focus with general language rather
than a rigid and specific aim corresponding to degree programs and areas.
The results of Delucchi’s study were based on descriptive statistics and multivariate logit
analysis since the distribution of decoupled institutions was skewed. The results supported both
hypotheses. Nearly 70% of the institutions analyzed by Delucchi (2000) exhibited decoupling
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between mission statement and major field of degrees. Both control variables had a significant
effect on the likelihood of decoupling; size (.652) indicated that the larger the institution, the
more likely it was to display decoupling, and location (-.799) indicated that an institution located
in the northeast, where the majority of liberal arts colleges are located, was less likely to display
decoupling than institutions located elsewhere. In terms of organizational characteristics,
selectivity was the strongest predictor of decoupling (-1.720), religious-affiliated colleges were
more likely to display decoupling than non-religious schools (1.467), and as endowment level
increased, the likelihood of decoupling decreased (-.427).
Delucchi (2000) employed an institutional perspective for his study, which assumed that
an organization formed in response to external factors and aimed to grow and survive. In order to
do that, organizations sought to resolve uncertainty and maintain operations that simulated other
organizations within the same environment. He concluded that many universities and colleges
that were established as liberal arts colleges continued to operate under that distinctive identity to
maintain its acceptability and support, but the prevalence of professional programs was an
adaptive measure to deal with uncertainty arising from changing student demand and
demographics and market shifts. Delucchi (2000) contextualized his study in the changes that
occurred in liberal arts colleges in the 1990s when high school graduates decreased and when
curriculum changes trended towards professional education. Under these conditions, liberal arts
colleges strayed from their original mission, but maintained public statements that endorsed its
historical purpose in order to adapt to the environmental needs while creating a continuous
image, which increased the institution’s likelihood of survival.
But researchers like Tedder (2010) argued that liberal arts education was not compatible
with vocational education and therefore expanding the curriculum to include vocational areas
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was not a plausible strategy for adaptation. Tedder (2010) argued that it was not possible to
implement an education where “educators can have single primary intention to both inspire
people to freedom (liberal education) and prepare people to fit into an economic or academic
niche (professional education)" (p. 81). Tedder (2010) also claimed that the essential difference
between liberal and professional education was that one created an “adapted” individual while
the other created an “adaptive” individual (p. 81). Education that served employers, Tedder
(2010) argued did not focus on instilling principles of dissent, negotiation, and freedom in
students. Therefore, a partnership between liberal and vocational education was not
commensurable, demonstrated by the following contradictory notion that education can
“manufacture citizens to employee-specifications while also instilling in them a high level of
self-determination since the economic demands agree with the work even if the conditions are
terrible unfair and unjust" (Tedder, 2010, p. 84). Further, he argued that just because employers
and students alike wished to make higher education a career preparation experience did not
assume a role for higher education in job training and vocational skill development. Rather,
Tedder (2010) argued that liberal arts education needed to continue developing education based
on its historic principles and mission and resist the attraction to focus on vocational aims.
Regardless of the nature of its adaptive strategies, Stimpert (2004) wrote that liberal arts
colleges faced growing pressure to identify themselves and their role in higher education. He
argued that the most successful schools were the ones that cultivated a “compelling identity that
communicates in just one or a few sentences what it is, what it aspires to be, and what
distinguishes it from many other competing institutions" (p. 44). Moreover, a compelling brand
also served as a powerful force in strategic planning, helping make decisions about resource
allocation. Stimpert (2004) provided examples like Berea College that was known for its work
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program and full-tuition scholarships, Earlham, known for its strong Quaker traditions, and
Colorado College known for its unconventional block calendar. Although Stimpert (2004)
claimed that a distinctive brand was a key to survival, he also acknowledged that it worked as a
limiting factor when the brand did not universally appeal to all students or when the institution’s
own constituencies did not value the brand.
In general, Stimpert (2004) argued that the liberal arts college brand needed to revitalize
itself by integrating residential facilities and student services into its academic value as well as
by improving the educational importance of extracurricular clubs, student leadership, and
athletics. In addition, Stimpert (2004) wrote that faculty roles needed to be preserved as part of
the liberal arts college distinctiveness. More specifically, he said that faculty contributions to
administrative leadership and academic operations, such as student advising and first year
experience, faculty hiring, and curriculum modifications were absolutely essential to the
character of the college. In terms of finances, Stimpert (2004) once again pointed to the
distinctive brand of the college as a strategy to guide expenditures. Liberal arts education, in its
most generic sense, was naturally expensive because it was labor and resource intensive, he
noted. When considering new programs or renewing old ones, the institution needed to assess
program performance and its value to student enrollment. The same principle, according to
Stimpert (2004), should be applied to financial aid allocation. The question was: did it help
recruit and retain? These strategies, focused on the prominence of the brand, were capable of
helping an institution adapt to survive.
Also understanding the importance of branding, Rodgers and Jackson (2011) tested how
effectively a small, private college branded its institution based on student perceptions.
According to Rodgers and Jackson (2011), a brand was an internal understanding of what an
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institution thought about itself. It was not the same as a mission and vision. They tested an
institution’s brand as it was perceived by first-year freshmen and graduating seniors. The
participants responded to five compound sentences each with blanks for students to fill in
regarding their perceptions about the institution. Participants were also given the Institutional
Culture Survey, which measured students’ perceptions about their institution. Freshmen
completed a pre-test during orientation and a post-test during the end of their first spring
semester. Also, the survey was administered to seniors during their last spring semester. Data
were collected during the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 years. In 2007-2008, 252(63%) freshmen
responded to the pretest, 75(19%) responded to the post-test, and 168 (35%) graduating seniors
responded to the survey. In 2008-2009, 236 (63%) freshmen responded to the pretest, 102 (26%)
of freshmen responded to the posttest, and 125 (29%) graduating seniors responded to the
survey.
Rodgers and Jackson (2011) analyzed responses and categorized themes using content
analysis. Using pattern coding, they paired like constructs and ranked their frequency. The
results indicated a stable understanding of the institutional brand among all three groups. Of
particular interest, fine arts programs and international and minority student populations were
consistently highlighted as themes in the responses, and even more so by freshmen than seniors
Rodgers and Jackson (2011) indicated that this theme might be explained by seniors who grew
so accustomed to the brand that its aspects were more implicit and no longer stood out to them.
Overall, incoming and outgoing students’ perceptions aligned with the institutional identity.
Rodgers and Jackson (2011) argued that assessing identity strength among students, faculty, and
other constituencies provided helpful insight into perceptions about the institution, especially
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when significant changes regarding curricula, programs, and mission were made to adapt and
survive (Rodgers & Jackson, 2011).
The Role of Religious Affiliation
Another area of research focusing on the adaptability of liberal arts colleges dealt directly
with religious-affiliated colleges. Matthews (1977) argued that these institutions were in a unique
position to create change in higher education because, in many ways, they were the most
independent and free institutions in the market and were capable of quickly changing course and
adapting. However, in order to quickly adapt, Matthews (1977) asserted that these institutions
needed to reframe their goals in contemporary terms while maintaining a constant philosophy.
Specifically, by keeping their moral education component intact, these institutions positioned
themselves to uniquely provide knowledge with context and perspective. In the modern market,
this constituted a distinctive approach, giving religious-affiliated colleges a niche. Though
Matthews (1977) argued that embracing parts of the religious tradition was a viable strategy of
survival, he did not propose a return to pietism and mandated religious practice. Rather he
proposed a moral-based education that returned values, ethics, and judgment to liberal arts
education as a tactic for the religious-affiliated colleges’ institutional survival.
As a related focus, Gomes (1999) also noted the declining role of religion in higher
education throughout the 20th century. Many of the oldest institutions in America gave a central
position on campus to the chapel, symbolizing the role of the church in early America’s college.
As Woodrow (2004) later echoed, religion was engrained in the early American college. As an
example, Harvard’s president taught a course in moral philosophy to all graduating seniors. But a
dramatic cultural shift, beginning in the 1950s and continuing in a more pronounced way into the
1970s, significantly limited the formal religious practices of universities and colleges. In short, a
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general mistrust in institutional power swept the nation during the mid-20th century. In addition,
institutions needed to appeal to a wider student pool outside denominational stakeholders
(Gomes, 1999). Consequently, many church-affiliated institutions rebranded religious activities
as a student service and chaplains became counselors instead of the “president’s vicar or alter
ego" (Gomes, 1999, p. 108). Overall, these changes tamed the religiosity in church-affiliated
colleges, and Gomes (1999) argued that they contributed to a lost sense of self and a quieting of
these institutions’ moral identities. By erasing so many aspects of their distinctiveness, many of
these institutions lost their niche and lacked vision. Consequently, Gomes (1999) argued that
once again embracing moral education alongside its traditional distinctions – college gatherings,
residential life, and integrated faculty – is an effective adaptive strategy for these institutions. By
refocusing the curriculum on principled leadership, cultivation of values, oratory and debate, and
learning based on the humanistic approach, he argued, will once again enable these institutions to
find a niche and serve it.
Yet, by the turn of the twenty-first century, Woodrow’s (2004) study indicated that
instead of embracing church-affiliations, some institutions found that erasing them was a more
adaptive strategy. In the early 1980s, with the emergence of professional marketing,
communications, and fundraising, a handful of church-affiliated colleges renamed themselves
with secular names. Woodrow (2004) listed several examples in existing research: in 1985,
Alabama Christian College became Faulkner University; in 1993, Columbian Christian College
became Cascade College; in 1997, Michigan Christian College became Rochester College; that
same year, Pacific Christian College became Hope International University; and in 1998,
Southern California Christian College became Vanguard University.
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Woodrow’s (2004) study focused specifically on the name changes of liberal arts colleges
affiliated with the Church of Christ. Of 13 colleges founded between 1885 and 1959, six colleges
(46%) changed their names removing the religious connotation, three retained religious names,
three never had a religious name, and one went from a non-religious name to a religious name.
All of the schools that kept their religious name were located in Texas or Oklahoma. With the
exception of changing the institution’s name, these six colleges did not make changes to the
mission, curriculum or operations of the college, and many publications still acknowledged the
church-affiliation of the college, yet the enrollment of all six institutions jumped after each one
changed its name. The study concluded that there was a growing shift toward secularizing higher
education, even church-affiliated colleges as a means of adaptation. Woodrow (2004) pointed out
that church-affiliations potentially had significant negative consequences for specific types of
applicants, especially international students.
The Role of External and Internal Factors
Finally, the last subsection of liberal arts college adaptation research focused on the role
of both external and internal factors in organizational adaptation. Kratz’s (1995) research
highlighted the importance of external factors while Milliken (1990) and Chaffee (1984)
attributed the likelihood and success of organization adaptation to internal factors with Chaffee
(1984) especially highlighting the importance of presidential leadership in this process.
Milliken (1990) conducted his study in the late 1980s and early 1990s, during significant
enrollment shifts in higher education. The purpose of the study was to examine the effect of
resource dependence, defined as how much an organization relied on the resource in question,
and how organizations’ resource dependence related to specific organizational characteristics
including the amount of state uncertainty, effect uncertainty, and response uncertainty that
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college administrators reported in connection with organizational change. Milliken (1990)
randomly sampled 148 private four-year liberal arts colleges and separated them by region. He
received 211 (35.8%) out of 589 responses from 122 schools. Milliken (1990) measured types of
certainty with a survey previously used in Duncan’s (1972) research, which asked participants to
estimate the chance of occurrence for six items on a five-point scale ranging from certainty of
non-occurrence to certainty of occurrence. He measured resource dependence by selectivity,
defined as the ratio of applicants to acceptances, and by dependence on undergraduate programs,
defined as the number of students enrolled in undergraduate and graduate programs divided by
the number of graduate students. Several scales measured perceived organizational
characteristics. The surveys asked questions like estimate the percentage of faculty who had a
national reputation or published a book in the last year or estimate the percentage of students for
whom the school was their first choice.
Using Daft and Weick’s (1984) model of environmental interpretation, Milliken (1990)
described a three-step process by which actors in an organization scan, interpret, and respond to
a change in their environment. When scanning, actors identified trends and changes in the
environment that might affect functioning. When interpreting, they identified threats and
opportunities, which required an understanding of how the identified changes affect the
organization. And when responding, actors described the task of taking action in response to the
changes. Each step generated a type of uncertainty. In scanning, actors experienced state
uncertainty if they could not identify the environmental changes or if they could not determine
likelihood of a change occurring. In interpretation, actors experienced effect uncertainty if they
were unsure about what effect the change could have on the organization or if they could not
clearly assess if the change was a threat or an opportunity. Finally, in responding, actors
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experienced response uncertainty if they were not confident about how to respond to the change
either because they were unsure of their adaptation options or their effectiveness.
Milliken (1990) made several hypotheses. First, he hypothesized that high resource
dependence was associated with high effect certainty, did not have an effect on the level of state
or response certainty, and moderated relationship between effect and state certainty. Second,
Milliken (1990) also hypothesized that high perceived organizational effectiveness was
associated with low effect certainty and high response certainty. Third, Milliken (1990)
hypothesized that strong perceived institutional identity was associated with low effect certainty
and high response certainty. Fourth, Milliken (1990) hypothesized that increased organizational
decentralization was associated higher levels of state, effect, and response certainty. And finally,
Milliken (1990) hypothesized that institutions located in regions where population decreases
among 18-22 year olds stayed low were less likely to interpret changing demographics as a
threat.
Milliken (1990) used bivariate analyses to assess correlations followed by multiple
regression analysis to explain variance. Effect and state certainty were correlated but accounted
for less than 10% of the variance. No relationship between state and response was found,
indicating that perceived change in the environment did not positively link to certainty in
response. In fact, the relationship between effect and response certainty showed that the more
significant threat, the less certain and actor was about the organization’s response. Results also
showed that the greater the institution’s selectivity, the less an environmental change was
perceived as a threat, and the greater the role of undergraduate programs at the institution, the
greater the effect certainty because actors were more convinced that the change would affect the
organization. Finally, in terms of organizational characteristics, when the organization was
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perceived as effective and had a strong identity, participants were more uncertain about the effect
the change would have on the institution and more certain that the institution would respond with
effectiveness. These results indicated that perception served as a powerful factor in influencing
organizational change.
Somewhat oppositely, Kratz’s (1995) study argued that external factors had more of a
prominent role in moving organizations to change than Milliken’s (1990) study acknowledged.
In a general sense, Kratz (1995) showed that curricular adaptations were more likely to occur in
organizations when the organizations’ peers had previously implemented the same change. Kratz
(1995) examined 52 different associations and consortia that connected almost half of all liberal
arts colleges in America. Broadly speaking, consortia and associations typically existed to share
information and decisions among colleges that had similar identities and missions. More
specifically, Kratz (1995) focused his study on the Council on Institutional Leadership data and
compared data from 12 institutions between 1971 and 1986. He studied finances, enrollment,
curriculum offerings, and general operations. He argued that an institution’s likelihood to adapt
in a specific way increased as the frequency of peer institutions that previously adapted in a
similar way increased. He also argued that an institution’s likelihood to adapt in a specific way
also increased if peer institutions that previously adapted in similar ways were successful in their
adaptation or if they were had similar tuition rates and enrollment sizes as the given institution.
Finally, Kratz (1995) argued that the extent to which a given institution was susceptible to peer
influence depended on the institution’s own performance. In a general sense, Kratz (1995)
concluded that consortia moderated organizations’ adaptability and organizations, at least in part,
based adaptability measures on peer institutions’ situation and performance.
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Finally, in After Decline, What? Survival Strategies at Eight Private Colleges, Ellen
Chaffee (1984) examined the strategic changes employed by leaders at private colleges that
experienced significant decline from 1973 to 1976, which was followed by a financial resurgence
in 1976 that was largely caused by an infusion of student federal aid funds. She selected 14 of 40
colleges identified by the Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) as revenuedeclining institutions between 1973 and 1976. Following Chaffee’s (1984) initial analysis of the
institutions, she completed interviews with representatives at eight of the 14 colleges and verified
interview material using historical documents. She used pseudonyms for all case institutions in
the study.
Chaffee (1984) concluded that the institutional futures of these colleges were more a
product of their internal factors than their external environment. She wrote, “The one
unequivocal conclusion that seems dictated by the empirical evidence of these case studies is that
for better or worse, the colleges themselves were the principal architects of their own future”
(Chaffee, 1984, p. 125). Further, she argued that the institutions’ presidents were particularly
influential and served as the organizations’ key decision-maker and ambassador: “…for small
private colleges in trouble, finding an able and dedicated leader is a matter of life or death”
(Chaffee, 1984, p. 2). Aside from a strong and positive presidential influence, revived institutions
projected strong values that solidified its foundation. Three of Chaffee’s (1984) eight case study
colleges were particularly relevant to the study of liberal arts college survival and are mentioned
below.
Links College, a small, nonselective, liberal arts college, was established in a rural area
after outgrowing facilities within a dying community following World War II. During the 1970s,
Links’ revenue decreased 23% and enrollment dropped from 2700 to 1450 students. While the
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external environment certainly presented challenges, Chaffee (1984) argued that the college’s
tipping point was internal. Links’ president during this era was focused almost exclusively on
fundraising and paid little attention to fiscal management responsibilities, neglecting to enforce a
range of policies. The complacent president, failing to evoke confidence from his institution, was
fired and his successor, facing the same set of institutional problems and external pressures,
immediately established clear communication and administrative teams to help address the
college’s challenges. He primarily focused his attention on fundraising and recruitment
operations, but oversaw all operations and ensured proper organizational and fiscal management.
During his tenure, the college reduced its dependency on tuition as its primary source of revenue,
reduced its debt service, and balanced its budget. Additionally, almost all program changes
moved towards vocational expansion. Links targeted curriculum changes that focused on parttime and nontraditional students and increased the diversity of its student enrollment by
responding to the needs of the community. At every turn, the college looked for ways to increase
its efficiency and its effectiveness. Chaffee’s (1984) overall assessment of Links College was
simple: it hugely benefited from “comprehensive executive leadership” (p. 32).
Ryke College, established as a Protestant-affiliated liberal arts college in a large
Midwestern city with nearly 50 other institutions in its immediate area, was both large and
selective and was known for its academic rigor. The college served mostly in-state students. The
institution benefited from the extensive philanthropy of a benefactor in the 1950s, which almost
single-handedly turned the college into a nationally-known institution by using funds to build its
faculty and recruit national merit scholars. But in the late 1960s, the college’s president avidly
pursued his own social activism agenda. The consequences of pursuing such a narrowly focused
agenda with little buy-in were both financial and public. He provided full scholarships to
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minorities instead of using funds to provide partial financial aid to a greater number of students.
As a result, he created huge budget deficits that showed his strategy was not sustainable.
Eventually, the college received negative publicity and philanthropic supporters lost confidence
in the college’s leadership and pulled their funding. In 1971, a new president brought a new
approach characterized by smart financial decisions but poor overall personnel management,
refusing to communicate with his administration and faculty. Still, his fiscal policy helped the
college recover until unexpected drops in enrollment once again sent the institution spiraling.
Finally, in 1975, a high school administrator was recruited for the college’s top job. He hired a
vice president who heavily focused on faculty hiring and retention, he implemented a process
which allowed college faculty and staff to contribute to budget discussions, he eliminated the
deficit, he began a capital campaign, and he implemented moderate tuition increases using
financial aid to strategically recruit students. The institution gradually cut curriculum that did not
focus on its liberal arts purpose, which created a smaller but stabilized college (Chaffee, 1984).
Finally, Chaffee (1984) chronicled Prairie College, a prestigious and selective, 1000student liberal arts college with a large endowment, located in the Midwestern area of the United
States. Its longtime president, who led the campus from 1949 to 1973, was a highly respected
leader who did not practice good financial management. His untimely death served as a tipping
point for the institution. His successor, a faculty member, who had a wealth of institutional
knowledge was appointed in part because of his “gift of putting people at ease,” and focused on
realigning the institution’s revenues and expenditures, creating a balanced budget, cutting costs,
and increasing fundraising, all the while protecting direct learning expenditures from cuts
(Chaffee, 1985, p. 82). Like Ryke, Prairie focused its mission exclusively on liberal arts, which
likely limited their enrollments especially during crunch times. However, the institution
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remained committed to its mission by strategically using financial aid to attract top-level
students. In addition, Chaffee (1984) observed that they “improved admissions and staffing,
strengthened alumni relations, provided career planning counseling, provided multidisciplinary
course work for freshmen” (p. 83). The college regained its stability, increasing its retention,
added computer courses and focusing intently on general education. The institution, though
smaller after its adjustment than before it, adapted to monumental challenges and created a plan
for long-term survival.
Like Chaffee, Puglisi (2011) also provided insight into presidents overseeing change at
small, private colleges. He claimed that the president was central to the change and bears the
biggest burden for its success and failure. Puglisi (2011) argued that in order to be successful,
presidents needed to drill down to the roots of financial problems and not focus on the
symptomatic deficit or failed campaign. He also indicated that a good team operated with trust
and acted in an advisory role, which was critical to the process of change. Presidents who were
most effective remained positive and poised, understanding that years of problems take years to
solve, but a five-year plan with attainable goals helps keep perspective and focus. Additionally,
the board of trustees was the president’s primary authority so effective president’s provided as
much information to the board as possible and established strong relationships with the chair and
the finance committee. According to Puglisi (2011), board of trustees members sometimes
became overly active in times in crisis. As a result, an effective president kept the board focused
on their financial role while the administration focused on operations. And as Puglisi (2011)
argued, it was always the president’s responsibility to protect budgetary allocations for academic
programs and student experiences. Finally, maintaining campus morale and communicating
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remained central to a president’s success in introducing change. “To the extent possible and
prudent, be open, honest, and transparent” (Puglisi, 2011, p. 88).
Chapter Summary
Chapter II provided a comprehensive review of scholarly research relevant to the current
study. The brief historical analysis of American liberal arts college, including its inception,
prominence, and its decline contextualized both the challenges these institutions faced and
continue to face in the twenty-first century. Additionally, understanding this evolution provided
insight into the adaptive strategies employed at these colleges during the last several decades.
The existing literature reviewed in this chapter served to inform the findings of the current study,
which focused on how liberal arts colleges adapted to the pressures of the Great Recession of
2007 in an effort to remain relevant in the twenty-first century.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Guided by a broad review of the current literature and the theoretical framework of
organizational adaptation, the current study’s purpose was to understand how private liberal arts
colleges adapted during the Great Recession of 2007 by examining institutional changes at three
private liberal arts colleges and their effects on the institutions’ operations. The study gave
specific attention to liberal arts colleges located in the southeastern region of the United States.
To achieve this purpose, the following specific research questions directed the study.
1. What external environmental pressures influenced the liberal arts colleges during the
Great Recession of 2007?
2. What adaptive strategies did the liberal arts colleges employ to respond to the external
environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007?
3. How did the adaptive strategies employed by the liberal arts colleges to respond to the
external environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007 affect their
operations?
4. How did institutional constituents perceive the adaptive strategies employed by the
liberal arts colleges to respond to the external environmental pressures during the Great
Recession of 2007?
I used a qualitative multiple-case study approach to address these research questions.
This chapter outlines the study’s research procedures and includes a description of and rationale
for the research design, as well as lays a specific procedural basis for collecting and analyzing
data. The chapter also addresses issues of data integrity and ethical considerations. By ensuring a

	
  

83	
  

“rigorous methodological path,” I aimed to produce valid and reliable results that enhanced the
current knowledge base in the educational research field (Yin, 2009, p. 3).
Research Design
A research design is a detailed plan that outlines the framework a researcher will use to
develop conclusions about the study’s research questions and interpretations about the study’s
central phenomenon. This framework includes established rules regarding data relevancy,
collection techniques, and analysis of results (Yin, 2009). The appropriateness of specific
research designs and techniques depends largely upon the nature of the research study’s purpose
and research questions. After a review of these established research practices and formulation of
the current study’s primary aim and research questions, I determined that the most appropriate
research design for the current research study was a qualitative multiple-case study.
Qualitative research encompasses a range of designs, but in a general sense, the approach
is characterized as including “forms of inquiry that help us understand and explain the meaning
of social phenomena with as little disruption of the natural setting as possible” (Merriam, 2009,
p. 5). Qualitative research usually explores a central concept or idea, known as the central
phenomenon, by posing open-ended questions that hinge primarily on participant’s perspective
(Creswell, 2008). The prominence of the participant’s perspective in qualitative research is based
on the design’s assumption that reality is “constructed by an individual interacting with their
social worlds,” and that understanding this process is a legitimate research aim (Merriam, 2009,
p. 6). Data from participant interviews along with other forms of data are collected in the
participant’s context, which is often referred to as the field or the naturalistic setting (Creswell,
2008; Denzin & Lincoln, 1997; Merriam, 2009; Patton, 2002). Finally, qualitative research
approaches are most fitting when investigating research questions that focus on new areas of
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inquiry, on investigating processes as opposed to outcomes, or on understanding an idea in a
detailed and descriptive way (Denzin & Lincoln, 1997; Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2009).
The most commonly used qualitative approach, the case study, gives particular attention
to intensely investigating and understanding a study’s fundamental concept (Stake, 2000). Yin
(2009) defined a case study design as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon in depth within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 18). Merriam (2009) supplemented that
definition by adding that case studies focus on a defined unit of analysis and emphasize “process
rather than outcomes,” “context rather than a specific variable,” and “discovery rather than
confirmation” (p. 19). Consequently, Yin (2009) argued that this design is most appropriate
when investigating research questions that examine the “how” and “why” of a research issue (p.
27). Yin (2009) described this rationale this way:
The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will
be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple
sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as
another result and benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to
guide data collection and analysis. (p. 18)
In an overall sense a case study is distinguished from other forms of qualitative research because
it draws on several types of data sources, including but not limited to participant interview data,
and gives significant attention to the context or contexts in which the unit exists (Merriam, 2009;
Yin, 2009). Additionally, it produces an in-depth investigation of a specific entity (Creswell,
2008; Patton, 2002).
While there are a number of deviations of case study frameworks, several researchers
affirm that the multiple-case study design, also known as the comparative case method or the
collective case study, produces more powerful, valid, and transferrable results than the single-
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case design because the researcher interprets results from multiple and varying cases during the
research study (Merriam, 2009; Stake, 2000; Yin, 2009).
When these established research procedures were considered with respect to current
study, it was most appropriate to frame the current study as a qualitative, multiple-case study
approach. With little empirical focus on the adaptation of liberal arts colleges during recession
times, the purpose of the current study and the nature of the research questions were largely
exploratory and aimed to discover aspects of the process of change as well as how and why these
changes occurred. To better understand the central phenomenon of adaptability in liberal arts
colleges amidst changing external contexts in the twenty-first century, I engaged in an intensive
study of three institutions that assumed multiple contexts for each case. I produced both an
independent and holistic description of each case as well as a comparative analysis of common
themes among all three cases (Merriam, 2009; Stake, 2000). This approach ensured that the
study gave attention to both a descriptive focus of each individual entity as well as a comparative
analysis across cases.
Finally, while case study findings do not yield statistical generalizations, qualitative case
study results are “generalizable to theoretical propositions,” especially when analyzing multiple
cases within the same study (Yin, 2009, p. 15). As Yin (2009) described, the researcher seeks to
understand the study’s results “in which a previously developed theory is used as a template with
which to compare the empirical results of the case study” (p. 38). Therefore, the comparative
analysis of the three institutions enhanced the overall understanding of organizational
adaptability and further shaped the theoretical frameworks presented in Chapter I. This process
helped shape general interpretations about the ways in which small liberal arts colleges adapt,
ultimately contributing to the existing body of theoretical research.
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Sampling
According to Merriam (2009), sampling in case study designs is typically “nonrandom,
purposeful, and small” (p. 8). By being purposeful in participant selection, researchers can
choose participants based on specific criteria that are important to better understanding the
central purpose of the study (Creswell, 2008). Additionally, restricting the sample size to a “few
individuals or a few cases” allows the researchers to conduct an intensive investigation and limits
the danger of overextending the study’s resources (Creswell, 2008, p. 217). With this rationale,
the current study employed “nonrandom, purposeful, and small” sampling strategies on two
levels: the case level and the participant level (Merriam, 2009, p. 8).
Since the current study’s research questions focused on organizational adaptation, it was
most appropriate that the analysis unit for the present case study was the institution (Patton,
2002; Yin, 2009). When sampling case institutions for the current study, I used maximum
variation sampling, a purposeful sampling strategy that selects participants with “widely varying
instances of the phenomena” (Merriam, 2009, p. 63). Patton (2002) stated that this strategy
ensures that “any common patterns that emerge from great variation are of particular interest and
value in capturing the core experiences and central, shared dimensions of a setting or
phenomenon” (p. 235).
Based on this approach, I selected each institution in the study because it was defined as a
“Baccalaureate College--Arts & Sciences” by Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching’s 2010 classification system; it was located in the southeastern region of the United
States; it was affiliated with a specific Protestant and Evangelical Christian denomination; and
according to popular media coverage between 2007 and 2011, each institution varied in the
nature and effects of its institutional adaptation (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
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Teaching, 2010). Additionally, the rankings of all three institutions, according to the most recent
issue of U.S. News & World Report’s National Liberal Arts College Rankings in which each
institution appeared, varied widely (U.S. News & World Report, 2011; U.S. News & World
Report, 2012). Of the three institutions, one ranked in the top 100 liberal arts colleges on the U.S.
News & World Report’s list, one ranked in the 100-200 bracket of the list, and the third
institution closed in 2009. Based on the above criteria, the sample cases were similar in terms of
classification and religious affiliation, but varied widely with regard to popular media coverage
and rankings, providing a solid rationale for maximum variation sampling.
After initial case selection, I spoke with three college presidents and asked that they
consider participating in the study. They agreed pending further details. Once the research
proposal was finalized, I contacted each institution’s president by email and followed up with a
phone call. The email (Appendix A) reintroduced myself, provided a copy of the case protocol
(Appendix B), and formally requested the institution’s participation in the study. All three
presidents consented by email; two consented through emails from their administrative support
representatives. To protect institution identity as much as possible, I assigned an acronym to each
institution: Colston College, Payton College, or Vilma College. The acronyms were arbitrary and
did not reflect value or a ranking of the institutions.
I also employed purposeful sampling in the current study when I selected individual
participants within each case. First, I focused on participants at each institution who were well
informed and equipped to provide insight into the case institution by nature of their role at the
institution. These initial potential participants that I identified at each institution included the
president, the president’s cabinet, two faculty members who held leadership roles in the faculty
governing body, and at least one board of trustees member. Participants at Colston College and
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Payton College held these positions at the time of the current study’s fieldwork whereas
participants associated with Vilma College, the closed institution, held these positions at Vilma
College sometime between 2006 and 2011. Additionally, I used these initial participants as
“gatekeepers” and, as part of the interview process, I asked them to identify additional
participants who were well informed and equipped to provide further insight into the case
institution (Creswell, 2008, p. 219). This secondary sampling method, identified by Creswell
(2008) as “snowball sampling,” allowed me to include participants with valuable insight who
were not initially perceived as important to the study (p. 217). I contacted these additional
participants and included them in the interview process as well.
In all, 31 participants took part in the current study, which included nine participants
from Colston College, eight participants from Payton College, and 14 participants from Vilma
College, however, one participant from Vilma College withdrew following the interview citing
confidentiality concerns. Therefore, a total of 30 participants’ interviews were included in the
study’s analysis. Figure 1 gives an overview of these participants and the duration of their
service at their respective institutions between 2006 and 2013.
More specifically, at Colston College, I interviewed the interim president and dean for
institutional advancement, six acting cabinet members, and two faculty members. Less than one
week before my fieldwork commenced at Colston College, Colston College’s president resigned
and the board of trustees appointed the dean for institutional advancement as interim president.
As a result, the president and a member of the board of trustees at Colston College were not
available to participate in the current study. At Payton College, I interviewed one board of
trustees member, the president, four acting cabinet members, and two faculty members. At
Payton College, the vice president for student development vacated his position three weeks
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before my fieldwork commenced. Consequently, he was not available to participate in the study.
Finally, I interviewed one board of trustees member, the three most recent past presidents, eight
former members of the cabinet who served at the institution between 2006 and 2011, and two
faculty members from Vilma College. After I completed the interviews, one participant from
Vilma College asked to be removed from the study citing confidentiality concerns. Therefore 13
of the 14 interviews from Vilma College were included in the current study.
To protect participant identity as much as possible, I referred to participants throughout
the current study by the nature of their role and the number of their case institution. Table 1
illustrates the selected biographical data of the current study’s participants including gender, age,
race or ethnicity, and the highest level of education attained. Biographic information was based
on public and self-reported data. All participants in the study were identified as White or
Caucasian. Of 30 participants, five were female and 25 were male. Of the five females, one
served as a faculty member and four served as cabinet members, one at Colston College and
three at Vilma College. Additionally, most participants were between the ages of 46 and 65,
however three participants were between the ages of 31 and 40 and three participants were
between the ages of 66 and 75. Of 30 participants, five participants, who were all cabinet
members, reported a bachelor’s degree as their highest level of educational attainment; two
participants reported a juris doctorate degree; eight participants reported a master’s degree with
two of those in education; and 14 reported doctorate degrees, with one of those in higher
education administration. All faculty members, presidents, and provosts interviewed at all three
institutions reported their highest level of education as a doctorate degree.
Table 1
Selected Biographical Participants’ Data
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Case
Institution

Role

Gender

Age

Race/
Ethnicity

Highest Level of Education
Achieved

Colston
College

Cabinet Member

M

61-65

White

Doctorate Degree

Cabinet Member

M

56-60

White

Master’s Degree

Cabinet Member

M

56-60

White

Juris Doctorate

Cabinet Member

M

51-55

White

Bachelor’s Degree

Cabinet Member

M

56-60

White

Bachelor’s Degree

Cabinet Member

F

61-65

White

Bachelor’s Degree

Cabinet Member

M

46-50

White

Master’s Degree (in Education)

Faculty Member

M

61-65

White

Doctorate Degree

Faculty Member

M

66-70

White

Doctorate Degree

Trustee Member

M

61-65

White

Master’s Degree

President

M

46-50

White

Doctorate Degree

Cabinet Member

M

56-60

White

Doctorate Degree

Cabinet Member

M

56-60

White

Bachelor’s Degree

Cabinet Member

M

51-55

White

Bachelor’s Degree

Cabinet Member

M

56-60

White

Master’s Degree

Faculty Member

M

36-40

White

Doctorate Degree

Faculty Member

F

46-50

White

Doctorate Degree

Trustee Member

M

46-40

White

Juris Doctorate

President

M

66-70

White

Doctorate Degree

President

M

71-75

White

Doctorate Degree

President

M

51-55

White

Doctorate Degree

Cabinet Member

M

51-55

White

Doctorate Degree

Cabinet Member

M

56-60

White

Bachelor’s Degree

Payton
College

Vilma
College
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Cabinet Member

M

46-50

White

Master’s Degree (in Education)

Cabinet Member

F

56-60

White

Master’s Degree (in Education)

Cabinet Member

F

61-65

White

Master’s Degree

Cabinet Member

F

31-35

White

Doctorate Degree (in Education)

Cabinet Member

M

36-40

White

Master’s Degree

Faculty Member

M

51-55

White

Doctorate Degree

Faculty Member

M

56-60

White

Doctorate Degree

Finally, Creswell (2008) argued that the institutional review board process is crucial in
qualitative case-study research since “data collection consists of lengthy periods of gathering
information directly involving people and recording detailed personal views from individuals”
(p. 218). Therefore, I completed the proper institutional review board procedures at my home
institution as well as at all participant institutions that required such authorization (Appendix C).
Data Collection
In the current study, data collection occurred during intensive fieldwork, defined by
Patton (2002) as the “circumstance of being in or around an on-going social setting for the
purpose of making a qualitative analysis of that setting” (p. 262). To properly record, describe,
and interpret data collection during fieldwork, I took field notes that contained participants’
observations and comments as well as my own reactions and reflections. As advised by Merriam
(2009) and Patton (2002), these two categories of notes were kept separate within all field notes
document. Additionally, as suggested by Patton (2002), I aimed to produce field notes that had
“thick, deep, and rich description” and quoted participants as appropriate (p. 331). Finally, I
digitally recorded interviews and observations as permitted by the study’s participants (Patton,
2002).
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To ensure consistency throughout the case study, I used protocols, defined by Creswell
(2008) as “forms designed and used by qualitative researchers to record information during
observations and interviews” (p. 233). Protocols lay out a step-by-step research process that
increases the likelihood of case replication, which is, as Yin (2009) adds, “essential if you are
doing a multiple case study” (p. 79). Additionally, case study protocol significantly increases the
reliability of a study, which is further addressed as part of the research trustworthiness section at
the end of this chapter. The case study protocol for the current study is located in Appendix B,
and included the case study’s purpose and research aims, and an outline of data collection
guidelines, methods of analysis, and procedures for ensuring trustworthiness and protection of
participant rights (Yin, 2009). Finally, as part of the case protocol, I employed three data
collection techniques - participant interviews, document analysis, and direct observations
(Patton, 2002). Together, these three techniques laid the foundation for an in-depth and holistic
multiple-case study approach.
Participant Interviews
Creswell (2008) defined one-on-one interviews as “data-collection process in which the
researcher asks questions to and records answers from only one participant in the study at a time”
(p. 226). Similarly, Yin (2009), argued that interview data collection is “one of the most
important sources of case study information” because the strategy has the potential to provide
data to the researcher that he or she might not otherwise have the capability of capturing during
the study (p. 106). However, to maximize this data collection strategy, it is important for the
researcher to ask the right questions and control the flow and type of data collection while also
creating a receptive atmosphere where participants feel comfortable sharing their observations
and experiences (Creswell, 2008).
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Qualitative researchers often times use a semi-structured interview approach to negotiate
a balance between the need to follow the protocol and maintain an open-ended format that allows
the participants to add their own perspective (Creswell, 2008; Patton, 2002). Patton (2002) and
Yin (2009) noted that this type of interview is advantageous because it maintains the same
pattern of questioning during all interviews, which increases the research study’s reliability, and
also provides participants with opportunities to articulate their thoughts without restricting their
answers. Lastly, it is critically important that researchers remain mindful that interview data are
always biased and represent the participant’s viewpoint and perception of reality.
Before I commenced participant interviews, the interview questions were field tested with
a liberal arts college president who was not otherwise involved in the current study. I emailed the
questions to the field tester, and I followed up with a phone call, providing the president an
opportunity to share his feedback regarding the interview questions. The field tester’s feedback
did not result in changes to the final interview protocol (Appendix D). Additionally, in
preparation for my fieldwork, I coordinated interview appointments with each participant at each
case institution ensuring that arrangements were consistent among all three institutions. I
communicated directly with some participants while I scheduled other participant interviews
through participants’ administrative support representatives by telephone and email.
Interview data in the current study were collected over a three month period. Based on
Creswell’s (2008) interview protocol and Merriam’s (2009) interview guide, the current study
used the participant interview protocol found in Appendix D. As noted, the interview was a
semi-structured interview with 15 general questions about the participant’s perceptions regarding
the institution’s adaptability, current state, and the participant’s role in the institution. The
interview questions were derived, in part, from Patton’s (2002) outline of types of interview
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questions, which include demographic, behaviors, sensory, behavior, and opinion and feeling
questions. Additionally, as advised by Merriam (2009), I began each interview with the least
invasive and controversial questions of the session. Finally, as Patton (2002) stated, each
interview concluded with a catchall and open-ended question aimed at prompting any
information the participant wished to share, but had not yet had the opportunity.
The interview protocol loosely regulated the interview process and provided a place for
my field notes. Since the interview was semi-structured, the protocol served only as a plan, and
the interview questions were not necessarily asked in the exact way in each interview.
Additionally, I used probes to gain more insight into a listed topic and pursued entirely new areas
of questioning not included in the guide (Creswell, 2008; Patton, 2002). This flexibility
maximized the participant contributions to the data collection process.
As previously outlined, participant interviews took place during my fieldwork. Each
interview began with individual participants completing a consent document that outlined the
details of the study and their participation in it (Appendix E). As guided by Creswell (2008) and
Yin (2009), the document provided a brief overview of the study including a rationale for
institutional participation, duration and aim of study and fieldwork, potential disturbance from
researcher presence, and results reporting and usage. Additionally, the informed consent portion
of the document addressed protection of participant rights including right to refuse to participate,
confidentiality and privacy (Yin, 2009). As communicated in the document, identities of both
individuals and institutions were protected in the research study to ensure confidentiality.
Finally, as an ethical measure, I committed to minimizing the disruption to the participant and
committed to full disclosure and to reporting results fully and honestly (Creswell, 2008). After
providing the proper permission to proceed, participants were asked to disclose demographic

	
  

95	
  

information and to identify other participants who were well informed and equipped to provide
insight into the case institution (Creswell, 2008, p. 219). I then contacted these additional
participants and included them in the interview process as well.
While I aimed to conduct all interviews in a face-to-face format in the field with a
planned duration of one hour, geographic and time constraints limited some participants’ role in
the study. Of the 30 participants, eight participated in phone interviews. More specifically, of the
nine participants I interviewed at Colston College, I interviewed eight participants in person and
on campus, and I interviewed one participant by phone since he was unable to be on campus
when I conducted my site visit. At Payton College, I interviewed all participants in person and on
campus with the exception of a board of trustees member, who was interviewed at his place of
employment. Finally, of the 13 participants’ interviews conducted and included in the current
study’s data analysis from Vilma College, I interviewed six participants by phone and I
interviewed seven participants in person, two of whom were interviewed at Vilma College’s
former campus. The remaining in person interviews took place at a private location chosen by
the participant.
Additionally, I digitally recorded and transcribed all interviews immediately following
site visits with one exception. One participant’s interview at Payton College was not digitally
recorded due to a device malfunction. Instead, the transcription was based on my field notes in
lieu of a recording. On average, interviews lasted 65 minutes with the shortest interview lasting
31 minutes and the longest interview lasting approximately 115 minutes.
Document Analysis
In addition to participant interviews and direct observations, a researcher can collect and
analyze documents, which, in addition to providing new information, can substantiate other
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forms of data, increasing the reliability of the study (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). Creswell (2008)
broadly defines documents as “public and private records that qualitative researchers obtain
about a site or participants in a study” (p. 230). Several researchers listed types of documents that
can be of interest to the qualitative researcher: institutional records; memoranda and
correspondence; official publications and reports; journals; written responses to questions and
survey results, newspapers and mass media products, meeting agendas and minutes, calendar,
notes, written reports of events, proposals, progress reports, internal records, and formal studies
or evaluations (Creswell, 2008; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). Documents are often times a good
source of information because they are free and available. However, researchers should be
cautious of the specific conditions under which a document was produced including its accuracy,
author, context, purpose, and scope (Yin, 2009).
Document analysis in the current study took place over a 10-month period. I selected
documents based on their significance to the current study’s purpose. Initial document
identification included organizational charts; strategic plans; board of trustee meeting minutes;
board of trustees resolutions; cabinet meeting minutes, faculty meeting minutes; alumni board
meeting minutes; course catalogs; opinion survey results; official institutional publications and
press releases; admissions data; budgets and review of costs and revenues, and institutional
profile and statistics. Additionally, I reviewed documents volunteered by participants before,
during, or after fieldwork. I obtained necessary permission to use documents from identified
document authorities. All documents were reviewed for their accuracy. Document collection and
analysis took place throughout the study. Table 2 specifies the public and private documents I
analyzed at each case institution.
Table 2
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Public and Private Documents Analyzed, Listed by Case Institution
Public Documents
Colston Faculty Handbook
College
Course Catalog

Private Documents
Board of Trustees Fundraising Reports

Common Data Set
Website Information
Admissions Materials
990 Tax Return
Campus Map
Organizational Charts
Alumni Magazines
Presidential Memorandums
Charter and Bylaws
Payton Faculty Handbook
College
Course Catalog

Board of Trustees Meeting Minutes
Board of Trustees Meeting Presentation

Common Data Set

Board of Trustees Resolution

Website Information

Presidential Memorandum

Admissions Materials
990 Tax Return
Campus Map
Organizational Charts
Alumni Magazines
College Profile Information
Vilma
Course Catalog
College
Tax Information
Alumni Magazines

Board of Trustees Meeting Minutes
Board of Trustees Fundraising Reports
Financial and Investment Committee Reports
Presidential Memorandums
Faculty Meeting Minutes
Education Policy Committee Meeting Minutes
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Faculty Handbook
Common Data Set
Admissions Materials
Campus Map
Organizational Charts
Proposed Budgets
Annual Audits
Accreditation Review Information and Reports
Charter and Bylaws
Colston College’s private documents dated 2008 and 2013, Payton College’s private documents
dated 2009-2010, Vilma College’s private documents dated 2006-2009.
Direct Observations
Direct observation, as defined by Patton (2002) includes “detailed descriptions of
people’s activities, behaviors, actions, and the full range of interpersonal interactions and
organizational processes that are part of observable human experience” (p. 4). Observation
provides the researcher an opportunity to collect data and to understand the context in real time
without being dependent on others’ perceptions (Creswell, 2008; Patton, 2002). This technique
adds valuable data to the study when the researcher observes things that participants do not
notice or are reluctant or neglect to articulate in participant interviews (Patton, 2002).
As part of the overall data collection strategy for the current study, I visited each
institution and spent between three and four days on each campus collecting data through
informal observation. During each campus visit, I interviewed participants, walked the campus
grounds, dined in the cafeteria facilities, and investigated the surrounding neighborhoods and
community. In accordance with Creswell’s (2008) research, I utilized the observational protocol
represented in Appendix G. Observational protocols, as described by Creswell (2008), divide
researcher field notes into two columns with one reserved for a description of activities and one
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reserved for the researcher’s reflections about his or her observations. Together, participant
interviews, document analysis, and observational notes provided data for in-depth analysis.
Role of the Researcher
Since the researcher acts as the primary research instrument in qualitative research
designs, special consideration is given to a researcher’s role as well as his or her inherent bias
and limitations (Merriam, 2009). A nonparticipant observer role is defined as one that works in
the field and collects data without engaging in the happenings of the study’s participants
(Creswell, 2008). In this role, the researcher is perceived as an “outsider” (Patton, 2002, p. 331).
In short, this type of role helps protect a researcher’s objectivity and minimizes the disturbance
caused by his or her presence in the field (Merriam, 2009; Patton, 2002).
For these reasons, it was most appropriate that I took on a nonparticipant observer
researcher role in the current study. I fully disclosed the study to each participant at the
beginning of participant interviews (Patton, 2002). Additionally, to continually consider my own
bias and limitations, I maintained an attitude of “reflectivity” and “reflexivity” throughout the
study (Patton, 2002, p. 331). As mentioned, I kept field notes, remarking separately on
descriptions of observation and my own interpretation and perspective of those observations.
Triangulation strategies discussed below also helped limit the role of researcher bias.
In the interest of full disclosure, I divulged my initial interest in the study, which further
explains my researcher perspective before the study commenced. My interest in the study is both
experiential and research-based. I earned a bachelor’s degree in 2006 from a liberal arts college,
value liberal education, and maintain a research interest in liberal arts colleges and education
throughout my academic career. Additionally, I disclosed my bias regarding the current study’s
findings before the study commenced. I anticipated that the findings of the current study would
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focus heavily on institutional constituents’ perceptions of leadership. To account and control for
this researcher bias, the current study used multiple data sources, one of which was participant
interviews that investigated several areas of each institution including, but not limited to,
leadership and constituent perceptions of leadership.
Data Analysis and Interpretation
The purpose of data analysis is to organize and interpret data collected in the study and
generate a “larger, consolidated picture” (Creswell, 2008, p. 245). However, this task proves to
be quite difficult for most researchers since there is no one agreed upon process for qualitative
data analysis (Creswell, 2008; Yin, 2009). In fact, Yin (2009) says, to a large degree, “much
depends on an investigator’s own style of rigorous empirical thinking, along with the sufficient
presentation of evidence and careful consideration of alternative interpretations” (p. 127). Still,
researchers suggest several general guidelines for organizing and analyzing data, many of which
were utilized in the current study (Creswell, 2008; Merriam, 2009).
In a broad sense, qualitative data analysis is iterative, inductive, and intensive (Creswell;
2008; Patton, 2002). An iterative collection and analysis process indicates that these two stages
are recurring and that the researcher uses one to inform the other throughout the study.
Additionally, the process is inductive in nature since the researcher moves from a large amount
of quite specific and detailed information towards a few overarching themes and patterns
(Creswell, 2008; Patton, 2002). Finally, good qualitative research and specifically case study
research, is holistic and intensive, giving attention to the entire unit of analysis and its multiple
contexts and sources of data (Merriam, 2009; Patton, 2002).
More specifically, the most popular form of data analysis is known as “content analysis,”
defined by Patton (2002) as “any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a
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volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings” (p.
453). As Merriam (2009) noted, through this process, the researcher uses collected data to
develop themes that inform his or her understanding of a study’s research questions. This process
occurs at two levels in a multiple-case study: within case and cross case (Merriam, 2009). At
both levels, there are two major phases to the approach – the descriptive phase, which includes
transcribing, organizing, and coding; and the interpretative phase, when the researcher develops
and compares patterns in the data and makes general conclusions about the research questions
determining the significance of research findings and how findings might inform established
theory (Patton, 2002).
In the descriptive phase, I organized and transcribed interview, observation, and
document data. This process necessitated that I first reviewed the data multiple times and
cultivated an independent understanding of each case (Creswell, 2008; Merriam, 2009; Patton,
2002). This process was accomplished by producing a written case record for each case
institution, which was essentially an organized compilation of all data collected during the study
for the specific institution (Patton, 2002). According to Creswell (2008), data collected can be
organized by source type, site, or a combination of both. Further, Merriam (2009) stated the
organization can be time- or topic-based. I made a judgment about organizational methods after
data were initially reviewed and organized data based on topics that were reflected in the
literature review and that appeared throughout the participant and document data. As Creswell
(2008) advised, I kept duplicate copies of all forms of data. Data were stored on a secure
computer and in a locked office during the study.
After I organized the data and developed each case record, I coded the data in the current
study. Merriam (2009) defined coding as “assigning some sort of shorthand designation to
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various aspects of your data so that you can easily retrieve specific pieces to the data” (p. 164).
Researchers develop these codes or categories on their own or from participant or literature
input. The codes should always mirror the study’s purpose, should be mutually exclusive, and
comprehensive (Merriam, 2009). However, as Creswell (2008) and Patton (2002) described, the
coding process is largely an interpretive one; coding and theme decisions are exclusively the
researcher’s to make. In terms of process, Creswell (2008) suggested coding the documents in
the left-hand margin and reserving the right margin for developing themes, the next step of the
analysis process.
As mentioned before, I worked through an iterative coding process that determined what
information fit together. After coding the data, I developed a master list of codes and grouped
similar codes together (Creswell, 2008). These clumps of codes created the foundation for the
study’s major themes that informed my understanding of the study’s central phenomenon.
Through this process, themes emerged, which Creswell (2008) defined as “similar codes
aggregated together to form a major idea in the database” (p. 252).
In interpreting these themes, I developed explanations regarding the study’s research
questions as well as explained data divergence that contradicted the study’s patterns or themes
(Patton, 2002). Additionally, I engaged in pattern matching, described by Yin (2009), as “one of
the most desirable techniques” to use for case studies because it “compares an empirically based
pattern with a predicted one,” which here was based in the theoretical framework outlined in
Chapter I (p. 136).
Finally, in an effort to provide the most sophisticated level of data analysis and
interpretation, I gave attention to the extent in which the study’s themes crossed over multiple
data sources or perspectives (Creswell, 2008). The study’s findings were also interpreted with
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respect to past studies, observations and reflections about the current study including the process
and potential limitations, and future need for study expansion. And as Patton (2002) directed, I
addressed the strength and consistency of the study’s evidence, how it informed the study’s
purpose and research questions, and the extent to which the findings were useful in light of a
specific purpose.
Research Trustworthiness
In any research study, the researcher is responsible for demonstrating that the study is
conducted with meticulous attention to proper and ethical protocol and to protecting the
trustworthiness of the study’s results. The current study was inherently limited due to its
qualitative design; limitations included issues of researcher bias, transferability restrictions, and
imperfect validity and reliability of data sources and interpretation (Creswell, 2008; Merriam,
2009). As a framework for addressing and limiting issues of research trustworthiness, Lincoln
and Guba (1985) outlined several strategies that ensure credibility, transferability, dependability,
and confirmability in research findings. By employing these strategies and addressing issues of
trustworthiness, I further substantiated the findings and reinforced the findings and significance
of the study. In short, through these strategies, I assured the research community that the results
are “worth paying attention to” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 290).
Credibility
The credibility test examined the likelihood that the current study’s research findings
were accurate and that I reported a credible explanation of these research findings. Creswell
(2008) described credibility in terms of validity of findings, and Merriam (2009) described the
test as posing this question: “Are investigators observing or measuring what they think they are
measuring?” (p. 201). Lincoln and Guba (1985) listed several strategies that examine the
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credibility of research findings; the current study employed the following: triangulation,
member-checking, and prolonged engagement.
Triangulation. While qualitative research operates from the premise that reality is
constructed and never objective, the research approach employed strategies that ensured “rigor,
breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1997, p. 5).
Creswell (2008) defined triangulation as the “process of corroborating evidence from different
individuals, types of data, or methods of data collection in descriptions and themes in qualitative
research” (p. 266). By reporting research findings that sprung from a diverse base of data
collection sources, the current research study’s results were more credible (Patton, 2002; Yin,
2009). To create “converging lines of inquiry,” I triangulated three major data collection sources
throughout the current study: participant interviews, document analysis, and direct observations
(Yin, 2009, p. 115).
Member-checking. Member-checking is the “process in which the researcher asks one or
more participants in the study to check the accuracy of the account” (Creswell, 2008, p. 267).
Member checking confirms that the researcher’s interpretation of interview data is perceived in
the manner in which participants intended it to be perceived (Creswell, 2008). To ensure accurate
transmission of interview data, each participant was provided, via email (Appendix F), with a
draft of interview data within 60 days of completing the interview. Interviewees were asked to
respond with their feedback, which was incorporated in the final data analysis and interpretation
process. Interviewees were also notified that failure to provide feedback within seven days
resulted in drafts being finalized for data analysis. Eleven participants made minor adjustments
to the wording of the transcript or corrected inaccurate figures reported in our initial interview;
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13 approved the transcripts with no changes; and six did not respond to the request for validation
or feedback.
Prolonged engagement. Lincoln and Guba (1985) argued that the researcher spending
extended time in the field enhances the credibility of a study. This prolonged engagement
provides the researcher with adequate time to build rapport, adjust to the settings, observe the
culture and activity of the participants within the case, and ultimately achieve the purpose of the
study. By engaging in extensive fieldwork at each case institution, I increased the credibility of
findings and established trusting relationships with participants while minimizing my disturbance
during a two to three day field experience at each site. Prolonged engagement allowed the
newness and foreignness of my presence to wear off and allowed participants to become more
comfortable sharing their observations with me. Consequently, results were more accurate.
Transferability
The transferability test assessed the extent to which the current study’s research findings
can be extended to other settings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Merriam (2009) and Yin (2009) refer
to this test as an assessment of external validity. As mentioned before, qualitative research results
are not statistically generalizable due to the nature of the research design and to purposeful
sampling strategies. However, I employed strategies that increased analytical transferability,
which Yin (2009) stated enables the researcher to generalize “a particular set of results to some
broader theory” (p. 43).
These strategies include the use highly descriptive data and multiple cases of analysis. A
theory is tested by replicating research findings among several cases or by demonstrating a
hypothesized difference among cases. In short, the researcher can also enhance transferability by
confirming data convergence and by addressing “rival explanations” (p. 133). These strategies
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substantiated findings so that they were applicable to other contexts and to the theoretical
framework addressed in Chapter I.
Confirmability
The confirmability test assessed my skill to conduct the current study in an unbiased
manner (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Confirmability is best enhanced by a researcher’s commitment
to being as reflective and reflexive as possible throughout the research study. A reflexive
researcher is someone who “openly discusses his or her role in the study in a way that honors and
respects the site and participants” (Creswell, 2008, p. 485). By maintaining a nonparticipant
observer role throughout fieldwork in the current study, I protected my ability to be neutral and
objective. Further, through the extensive use of field notes, I reflected on my own predispositions
and attempted to control personal bias throughout the study.
Dependability
The dependability test assessed the consistency of results. Merriam (2009) and Yin
(2009) described this test as a verification of reliability of results. Reliability and consistency are
best assessed by the “extent to which research findings can be replicated” if the study were to be
repeated (Merriam, 2009, p. 205). Dependability of results is particularly challenging in
qualitative research because human activity and environment are ever changing (Merriam, 2009).
However, there are strategies that can enhance dependability of findings even in qualitative
research designs.
Strategies that increased the current study’s dependability included the use of case study
protocol, development of a case study database, an audit trail, triangulation, and maintaining
transparency (Merriam, 2009; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). The use of a case study protocol
(Appendix B) operationalized the procedure creating an easily replicable step-by-step guide. The
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case study database ensured that all documentation – interview data, documents, observational
data, and field notes - remained organized and consistent throughout the research study easily
outlining an audit trail for potential reviewers (Yin, 2009).
Finally, the prominence of the researcher’s role in qualitative research also presents
obstacles to a study’s dependability. The researcher may interpret results differently than another
researcher, participants may respond to the researcher differently than they would to another
researcher, and researcher perceptions and biases might affect a study in different ways. To help
control for these researcher specific effects, I depended heavily on maintaining a reflective and
reflexive approach to field notes throughout the study, acknowledging my biases in an effort to
control for their impact on the study.
Chapter Summary
Patton (2002) listed several principles of qualitative inquiry that highlight the strategies
used in the current study’s overall approach. The design was based on naturalistic inquiry that
required me to collect data in the participant’s ordinary environment and remain open and
flexible during the process. A purposeful sample focused the study’s sample so data collection
was intensive and thorough. Additionally, I collected and consulted data from multiple sources
when I identified the current study’s themes and developed interpretations about how those
themes addressed the current study’s research questions. I remained as neutral as possible
throughout the process. Finally, data were analyzed with a contextual lens that gave attention to
the environment in which each individual case existed. Throughout the study, I ensured that the
study followed a thorough process that led to trustworthy results. While the chapter outlined the
research protocol for the study, I respected the emerging process that is characteristic of
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qualitative research, and adjusted the study based on participant feedback to maintain a
participant-focused study (Creswell, 2008, Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009).
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
The current study’s purpose was to understand how private liberal arts colleges adapted
during the Great Recession of 2007 by examining institutional changes at three private liberal
arts colleges and their effects on the institutions’ operations. To fulfill this purpose, the study
was guided by four process-focused research questions, which were appropriately addressed
using a qualitative multiple-case study approach. The research questions that guided the study
were:
1. What external environmental pressures influenced the liberal arts colleges during the
Great Recession of 2007?
2. What adaptive strategies did the liberal arts colleges employ to respond to the external
environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007?
3. How did the adaptive strategies employed by the liberal arts colleges to respond to the
external environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007 affect their
operations?
4. How did institutional constituents perceive the adaptive strategies employed by the
liberal arts colleges to respond to the external environmental pressures during the Great
Recession of 2007?
The following chapter provides a brief overview of the data collection and analysis
processes used in this study, followed by an in-depth report of the findings. The findings of the
study are presented in two sections. The first section provides an institutional profile of each
case, which includes a detailed overview of each institution’s characteristics, its pre-recession
status, and its operations and adjustments during the recession. The second section of the
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chapter’s findings analyzes the themes presented across case institutions as they relate to the
current study’s research questions.
Data Collection
I deemed a qualitative multiple case-study approach to be the most appropriate
investigation method for the current study. In an effort to draw on several types of data sources, a
strategy Merriam (2009) and Yin (2009) referred to as a distinctive feature of case studies, data
collection in the current study included three information bases: participant interviews, historical
documents, and observational notes. While I collected historical document data during a 10month period, I gathered interview and observational data for the current study during a
concentrated twelve-week period in January, February, and March of 2013.
I interviewed 31 participants in the current study; however, one participant from Vilma
College withdrew citing confidentiality concerns. Therefore, of the 30 participant interviews I
collected and analyzed, nine were from Colston College, eight were from Payton College, and 13
were from Vilma College. I selected participants associated with Colston College and Payton
College because they served as a board of trustees member, a president, a cabinet member, or a
faculty member at their respective institution at the time of the current study’s fieldwork.
Additionally, I selected participants associated with Vilma College because they served as a
board of trustees member, a president, a cabinet member, or a faculty member for some period of
time between 2006 and 2011.
During each interview, I asked the participant 15 open-ended questions listed in the
interview protocol (Appendix D). When necessary, I followed up participants’ answers with
probe questions to encourage them to elaborate or clarify their responses. I recorded and
transcribed interviews immediately following site visits with one exception. One participant’s
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interview at Payton College was not digitally recorded due to a device error; I substituted my
field notes in the recording’s place. All interview transcriptions were provided to participants for
review and approval; 11 participants made changes, 13 gave their approval without changing the
document, and six did not respond to the request within the specified timeframe. To protect
participants’ identity in the study, I denoted participants by their case institution number and
institutional role.
As mentioned, documents associated with all three case institutions were collected during
a 10-month period. These documents included both public and private documents, some of
which were provided to me by participants; examples of public documents included institutional
catalogs, campus maps, faculty handbooks, vision and mission statements, strategic plans,
common data sets, charters and bylaws, and tax returns, and examples of private documents
included board resolutions, faculty meeting minutes, board of trustees meeting minutes, internal
documentation, and accreditation review information.
Finally, I conducted a multi-day campus visit at each case institution. During each visit, I
conducted participant interviews, used the institution’s facilities, investigated the surrounding
areas and neighborhoods, and walked the campus grounds, gathering observational data that
corroborated interview and document data regarding the nature of the institution’s campus and
operations. Together, participant interviews, document analysis, and observational notes
provided data for the study’s in-depth analysis.
Data Analysis
The analysis process in the current study occurred at two levels: within case and cross
case (Merriam, 2009). At both levels, I included a descriptive phase, which focused on
transcription, organization, and codification of data; and an interpretative phase, which focused

	
  

112	
  

on the development and comparison of patterns in the data and the analysis of themes and how
they informed the current study’s research questions (Patton, 2002).
After transcribing interview data and reviewing document data and observational notes in
the descriptive phase, I produced a case record for each case institution, which was essentially an
organized compilation of all the data collected during the study related to each specific
institution (Patton, 2002). After creating a holistic description of each case, I engaged in the
process of coding data and developing themes to produce a comparative analysis of all three
cases. Merriam (2009) defined coding as “assigning some sort of shorthand designation to
various aspects of your data so that you can easily retrieve specific pieces to the data” (p. 164). I
electronically coded data by color coding participants’ transcripts and copying data into
categories that I developed after my initial interviews and campus visits and after review of the
transcripts, documents, and research questions. Once categorized, I subdivided data creating
more specific focuses depending on the richness and depth of the information in each category.
These clumps of codes and categories created the study’s major themes, which Creswell (2008)
defined as “similar codes aggregated together to form a major idea in the database” (p. 252). This
process continued until no new ideas or themes appeared when reviewing transcripts, documents,
and notes. At this point, which Creswell (2008) referred to as the saturation point, I moved from
developing themes to interpreting the identified themes. In interpreting these themes, I developed
explanations regarding the study’s research questions as well as explained data divergence that
contradicted the study’s patterns or themes (Patton, 2002).
Profile of Case Institutions
Colston College
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Colston College was a four-year, liberal arts, residential institution affiliated with a
mainline Protestant and Evangelical Christian denomination. The privately operated institution
was governed by a 42-member board of trustees, which included three officers; 10 church
representatives, five of which were required to be clergy and five which could be laity; 25 at
large members; three ex-officio members; and one faculty representative. Prior to 2008, all 10
church representatives were required to be clergy. Ex-officio position holders on the board
included the acting bishop of the denomination’s region, the acting administrator of the
denomination’s region, and the president of the institution. The ex-officio members and faculty
representative did not have voting power on the board. The institution’s charter stipulated that no
less than 50% of the board was required to be Colston College alumni and a term limit of two- to
six-year terms was imposed on board of trustees members. Officers only served for three-year
terms, but the board held the authority to negotiate extensions. Recommendations for potential
board of trustees members originated with the board’s executive committee and required both the
general board and the denomination’s governing structure’s approval. The institution employed
192 staff and administrators. According to the institution’s organizational chart, Colston
College’s cabinet consisted of the president, the dean for institutional advancement, general
counsel, the chief information officer, the chief communications officer, the provost, the chief
financial officer, the dean of students, the vice president for enrollment, and the executive vice
president for strategic initiatives. In some cases, one administrator filled more than one cabinet
role at a time.
Colston College was originally founded in the late 19th century by a minster for the
purpose of providing primary and secondary education. Within five years of its founding, the
church purchased the school and moved it to a central location within the state. Within the next
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few decades, the school shifted its focus to higher education, dropping its primary and secondary
operations and renaming itself after a respected bishop in the church. Two smaller in-state
institutions within 90 miles eventually merged with Colston College.
Located in a suburban area of approximately 60,000 people, the institution was less than
40 miles from the state’s capital. Colston College was located in a newer looking area of town
near the community’s downtown district. There were two other institutions of higher education
in the immediate community. As I observed, Colston College’s 175-acre campus sprawled in its
medium-sized community and was located in close proximity to the interstate and main corridor
through town. Its main buildings included its student life center and athletic complex, both of
which were recently constructed; its chapel; its physical sciences center; and its new commercial
apartment complex.
The college’s vision, mission, and purpose pointed to its role as a national figure in
liberal arts that offered a curriculum and education that was traditional but relevant. Colston
College maintained a heavy focus on the role of engaged learning as part of the educational
experience. Colston College was also focused on development of the whole person and used
words like service, fulfillment, and the world community. Participants characterized the
institution as a “college of individuals,” “eclectic when compared to others,” and “crunchy.” One
faculty member stated that the institution was “focused not only preparation of students for
careers, but also [aimed] people in the direction of self-understanding, of knowing who they are
as they go and face whatever tasks the world has to offer.”
Colston College offered a bachelor’s degree in arts, a master’s degree in accounting, and
10 pre-professional programs. Majors included: accounting, allied health, American studies, art,
biochemistry/molecular biology, biology, chemical physics, chemistry, classics, computer
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science, creative writing, economics, economics and business, environmental studies, English,
literary studies, film studies, French, German, history, interdisciplinary studies, kinesiology,
mathematics, music, philosophy, philosophy and religious studies, physics, politics, psychology,
religious studies, sociology/anthropology, Spanish, and theatre.
Colston College required several experiences beyond a student’s major requirements for
successful completion of a degree. More than one fourth of a student’s course requirements were
fulfilled through core courses in humanities, natural sciences, and social sciences. In addition,
Colston College required demonstrated proficiency in writing, quantitative skills, and physical
activity. All students at Colston College were required to complete a shared freshmen course and
weekly seminar as well as a senior seminar. And finally, and perhaps most notably, Colston
College required all students to participate in at least three engaged learning activities during
their educational experience, which included areas like study abroad, research, internship,
service, or something else that was experiential in nature. Colston College also provided
domestic and abroad off-campus courses that were sponsored by either Colston College or by
another consortium institution. Colston College also advertised a host of exchange programs and
travel opportunities.
Colston College’s total enrollment in the fall of 2012 was approximately 1,380 students.
The institution advertised that it admitted students without regard for race, color, gender, age,
disability, religion or national origin, or financial status. Several factors were reviewed when
considering admission, including personal motivation, competence, potential, and character. Less
than half of the institution’s enrollment came from within the state with the vast majority of outof-state students coming from one of the institution’s contiguous states. One hundred percent of
students at Colston College received some form of financial aid. In 2010, the institution awarded
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27.1 million dollars in institutional aid.
Colston College housed more than 80% of their students on campus in 19 residence
areas, which include traditional dorms, apartments, and houses. Colston College prioritized
student life and involvement at the institution, and provided numerous outlets for engagement
with more than 80 student organizations, all of which were seen as integral to the learning
experience. Colston College had 21 varsity National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
Division III sports teams and a host of intramural sports. There was no Greek life program at
Colston College, which several participants noted as a distinctive feature and point of pride for
the institution.
Colston College’s faculty were made up of 109 full-time tenure track professors, the vast
majority of which held terminal degrees in their field of expertise. Additionally, the college
employed 52 adjunct professors. With a small enrollment, class sizes were seldom more than 20
and the faculty-student ratio stayed low at 11:1. Colston College’s faculty exercised selfgovernance to achieve the college’s mission and held broad authority over academic matters.
Colston College’s faculty were responsible for 16 standing committees. Three participants noted
the caliber of the faculty as a foundational piece of the institution.
When asked, “What makes [Colston College] distinctive?,” almost every participant
defined Colston College’s distinctiveness in its engaged learning program, which was named,
branded, and marketed as the institution’s capstone program only 10 years prior to the current
study’s fieldwork. The vice president for enrollment described the program particularly well
when she said:
[Our engaged learning program] has just been a phenomenal transformational program
for the institution. It has really launched [Colston College] to a national level in ways that
it had not been before. Not only do we consider ourselves, but we’ve been recognized by
numerous other colleges as well as individuals through the industry, as a real leader in
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engaged learning.
Several participants also noted the positive nature of national publicity and recognition the
institution gained as a result of the program’s success.
Pre-recession profile. In the early 2000s, a newly hired president at Colston College
identified two paradigm-threatening, external pressures in the institution’s immediate
environment: a change in the state-funded scholarship program that left Colston College at a
recruiting disadvantage for in-state students and the creation of an honors college endowment at
the state’s flagship university, which created new or accelerated competition within the state.
With these two new threats, Colston College’s enrollment hovered around 1000, which,
according to participants, was the highest enrollment the institution had ever been able to achieve
up to that point. Colston College’s new president brought a new vision and the institution’s
leadership made, what they believed to be, necessary changes to respond to these external
threats. The dean of students described this changing time at the institution this way:
The new president came in with the understanding that they had to innovate and be
different and they could no longer be this great school where you just count on people to
drop in your lap. You had to be on the larger stage, you had to go out and do something.
And now, we have a national reputation, at least, for being innovative.
A distinctive new program. Colston College’s national reputation for being innovative
was built largely on a program that was set in motion in the fall of 2003 when the new president
presented a groundbreaking curricular idea to the faculty and challenged them to appoint a
committee to flesh out the details with the provost. The committee convened and brainstormed,
solicited the general faculty’s feedback, surveyed students, and consulted market research data
and reports. The end product was a program that required students to participate in a specific
number of out-of-classroom experiences that spanned over at least three areas of focus. The
program also provided students with a transcript documenting their engaged learning experiences
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and recognized incoming freshmen that had already engaged in experiential learning projects
before attending the institution.
As many participants pointed out, one reason the program was so successful was because
many of the experiences in the new formalized engaged learning program were already being
taken advantage of on a regular basis by students who voluntarily participated in them. The new
program, however, made the experiences a requirement for graduation. Participants described
this process as one that “simply codified what we were doing for a long time” and “labeled
activities that were available on a voluntary basis.” Perhaps most articulately, the vice president
for enrollment said the program was a success because it was “truly already in the fabric and
fiber of this place.”
In addition to the program already being part of the institution’s identity, several
participants also attributed the success of the program to the way by which it was developed and
implemented. In a general sense, the program was developed through an initial presidential
vision that was supported by the board of trustees and articulated persuasively at a faculty
meeting in 2003. The president challenged the faculty to develop a program that was distinctive
on a national level and true to the institution. The broad vision was given to the faculty who then
developed the specific curriculum and the identity of the program. The faculty committee
incorporated faculty feedback, student surveys, and consultant research into their program plan.
Once formalized, external relations and admissions representatives traveled to targeted areas and
explained the new program to prospective parents and students. In addition, the institution
financially supported the program with budget dollars and new private gift revenue. In fact, at
the time of the current study’s fieldwork, significant portions of the budget as well as
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endowments supported student activities and faculty involvement in these experiential learning
opportunities.
More specifically, participants noted the president’s persuasive “visionary speech” and
the way the faculty “just moved it forward in less than a year” with “tremendous investment of
time and enthusiasm” when they described the strengths of the process of adding the new
program. Additionally, a cabinet member noted that the implementation of the program marked a
point when “we worked so closely with the faculty in a new way,” and a faculty member noted
that the program was a tremendous success because “alumni and trustees really put their money
where their mouth was to help get this thing off the ground.” In short, the program was viewed as
a success because each constituent group perceived itself as having a meaningful role in the
process and valued the roles of other constituent groups in the process as well. One faculty
member described it this way:
That’s been one of the really positive things about the president. He picked up on the
trends and stimulated the faculty into action to come up with what wound up being [the
engaged learning program]. He laid it out as a goal, and the faculty came up with the
program. He provided the stimulus and the trustees agreed with him.
Value realignment. Equally as transformational as and interrelated with the engaged
learning program was the implementation of the institution’s cost restructuring plan. The
institution and its consultants saw the expansion of Colston College’s engaged learning program
as an opportunity to realign the institution in the marketplace. So, Colston College increased
tuition, the discount rate, and enrollment all within five years of the program’s kickoff. Noting
the innovative and unexpected nature of this approach, the interim president and dean for
institutional advancement described it this way:
We are very, very atypical from what most of our peer institutions have done in the last
five or six years, which has actually accounted for most of our growth and our increased
net revenue. We went on a very intentional pricing repositioning platform about seven
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years ago. The data said that we could do better in the market if we increased our price
significantly because the quality of what we were doing here wasn’t represented in the
eyes of the marketplace in terms of our price. The information demonstrated that we
could afford to do that by discounting back significant portions of the increased amount
while still, because of the incremental increase in enrollment, still increasing overall net
revenue for the college and increasing net revenue per student, but not as fast as you
otherwise would see it. And that’s what we did and it was scary and it worked.
Impressively, after implementing the value alignment, the institution’s enrollment grew by 40%
in less than 10 years, and surpassed their goal five years ahead of schedule while also
maintaining and slightly increasing the level of the incoming class’ academic profile.
Since 2006, Colston College has received ranking accolades from U.S. News & World
Report, Princeton Review, Fiske, and Colleges that Change Lives. Additionally, national
publications intermittently chronicled the institution’s trajectory during the last decade.
In the context of the recession. Colston College experienced record high enrollment
levels before and during the recession and the size of its student body increased by nearly 40% in
less than 10 years. The institution also increased its net revenue by more than 45% since the
recession’s start. Additionally during this time, the enrollment demographics shifted from a
majority of in-state students to a majority of out-of-state students as a result of the
implementation of the new engaged learning program and the value realignment. Further,
throughout the recession, Colston College passed only a small portion of its tuition increase on to
its students. Colston College also provided additional financial aid on an ad hoc basis to students
with extenuating circumstances caused by the recession. A financial review committee made up
of faculty and staff reviewed special cases and provided additional support to specific students
who demonstrated dire financial challenges.
New athletic programs. During the recession, the board of trustees and the administration
made a decision to institute men’s football and women’s lacrosse programs as varsity sports at
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the institution. The decision will be fully executed in the fall of 2013. According to official board
documents posted on the institution’s website, the board’s decision stated that their analysis
indicated that a football program “would support the efforts of [Colston College] to increase the
size, quality and diversity of its student body” and would “protect recent enrollment gains,
faculty additions, and enhancements to faculty salaries made possible by these enrollment gains
in a time when the number of college-bound students is projected to decrease in [the state] and
across the nation.” A cabinet member at Colston College described the strategy this way:
We considered [it] a small first step, but necessary, to help us increase the overall
enrollment. Football in and of itself, along with the women’s lacrosse offering on the
ladies’ side, was an effort for us to take, in a short period of time, advantage of an
opportunity which would allow us to increase our enrollment in a way that no other
initiative could have provided.
To facilitate the institution of these programs, the college approved a multi-million dollar capital
project that expanded its athletic facilities and enhanced the overall complex available for
athletes participating in all sports. The ongoing costs of these additional sports included
additional personnel and investment in equipment. However, participants stated that preliminary
analysis indicated that the sports would pay for themselves, and even generate revenue, if
established recruiting goals were met.
Technology-based education. In addition to a continued prioritization on the institution’s
newly branded engaged learning program, Colston College also prioritized the broadening of
technology-based educational tools and the investigation of online education. According to
Colston College’s chief information officer, the institution established his cabinet level position
in 2011 with the charge “to surface new ideas and ways that we can run the organization more
efficiently” by “making sure that we are marshaling technology dollars and resources in the most
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economical fashion to fulfill the [institution’s] mission.” Colston College’s chief financial officer
described the institution’s perspective of its new technology-based approach this way:
Because of who we are and where we are, there is a certain type of online education that
fits our mission. We’ve developed certain technologies using platforms that are available
that deliver a high equality classroom experience[s], which we see potentially allowing us
to partner with our schools, both in our peer groups and on a national level, where there
may even be other areas that we haven’t touched on yet where there would be a product
that really fits the mission of [Colston College].
More specifically, the institution investigated the use of and began offering online courses. It
also looked at partnerships with schools in its consortium to deliver courses between institutions
that would alleviate the need for additional faculty resources.
Campus renewal. In the middle of the recession, Colston College also released bonds to
fund two major capital initiatives: a student life and technology center and a wellness center.
Additionally, the institution built a new urban village, which was described by the chief financial
officer as…
…a residential-commercial development of property that the college had owned for
years. What has developed is a core commercial area. It consists of two commercial
buildings with commercial retail on the first floor and then the college owns three floors
above for student housing.
All three projects were funded through a combination of private gift revenue and bond issues.
These capital projects were cornerstones of the institution’s capital campaign. A 2008
presidential memorandum noted the board of trustees’ approval of the construction of the student
life center.
Balanced approach. Participants indicated that the institution’s fiscal management
approach to the recession was a balanced approach, focused both on increasing revenue and
decreasing costs as much as possible while giving special priority to protecting the quality of the

	
  

123	
  

product provided by the institution. The dean of students described the institution’s priority to
quality this way:
When schools get tight, you got to be innovative, but you [have] to be careful not to cut
your nose off to spite your face, to be able to make measured decisions. If you make
anything too dramatic, you can send folks into a panic and question the stability of the
college. I’m really proud of [Colston College] because we didn’t have that. We were
growing at a time when everybody else was having trouble and the reason is that
commitment to the student experience.
Institutional concerns. Most participants pointed to the institution’s success in
implementing its engaged learning program before the recession and approaching cost
containment and revenue generation from a balanced stance as the institution’s biggest successes
throughout the recession. Institutional concerns at the time of the current study’s fieldwork
included lowering the endowment spend rate, the need to broaden the resource base and build the
endowment, and the problem of self-selection among applicants. With specific regard to the
endowment spend rate, a cabinet member pointed to both the need to reduce the rate and the
increased pressure the reduction will create on the need to increase private fundraising to support
operational activity. He compared Colston College to its peer institutions, stating:
I can say that our draw [on the endowment] is at the higher end of the norm and we even
saw that in reviewing most recently with our peers that they have dropped their
endowment draws faster than we have. So we’ve been slow in bringing our endowment
draws down, and as a consequence, we’re being challenged now to reduce our draw
going forward.
In addition to multiple interviews that confirmed the institution’s spend rate was too high,
document analysis also indicated that Colston College depended more heavily on annual fund
dollars to balance its budget than three of its benchmark institutions. According to private
fundraising documents provided by Colston College, the institution’s annual fund contributed
just above 2.5% of its total annual revenue. However, trustees’ giving to the annual fund was
higher at Colston College than at its two peer institutions, which the interim president and dean
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for institutional advancement found to be encouraging, but lower to capital projects and the
endowment, which was not seen as an ideal situation.
Additionally, participants were concerned with the need of the institution to continue
innovating to meet the challenges in its external environment. A faculty member described the
institution’s situation this way:
We’re back at that point now but certainly not as desperate as it was. Market research
[says] that we’ve kind of plateaued again. There is a sense that it is time to innovate some
more. You got to kind of keep ahead of the curve if you can. You can’t rest on the laurels,
you always having to be having one more capital campaign. You have to keep innovating
and keep up-to-date and good, strong programs.
Payton College
Payton College was a four-year, liberal arts, residential institution affiliated with the same
mainline Protestant and Evangelical Christian denomination as Colston College. A 67-member
board of trustees, which included six officers, seven ex-officio members, 34 active term
members, and nine life members, governed the privately operated institution. Ex-officio position
holders on the board included the acting bishop of the denomination’s region, the acting
administrator of the denomination’s region, the president of the institution, the president of the
alumni association, the president of the student government association, and the chairs of two
standing faculty committees. Ex-officio and life members did not have voting power on the
board. The institution employed 140 staff and administrators. According to the institution’s
organizational chart, Payton College’s cabinet consisted of the president, the provost, the vice
president for advancement, the vice president for finance and administration, the vice president
for enrollment management, and the vice president for student development.
The institution’s charter was one of the oldest liberal arts charters west of the Mississippi
River and the institution was among the first 100 institutions of higher education founded in the
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United States. Payton College’s founding was wrapped up in the merging of a centrally located,
in-state public institution with a private institution in the early 19th century. Eventually, at the
turn of the 20th century, the institution was purchased by a Protestant denomination and moved to
the periphery of the state. The organization paid 166 dollars for the institution. According to the
institution’s website, the institution’s resident historian recalled that tuition in those days was 50
dollars plus the cost of room, board, and firewood. For more than five decades, the institution
operated as an all-men’s institution before becoming a coeducational college.
The institution was located in a metropolitan area of nearly half a million people in the
northern part of the state. The area’s economy was based in oil and gas, medical and biomedical
schools and centers, and military operations. As I observed, the campus was situated near the
area’s downtown district in a historic neighborhood that was mixed with homes on the historic
registry and dilapidated rental properties. The area also had pockets of high crime. Payton
College’s 65-acre campus was regarded as a historic cornerstone of the community, which was
demonstrated by its Georgian architecture and longtime presence in the area. Its main buildings
included its science hall, library, music building, playhouse, arts center, athletics arena, and its
chapel. Payton College’s fitness center, built in the 1990s, was the campus’ newest building.
Particularly important to Payton College’s location was the fact that there was not
another institution like it in the state or within 200 miles of the institution. Three participants
noted its regional distinctiveness in terms of its focus on liberal arts, its residential approach to
education, and its level of academic rigor. One cabinet member framed this circumstance as an
opportunity by saying, “We don’t have another selective private institution within 200 miles of
us, so we must maximize what we are doing.”
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The college’s vision, mission, and purpose pointed to its role as a selective educational
institution that sought to prepare students for their careers and their lives through liberal arts
education, which included academic rigor in the curriculum and an engaged on-campus student
life outside the classroom. The institution’s guiding documents spoke to the priority of
discovery, service, leadership, and the development of well-rounded individuals. When asked to
describe the institution, participants noted these aspects of the institution: small, selective, old,
private, and national. When probed, participants pointed to the commitment of the faculty, the
frequency and rate of individualized attention in and outside of the classroom, and the
institution’s commitment to strong academics and personal development. One cabinet member
described an educational approach that was “not necessarily tied to employment goals, but more
tied to developing each individual student’s promise.”
Payton College offered two undergraduate programs, one in arts and one in sciences, with
majors in art, biochemistry, biology, communication, biophysics, business administration,
English, chemistry, economics, French, geology, history, mathematics, music, neuroscience,
philosophy, political science, psychology, religious studies, sociology, and theatre. Additionally,
the institution offered two graduate programs, one in teaching and one in business.
If one of the established 24 majors did not fit a student’s interest, the institution allowed a
student to develop a particularized major that was built from existing courses and fit their
concentration. Acknowledging the importance of career preparation, Payton College also
provided 16 programmatic opportunities, many of which were pre-professionally based, and
three joint professional degrees in consortium with other institutions of higher learning. Finally,
the institution offered internship opportunities; mentoring; domestic and abroad travel programs;
and partnered with more than a dozen international organizations and institutions as part of its
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exchange program. In a general sense, a Payton College faculty member described the
curriculum this way:
Its academic focus and academic mission are grounded in a fairly traditional approach to
liberal arts education, but it is not constrained by that; we have pre-professional programs
as well. We have a more expanded version of what would have been called the traditional
liberal arts 50 years ago.
Payton College required several experiences beyond a student’s major requirements for
successful completion of a degree. One third of a student’s hour requirements were fulfilled
through core courses, some of which were aimed at framing disciplinary content in the context of
one of three specific global challenges in the modern world. The institution’s faculty identified
the modern day challenges studied in the curriculum. Additionally, students were required to
complete an interdisciplinary freshmen course and senior capstone seminar; an intensive onemonth study not normally offered through semester coursework and that usually occurred off
campus, abroad, or in the field; and a three-armed experience that educated students through
service learning, career exploration, and intercultural exposure.
Payton College’s total enrollment in the fall of 2012 was approximately 700 students,
although a faculty member stated that the enrollment as of March 2013 was closer to 600. The
institution admitted students without regard for race, color, gender, age, disability, religion or
national origin, or financial status. Several factors were reviewed when considering admission,
including grades, test scores, leadership experience, service, and personal essay. While Payton
College’s president referred to the institution as “national,” its enrollment at the time of the
current study’s fieldwork painted a more regionally-based picture. More than half of the
institution’s enrollment came from within the state, with the vast majority of the remaining
students coming from one of the institution’s contiguous states. A student was eligible to receive
financial aid through federal and state support as well as private scholarships and institutional
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aid. In 2010, the institution awarded 10.9 million dollars in institutional aid with 800 students for
a discount rate of 61.1%. Finally, according to the vice president for enrollment management, the
campus’ international student population was approximately 2% of the total enrollment.
With a small enrollment, class sizes were seldom more than 20 and the faculty-student
ratio stayed low at 11:1. While this was a “strength in the relationship,” one cabinet member
pointed out that “it [was] a weakness in the cost of operating.” General consensus among
participants was that the institution had not grown as fast as they hoped it would grow. In a
general sense, the recruitment challenges Payton College faced centered on the affordability of
the institution’s education and finding a critical mass of students who were willing to pay for it.
Payton College competed heavily with significantly cheaper in-state public options where higher
education was subsidized by a state-funded scholarship program. Participants also discussed the
challenge in articulating the value of their service and product to prospective students and
parents. The enrollment challenges that faced Payton College’s are discussed more in depth in
following sections.
Payton College was a residential campus that housed full-time students in five
dormitories. The institution recently launched a living learning community program that is
discussed in depth later in this chapter. As part of the new program, the institution approved a
policy that mandated on-campus living, which will be fully executed in the fall of 2013.
Additionally, Payton College provided numerous outlets for student engagement. Payton College
had 17 varsity and four club NCAA Division III sports teams. Student and religious life included
student and residence hall government; Greek life with two sororities and five fraternities; honor
societies, media and publications; special interest and academic clubs; and service opportunities.
Students at the institution were described by a faculty member as “very involved with
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opportunities to be multiply involved in leadership roles.”
Payton College’s faculty were made up of 90 members, 57 of whom were tenured, and
the vast majority of whom had terminal degrees in their field of expertise. The president and a
member of Payton College’s cabinet described the institution’s faculty as “a very rigorous
faculty that prize teaching above all and are not going to compromise the standards or the quality
of the education that they produce” and “extraordinary in their long-term commitment.” Payton
College’s faculty handbook stated that the college endorsed the American Association of
University Professors’ Statement of Colleges and Universities of 1966, which acknowledged the
importance of shared governance among students (when appropriate), faculty, administration,
and the board of trustees. The faculty coordinated seven standing faculty committees at Payton
College and participated in nine institutional committees.
When asked, “What makes Payton College distinctive?,” aside from pointing to
traditional strengths of small liberal arts colleges like faculty-student relationships and the
commitment of the personnel to the institution, many participants struggled to identify Payton
College’s distinctive features. One cabinet member noted, “Currently, the curriculum is pretty
standard.” A faculty member discussed Payton College’s distinctiveness as something that the
admissions office was focused on “sloganeering.” And while the president discussed the
achievements and successes of the institution, he was also candid and honest and admitted, “We
are probably not as distinctive from the other liberal arts college as we can or should be.”
Since 2006, Payton College has received ranking accolades from U.S. News & World
Report, Princeton Review, The Templeton Guide, Money Magazine, 200 Colleges for Science,
Forbes, and Peterson’s Competitive Colleges. Additionally, national publications intermittently
chronicled the institution’s trajectory during the last decade.
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Pre-recession profile. In order to investigate how Payton College was affected by and
responded to the most recent economic pressures of the United States’ economy, it was
necessary to first understand the institution’s operations from a pre-recession perspective. In a
general sense, Payton College’s pre-recession profile was best defined as a seemingly active
institution that was funded largely through budget overspending.
Overspending. At the beginning of the 2000s decade, enrollment at Payton College was,
according to the institution’s vice president for finance and administration, “hovering between
800 and 900 students” and the discount rate was between low and middle 60%. At that time, the
institution had more than 40 academic majors and participated in NCAA Division I
intercollegiate athletics, which came with steep operation costs, fees, scholarships, and travel
expenses. Payton College enrolled between 200 and 300 athletes during this time, which made
up approximately one third of the institution’s total enrollment. As described by an Payton
College cabinet member, put simply, Payton College’s “financial aid was just phenomenal”
across the board. As a result, the institution did not realize the net tuition revenue it needed to
balance its budget. When asked to describe the institution’s pre-recession situation, many
participants started by saying things like: “the college was overspending for a decade before the
recession” or “we were not operating off of a balanced budget” or “the college had run a 12-year
deficit.”
However, for many years, the problem of an unbalanced budget was disguised by a
strong economy and a booming stock market that produced increased endowment earnings. A
board of trustees member described the problem this way:
The stock market was queued up. We had a gigantic 20-year compounded growth rate for
10 years through the 1990s, which is totally unsustainable when considering the 100-year
average is 10%. If you are earning 20% for a long time, you can’t stay there, there is no
way to sustain that, although at the time you don’t believe it because it’s just doing so
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great and you want to live it. Because [Payton College] had not addressed some of its
underlying weaknesses, we were spending two to four percentage points higher on the
endowment than we should have depending on how off that year had been. We did this
for somewhere between eight and 10 years. In a 100 million dollar endowment, every
point is 1 million dollars. Instead of addressing the cost issues as fundamental issues, the
1990s delivered 20% returns, which allowed [Payton College] to overspend the
endowment by two or four points and still have earnings left over, but the overspending
becomes an issue in the next decade. We never got the enrollment we needed and never
got the tuition rate. And then the recession hit.
So, instead of finding a balance between the costs and revenues of the institution, the institution
compensated for the deficit by overspending its endowment spendable earnings. In short, instead
of banking some of its excess earnings during high return times like responsible investment
practices advised, the institution spent practically everything it made in endowment revenue.
According to board of trustees meeting minutes from 2010, a review of the previous seven years’
finances showed a cumulative deficit of more than $25 million that was covered with endowment
earnings.
It was also noteworthy that a participant acknowledged the board’s oversight during these
booming decades, but also noted that, due to Payton College’s accounting practices and methods,
increased endowment earnings masked the true deficit. He explained this by saying:
Another problem is that we have to use fund accounting for colleges and universities,
which is not the same as what all of us in the business world use every day. It’s a
different kind of deal. You take your unrealized gains and losses out of your endowment
and you plug them into your total return for the year. In other words, if you have 100
million dollars in your endowment and it goes up to 110 million dollars, that 10 million
dollars goes into your profit and loss statement. So if you are losing 5 million dollars a
year and you add 10 million dollars to it, you are plus 5 million dollars and everything
looks great. But, what we didn’t see, and should have seen but didn’t, or to the extent that
we thought we knew it, but it didn’t strike us as urgent was that masking of that structural
flaw. If we hadn’t had the endowment, we would have had the proverbial come to Jesus
meeting much, much quicker because we simply could not have paid our bills unless we
had cut costs, more net tuition, or some of both.
Fundraising. Additionally, the vice president for advancement indicated that fundraising
at Payton College grew dependent on “a very small group of select individuals” in pre-recession
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times. A few million-dollar gifts were used to maintain the operations of the institution on an
annual basis. Also noteworthy, shortly before the recession, the institution started a 100 million
dollar comprehensive campaign with objectives that included raising money for the annual fund,
endowed scholarships and professorships, programs beyond the classroom, and the construction
of a science building. The campaign was ultimately called off during the recession after meeting
less than 50% of its goal.
In short, Payton College was balancing its budget during pre-recession times through,
what the president later labeled in a February 2010 board of trustees meeting as, “endowment
overdraws” and “heroic giving” (Board of trustees meeting minutes, 2010, p. 3). But even given
the volatile financial status of the institution, participants acknowledged that the institution, in
pre-recession times, was vibrant and did not appear depressed. During this time, enrollment was
decent even though students were attending at a significantly reduced cost and faculty and staff
maintained their employment, benefits, and even saw raises during those years. As the vice
president for enrollment management said, “On the surface things were very good.”
In the context of the recession. During the first year of the recession, amidst a search for
a new president, Payton College’s board of trustees met and discussed the findings of a board
subcommittee’s three-month review of the college’s financial situation. A board of trustees
member recalled the decision to conduct the review this way:
So that’s when some of us on the board in the fall of 2008, when the market collapsed,
having seen what happened in 2001 and having not really done anything about it since
the market went up again and kind of bailed us out. And so in 2008, I and some of the
others said we’ve got to do something because if this runs out for another couple three
years we are going to be in real trouble. We were already in some trouble.
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Ultimately, the findings led the board to develop a resolution with the aim of outlining the
institution’s approach to addressing its growing financial pressures brought on, in part, by the
economic recession of 2007.
Board resolution. The result of their discussion was a five-point board resolution, passed
in 2009, that was geared towards reducing the costs of the institution and increasing the student
revenue. According to information presented in a May 2009 board of trustees meeting, these
points included: (a) the approval of a fiscal exigency policy, (b) the establishment of the position
of vice president of enrollment whose responsibility was to grow the student body to 1200 by
fiscal year 2014, (c) a five-year budget increase for student life and the encouragement of “the
completion of special projects such as residence hall renovation and the Greek Village,” (d) the
recommendation that the college “begin the process of restructuring its academic programs
reducing the instructional budget, reducing the number of majors; and increase the studentteacher ratio to approximately 15:1…;” and (e) the resolution that the college would leave its
current athletics division and conference and pursue alternatives (slides 21 & 22). According to
Payton College participants, this five-point resolution constituted the board’s most radical move
in the college’s recent history. Additionally, participants indicated that the effects of the board
resolutions changed the institution in a transformational manner. One cabinet member said, “In
many ways, the board decisions have changed virtually every aspect of the processes on this
campus.”
Once in office, the new president’s job was then to enact the board resolutions and set the
institution on a financially sustainable path. The president immediately identified 3 million
dollars worth of budget cuts necessary to balance the budget with a 5% spend rate from the
endowment. The reductions included 1 million dollars in cuts over a one- to four-year period
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from each of the following three areas: administration, athletics, and academics. While the
president acknowledged that he was aware of the institution’s dire situation before being elected
president, he admitted that the “depth of the emotional impact of what it was going to take to
correct the issues” was hard to foresee.
Administrative cuts. In an effort to carve out 1 million dollars from the administration’s
budget, the institution reduced its workforce by 25 staff members and nine faculty members, four
of whom were tenured. Faculty members were eliminated by virtue of their respective programs
being cut. Every member was offered a severance package based on grade and time of service,
and faculty were given the option to appeal the decision. All four tenured faculty sought appeals,
but none were granted. The process took a full year to execute, which prolonged the
administrative transition. Participants regarded this as one of the most difficult and damaging
moments of change for the institution, describing it as “brutal” and “painful by any definition.”
Athletics cuts. The board fully enacted the transition of the athletics program from one
division to another before the incoming president arrived. This issue, among all the points that
the resolution addressed, proved to be the most contentious issue facing the board. After several
months of internal meetings, discussions with conferences, and consultant analysis, the board
finally held a several hour meeting that concluded with a vote. Before the vote was taken, the
board read a letter from the incoming president, which urged the board to make a decision so the
institution could move forward. The president and the board both agreed that if the institution
waited to address the athletics issue under a new president, the process would be prolonged. A
board of trustees member described it this way:
If he would had to have come in and lead that fight, it would have used up all his
goodwill. So we used up all of our goodwill, and pushed and forced the decision, it
needed to happen. It was an accomplished fact when he arrived, which was probably best.
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The board finally voted to switch divisions two weeks before the institution’s new president
began his tenure.
The division shift did not necessary save scholarship dollars since those costs were offset
by game guarantee revenue, but it did save operational dollars associated with travel, salaries,
and operations. The cuts were phased in so that everyone who had already had an athletic
scholarship kept it until they withdrew or graduated from the institution. While participants
acknowledged that many trustees and alumni did not support the transition, every participant said
it was the right thing to do.
Academic cuts. In order to implement the board resolution and the president’s directive
to eliminate 1 million dollars from the institution’s academic operations, the president charged
the faculty to appoint a group of colleagues to restructure the curriculum. The president recalled:
The board resolution went straight to the faculty-student ratio and I reframed it as a
capacity issue. Here’s the money I think we need to get out of the academic side of the
budget, here’s the number of the students I think we need to be able to serve, you come
back and tell us what the academic program should look like within those constraints.
The faculty committee was given enrollment and budgetary parameters and a very
aggressive timeline for making changes. In a general sense, the guiding principle of the cuts was
to create a curriculum that would “define church-related liberal arts education for the twenty-first
century.” One cabinet member noted that career-focused majors and areas of study that did not
generate enrollment were least likely to remain in the curriculum. But, in a February 2010 board
of trustees meeting presentation, the directive instructed that the changes should “confirm
blended mission rather than pure liberal arts” (slide 10).
In order to complete the process, the leading faculty committee chair consulted with the
president and recommended that a committee outside of the standing committee structure be
charged with the restructuring of the curriculum. Ultimately, the ad hoc committee was
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comprised of the chairs of all active faculty committees as well as divisional representation
elected by the faculty at large. The restructuring process was implemented with the help of an
interim provost who most participants regarded as exceptional. The faculty also asked that the
entire process be confidential. Once the committee made its recommendations to the president,
the president reserved the right to modify them before presenting them to the board. While the
committee, in writing, acknowledged the restructuring process as “careful and consultative,” the
general faculty chose not to formally vote or comment on the academic changes.
The result of the changes was a 50% decrease in majors, which then led to the
termination of nine faculty members, four of whom were tenured, two of whom were tenuretrack, and three of whom were not tenure-track. Some of the cut majors did not have students
active in the program at the time of elimination, but some did. Like athletics, this transition was
also phased in and all faculty members were retained as long as already enrolled students
remained in the proposed eliminated programs. The institution eliminated 15 majors, which
included accounting; ancient and modern languages; business economics; dance; elementary
education; finance; health and exercise science; music education majors in instrumental and
vocal; music performance majors in orchestral instrument, organ, vocal, and piano; music majors
in sacred music and theory and composition; performing arts; physics; social studies; education
and all other secondary education majors; and Spanish. The institution also eliminated five
minors in accounting, business economics, energy management, finance, and health and exercise
science; and three programs in German studies, health and physical education, and Latin.
It was important to note that, as part of the curriculum evaluation, Payton College’s
administration analyzed the number of majors and the enrollment size of each of its peer
institutions within its consortium. Payton College found that it offered the second largest number
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of majors and had the lowest number of students per major in the entire consortium. The school
with the highest number of majors in the consortium was more than 5 times bigger than Payton
College. The school with the next lowest rate of students per major nearly doubled the rate of
Payton College.
The entire restructuring process, according to 2010 board of trustee meeting minutes, was
completed in less than 10 months with the faculty committee completing its work and making its
recommendations to the president in less than six months. In fact, a March 2010 board of trustees
resolution that finalized the academic restructure reiterated the need for continued swift action:
We support and encourage the president and faculty to work in as quick and deliberate
fashion as practical to develop and implement the necessary structure and programmatic
changes to the existing and future academic programs of the college to establish a
distinctive and financially sustainable curriculum for the future. (p. 3)
However, participants commented on the rushed nature of such sweeping academic change at the
institution as a negative aspect of the process that led to uncertainty and additional problems.
One cabinet member said that the institution was “changing more quickly than anyone is
comfortable with.” Another cabinet member noted the fast-paced and ambiguous decisionmaking process this way:
Even in times of crisis, the board is pretty methodical about the way it goes about doing
its business. I’d say everywhere else, it had the sense of being hurried. It’s not very often
in the [time] that I’ve been here that I felt like we really deliberated effectively about that
decision.
And finally, a faculty member described the process this way:
The process, we weren’t in control of that, it was much faster than we would have liked
it, we knew that we were going to have unforeseen problems delivering it because we had
to do it really quickly so we weren’t able to trace out a measure that said are we going to
be able teach this way, do we have enough labor, there are going to be problems that
we’ll have to iron out whereas if we’d gone slower, we’d figured it out.
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Balanced budget mandate. On an institutional level, the president mandated a balanced
budget, which had not been in place in prior years. By way of 3 million dollars of phased-in cuts
and additional private giving, the institution compensated for lowering the endowment spending
rate and the tuition discount rate. The institution balanced its budget with a reduced spend rate
within a year of implementing the cuts. Additionally, the institution phased in depreciation
budgeting into its annual projections. Creating a new culture of disciplined spending, participants
said, was a long-term adjustment for the institution. The president described it this way:
The other important piece of that was to get into people’s minds that this wasn’t
temporary; this was a resetting of the cost structure of the institution. It wasn’t a hiring
freeze, it really wasn’t a layoff, it was a reduction in the cost structure of the institution.
Everything we create today has to have a new justification.
Institutional concerns. While participants noted that the institution’s biggest successes
happened in its most recent adjustments, particularly in gaining control of the institution’s
spending rate and balancing the budget, participants also stated several concerns regarding the
stability of the institution. These concerns focused on the need to generate a larger and more
stable enrollment at the appropriate discount rate; the need to reduce the institution’s
overdependence on annual fund dollars to balance the operational budget so to avoid donor
fatigue and move forward with capital fundraising; and the need for faculty and staff to get “on
the same page” and “work effectively together.” Finally, Participants also articulated concerns
regarding the continued “draconian” nature of change at the institution. Finally, as a result of the
curriculum changes, institutional participants’ perceived the college as becoming more liberal
arts-focused, which both encouraged and concerned participants. One faculty member described
it this way:
With all these changes, it’s a gamble, what’s going to work. And, so what’s distinctive
about [Payton College]. One of the things is, and it also probably makes people happy
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and nervous at the same time, is that this president has double-downed on the liberal arts.
Vilma College
For the purposes of the institutional overview, statistics and information are reported as they
last existed in the 2010-2011 fiscal and academic years or as they were last reported in
documentation made available to me during the current study’s fieldwork.
Vilma College was a four-year, liberal arts, residential institution affiliated with the same
mainline Protestant and Evangelical Christian denomination as Colston College and Payton
College. Vilma College ceased to exist in 2011. A 24-member board of trustees, which included
four officers, a twelve-member executive committee, and eight ex-officio members, governed the
privately operated institution. Ex-officio position holders on the board included the acting bishop
of the denomination’s region and three additional denominational stakeholders associated with
specific arms of the church, the president of the institution, an alumnus or alumnae
representative, and the institution’s general counsel. Ex-officio members did not have voting
power. The institution’s 2007 faculty handbook stated, “Final authority in all maters rests with
the board of trustees” (p. B1). The institution employed 59 staff and administrators. According to
the institution’s organizational chart, Vilma College’s cabinet consisted of the president, the vice
president for academic affairs, the vice president for business affairs, the vice president for
development and university relations, the vice president for enrollment management, the vice
president for student development, and chief student affairs officer. At times, the last two or
three cabinet positions were combined into one role.
In the middle of the 19th century, the denomination’s organization acquired a charter from
the state to establish a women’s college. Seventy years later, the organization voted to expand
the college to a coeducational institution and changed its name to honor one of the
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denomination’s clergy. In the early 1990s, the institution changed its name from a college to a
university. While the church affiliation was formal until the institution ceased to exist in 2011,
participants noted that the denomination’s faith and identity were not pushed on students or
faculty and staff, even though, according to the vice president for development and university
relations, Vilma College was traditionally responsible for educating nearly one quarter of the
denomination’s clergy in the region.
The institution was located in a medium-sized community of 85,000 people in the
western part of the state and was within 125 miles of two major metropolitan areas with
populations greater than 1 million people. The institution’s immediate community contained
three other higher education institutions, one two-year community college and two private fouryear institutions, all of which were thriving during the current study’s fieldwork due to
expansions in online education and adult learning programs. The local community was most
known for its health care facilities. Participants agreed that the college was well known in its
immediate community and region. One president even joked that “you couldn’t go anywhere in
the community without tripping over an alum.”
As I observed, Vilma College’s 50-acre campus was located within a few miles of the
community’s downtown area in a high crime neighborhood that shared the institution’s name.
The campus was known for its aesthetic grounds and Georgian buildings, especially its chapel,
library, union, and administration building, which I observed was situated in the most prominent
area on campus. More specifically, admissions materials, published in 2008, described the
campus this way:
[Vilma College] is what you’ve always imagined college to be. Whether it’s the stately
Georgian architecture, the open green quads, the quiet tree-lined walkways, or the warm
and welcoming atmosphere, our students tell us that from the very first moment, [Vilma
College] felt like home.
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Participants described the campus’ beauty as one of the institution’s greatest assets although
some of the buildings were “in very bad disrepair” as a result of deferred maintenance. Another
participant described it this way: “It was an incredible institution and it was a beautiful school. It
was a beautiful from afar. Now if you started looking, there were a lot of things that needed
upgrading.”
Additionally, participants commented on the less than desirable surroundings of the
campus. One president described the institution’s neighborhood as “the lower end of town” and
the vice president for development and university relations stated that there were “drug
problems, gang issues, and shootings” close to campus. One president noted that part of his role
was “to connect with the city and try to help turn the neighborhood around to protect campus
because campus safety [was] such a huge factor.”
The college’s vision, mission, and purpose pointed to education as a service of the church
to be used for the service of God. The institution sought to provide liberal arts education
combined with vocational preparation, uphold Christian values of stewardship and service, and
focus on creating a nurturing environment. The institution’s messaging focused on the Wesleyan
way and its Christian philosophy, cultural heritage, and enriching perspective; but, when asked to
describe the mission of the institution, participants did not mention a Christian mission or
purpose. Instead, the vice president for academic affairs responded by saying “Your typical
mission, prepare students for the world.” Others talked about creating students that were leaders
for the business and the community. Admissions materials, published in 2008, echoed this dual
preparation track this way:
The true value of your education at [Vilma College], however, is that you leave prepared
for your future. You’ll be an expert in your field. But more than that, you’ll know about
the world and the infinite opportunities it offers to you. That’s the value of a liberal-arts
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education. Not just job training, but life training.
According to several participants, the institution valued freedom of thought, understanding
oneself, and deep personal relationships with students and faculty and staff. Almost all
participants mentioned the academic rigor of the institution, noting that the institution had a good
name because of its solid education and excellent reputation for liberal arts teaching and
curriculum.
Vilma College offered four bachelor’s degree programs in arts, business administration,
music, and science from six schools within the college. Majors at Vilma College included
accounting, art education, art history, biology, business administration, chemistry, church music,
communications, computer information systems, economics, elementary education, English,
entertainment music industry studies, environmental sciences, environmental studies, family and
consumer sciences, family and consumer sciences education, fashion merchandising, food and
nutrition, graphic art and visual communication, history, human performance, interior design,
international business, international studies, management, marketing, mathematics, media and
film studies, modern languages, music, music education, performance, philosophy, physical
education, physical sciences, political science, psychology, public relations, recreation and sports
management, religion, religion/philosophy, secondary education, social work, special education:
comprehensive, special education: hearing K-12, special education: modified, special education:
speech & language, speech communications, studio art, theatre, and visual art.
Vilma College participants pointed to the entertainment music industry studies degree as
a curriculum and enrollment strength. Participants also noted the social work program as a
particularly innovative addition to the curriculum. Both programs were added to the curriculum
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within the last five years of the institution’s existence. A few other participants noted the strength
of the music programs at Vilma College.
Acknowledging the importance of career preparation, Vilma College also provided 10
pre-professional programs, including programs in medicine, law, and engineering. The
institution’s 2008 Viewbook described the curriculum as one that prepared students for “life,
work, spiritual growth, social and civic involvement, leadership, and family responsibilities” (p.
7). Vilma College also offered independent study and internship opportunities, a study abroad
program in London, summer language immersion programs, and a three-year residence program
that prepared students to enter an accredited professional school at the end of their junior year.
However, none of these programs were mentioned by participants except for the study abroad
program in London, which was noted by two faculty members as a popular and high-quality
program at the institution.
Vilma College also required several experiences beyond a student’s major requirements
for successful completion of a degree. The mandatory 128-hour curriculum included a core with
courses from each traditional discipline, including two courses in religion. Additionally, students
were required to complete a freshmen and senior course; take discipline specific comprehensive
examinations before graduation; and complete the Measure of Academic Proficiency and
Progress (MAPP) examination. Additionally, every Vilma College student was required to
declare both a major and minor in order to successfully meet the requirements for graduation.
Participants did not mention any of these additional student experiences as noteworthy or
distinctive.
Vilma College’s total enrollment in the mid 2000s before the recession was
approximately 800. In addition to academic achievement, the institution reviewed a student’s
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character, leadership, interests, aptitude, and determination when considering admission. The
institution admitted students without regard for race, color, gender, age, disability, religion or
national origin, or financial status. In 2007, the institution awarded approximately 8 million
dollars in institutional aid. The institution, according to a chief student affairs officer, brought in
mostly middle-class to lower-level income students and provided significant institutional aid.
Admissions materials also highlighted the institution’s strong commitment to providing a
financially accessible education by meeting every student’s total financial need as long as they
completed the necessary paperwork on time. Finally, as a point of pride, the institution boasted
that its education was almost 40% less than the national private college tuition average.
With a small enrollment, class sizes were seldom more than 20 and the faculty-student
ratio stayed low. Common data set documents from 2007-2008 indicated that the faculty-student
ratio was as low as 9.4:1 in 2007. A board of trustees member, who was also an alumnus,
recalled his student experience of small classes, noting that what he saw as a strength when he
was a student, he later understood was a stress on the institution.
Vilma College was a residential campus that housed students in five on-campus
traditional dormitories. Vilma College provided club and organization opportunities to cultivate
interest in particular areas; areas included religious life, a volunteer clearinghouse, student
government, and academic and special interest organizations. Participants also noted that Vilma
College coordinated a Model United Nations team and Mock Trial team, which competed
regionally and internationally and were both popular programs on campus. Vilma College had 11
varsity National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) Division I sports teams and five
intramural sports. Greek life at Vilma College consisted of three sororities and three fraternities.
In 2009, Vilma College’s faculty were made up of 47 full-time members, eight adjuncts,
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and 19 emeriti. However, common data set documents from 2007-2008 showed that only two
years earlier, Vilma College had as many as 67 full-time faculty members and 30 part-time
faculty members. Of the institution’s 67 full-time faculty members, 67% had terminal degrees
and only two of them were from diverse backgrounds. The institution’s 2008 Viewbook noted
that several faculty members belonged to the “30+ Club,” which recognized faculty who served
for thirty years or more at the institution (p. 4). Several participants pointed to the dedication and
commitment of the faculty at Vilma College, and also commented on how underpaid they were.
Many of them referred to themselves as “missionaries,” one former cabinet member said. The
faculty coordinated 20 standing faculty committees at Vilma College, three of which were filled
with elected members and 17 of which were filled with appointed members.
When asked, “What makes Vilma College distinctive?,” participants pointed to its small
school atmosphere and its priority on letting students explore who they were “without pressure to
become a certain cookie cutter person.” Beyond that, participants admitted that finding what was
distinctive or different about Vilma College was a constant challenge. One cabinet member noted
the lack of cohesive vision by saying: “I think people had a hard time explaining that. Everybody
had their own view of [Vilma College].”
Pre-recession profile. Although the institution had committed stakeholders and a long
tradition of solid education, it also had a storied history of crisis, particularly financial crisis. The
vice president of academic affairs recalled hearing tales about the president selling tomatoes
during the recession in the early 20th century or cutting the lawn in the quad to save money.
Another participant pointed to the leanness of the institution as a challenge that constantly made
it vulnerable. “We were always too close to the bone so anything significant would start to put us
into a nosedive.” Another called the financial situation “always precarious.”
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Financial distress. Immediately before the most recent economic recession, 2005 and
2006 board of trustees meeting minutes showed that the institution’s relatively new president
hired a group of external consultants to guide the institution on recruiting, marketing, and
fundraising efforts. The consultants’ initial comprehensive review of the college’s financial
situation and fundraising needs was presented to the board of trustees and recorded in the board’s
meeting minutes. Their review was helpful in understanding the extended short-term financial
history of the institution. At the time of the report, the institution owed 6 million dollars in longterm debt and a short-term debt, or credit line, with 1.75 million dollars was due within six
months of the report. Two participants described the institution’s long-term debt, in the form of a
multi-million dollar capital bond issue that was nearly two decades old, as an “albatross.” The
debt service proved to be an enormous challenge to overcome on a regular basis, which gained
the attention and interest of the institution’s creditors, especially as the recession wore on over
time. Additionally, at the time of the consultant report, the fiscal year’s budget was projected to
be overspent by 1.4 million dollars. At that point, institutional financial aid was awarded at a rate
greater than 70% and less than 15% of the institution’s revenues were available to pay salaries,
benefits, and operation costs. Graduation rates and retention rates were less than 40%.
Community partnerships continued to decline, faculty raises were neglected, and dormitories
needed refurbishment.
Proposed budgets presented to the board of trustees for approval and recorded in 2006,
2007, and 2008 board of trustees meeting minutes showed that the two budgets prior to the
recession and one budget into the recession all indicated that proposed budgets were consistently
misaligned with established patterns of revenue and expenditures. Revenue streams were
overestimated again and again. In reality, for all three of these fiscal years, the institution grossed
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and netted less tuition revenue than it projected and enrolled fewer students than it projected.
These misaligned budgets either created deficits or the necessity for the institution to balance the
budget with significant unrestricted gift revenue (see Table 3).
Table 3
Vilma College’s Projected and Actual Revenue 2005-2008
Net
Tuition

Annual Fund
& Gifts

Edu/Admin/
Other/Aux

Endowment
Earnings Income

2005-2006 Projected

56%

16%

26%

2%

2005-2006 Actual

35%

15%

27%

2%

2006-2007 Projected

41%

29%

28%

2%

2006-2007 Actual

35%

40%

23%

2%

2007-2008 Projected

43%

29%

26%

2%

2007-2008 Actual

29%

46%

23%

2%

Deficit

21%

Sources: 2005-2006 proposed budget, 2006-2007 proposed budget, 2007-2008 proposed budget
Even with budgets consistently being adjusted midyear, the administration produced and
the board of trustees approved budgets that projected increased revenue. For three consecutive
budget years, the administration projected between 22% and 29% increases in net tuition,
between 3% and 10% enrollment increases, and between 4.6% and 12% increases in overall
revenues while expenditures were never projected to increase more than 5%. Even more
surprisingly, the institution increased all traditional revenue categories and gave 4% raises to all
faculty and staff, which increased its expenditures, in its 2007-2008 budget, only one year before
the recession. Months later, the institution’s accreditation entity referred to these raises as
“counter-intuitive” (Report of the reaffirmation committee, 2008, p. 28).
In terms of long-term trends, at the time of the consultant report, the institution had a
five-year history of operating with a deficit that totaled more than 7 million dollars, enrollment
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declined over the past five years, and annual gift income had not increased significantly for
several years. The endowment was less than 10 million dollars, was borrowed from on multiple
occasions, and contributed less than 2% to the annual operating revenue. Immediately before the
recession, a policy was put in place to reduce the 6.5% spend rate on the endowment in an effort
to protect the corpus, but the board later approved a multi-million dollar loan from the
endowment to pay the institution’s short-term debt during the recession.
In short, the institution faced continual revenue stream issues and cash flow slowed at the
end of each semester and each fiscal year. Essentially, the institution “lived on a line of credit,”
one president noted, “We had to pay it off every month and we lived from one infusion to
another twice a year, each semester.” Board of trustees meeting minutes from 2006 to 2009
indicated that financial stress was repeatedly a focus of discussion at the board of trustees level,
noting as early as 2006, “the problem area continues to be the decrease in net tuition revenue.
Spending reductions cannot be made to offset the revenue loss” (Board of trustees meeting
minutes, 2006, p. 2). Then, in 2007, board of trustees meeting minutes indicated that continued
budget shortfalls were a grave concern: “The shortfall in net tuition revenue will again require
[Vilma College] to raise significant gift revenues to balance the operating budget” (Board of
trustees meeting minutes, 2007, p. 5). Similarly, 2008 and 2009 board of trustees meeting
minutes continued to indicate that the institution was never able to sustain a balanced budget.
Fundraising. Historically, the institution’s fundraising challenges centered on the
limitations of a small and financially restricted alumni pool. Vilma College had an alumni base
that remained largely local and typically established careers in public service and in the church,
professions that did not often coincide with financially significant philanthropy to the college. A
former vice president for development and university relations described the challenges this way:
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They had fond memories of the school. The problem was they did not leave the area. So
you are basically talking about a population of people that lived within 120 miles. I’d say
that’s probably where 70% or 75% of the alumni lived. They were fond and dear to my
heart, but you want your alums to go to New York and make money on the stock market.
You want them to go to other places.
Additionally, when fundraising was actually successful at the institution, it almost
entirely supported the operating budget’s deficit caused by shortfalls in net tuition revenue. A
vice president for development and university relations, who ultimately departed the institution
as a result of its unsustainable fundraising practices, described this recurring situation as one that
presented a direct challenge to long-term planning at the institution. He said:
It was hard to do any long-term planning from a fundraising standpoint because we
would make projections for the next year’s admissions targets, and then in August, when
we knew what the actual numbers were, we constantly had to raise more money just to
keep the doors open. The projections were always lower than what the institution was
spending, and providing a high tuition discount compounded that. The last year that I can
recall, private fundraising accounted for more than 5 million dollars, and 85% of it went
to operational costs, and that was double our initial goal. You can’t work like this forever.
The threat was always there to close. When I left, I cried because I knew it was not going
to be there for much longer.
Still, Vilma College engaged in significant fundraising activity that yielded momentous
results immediately prior to the start of the recession. Board of trustees meeting minutes from
2005 and 2006 indicated that, immediately before the recession, “the university raised more
money in gifts and pledges than ever before” and the institution saw a large increase in net
assets, which had not occurred in more than five years (p. 2). Gift revenue hit its peak right
around the beginning of the recession when private gift support accounted for more than 50% of
the institution’s operational revenue (see Table 3). The institution also started a capital campaign
in 2006 with a goal of raising 20 million dollars over a three-year period. The institution’s
relatively new president proposed the campaign in 2006 as an aggressive step that the institution
needed to take to generate support to pay off short-term debt, renovate dorms, provide operation
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funds, increase faculty salaries, endow scholarship funds, and build the general endowment.
But, while private gift revenue hit record totals in 2007, most of the fundraising activity
was concentrated among a very small group of donors. In fact, board of trustees meeting minutes
and participants’ interviews indicated that two donors, one alumnus and one parent, became
particularly financially involved immediately before the recession and eventually were appointed
to leadership roles on the board of trustees. Several participants noted the entrance and
involvement of these two board of trustees members prior to the recession. The chief student
affairs officer described the progression this way: “The administration also started to rely heavily
on gifts in kind from two specific board members, who also attached some expectations to their
funds.”
Mission. Additionally, several participants framed the institution’s inability to generate
adequate tuition revenue as a problem rooted in the inflexibility of the educational approach and
restriction of curriculum offerings. While participants diverged in assigning responsibility as to
who restricted the institution’s curriculum and educational approach, most participants agreed
with the notion that the institution was too restrictive in its mission. During its long-term history,
it had eliminated popular and professional majors like athletic training and educational programs
that focused on fee-for-service adult learner classes. The vice president for business affairs
described the institution’s limited vision this way:
They wanted to keep the small resident liberal arts student model going and did not
recognize that that was not a viable long-term solution and they had to make changes to
be a little more inclusive of other educational opportunities and ideas.
The college refused expansions related to online education and nontraditional students, and when
a health care organization offered to help underwrite a nursing program, the institution declined
on the basis of “academic purity.” In short, participants characterized the institution by its
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widespread “resistance to change.”
So, in a general sense, the immediate need for Vilma College in pre-recession times was,
according to its then president, to “stabilize financially and boost enrollment.” The president
defined his role in this process as primarily a fundraising force. He said:
What was desperately needed was money. The university was in significant debt. They
were having trouble making payroll, but all the fundraising was dedicated to paying the
bills, very little of it was capital. I knew it was bad going in, but when I went in the
economy was still strong. I thought there was a good chance I could stabilize things and
stabilize enrollment.
In the context of the recession. The institution saw several successes in the early
recession years. Almost immediately after the start of its fundraising campaign, the college
received its single largest gift in institutional history, a 7 million-dollar combined gift from the
two trustees noted earlier. Additionally, one of the college’s women’s athletic teams won a
national championship. Several capital improvements updated areas on campus including
dormitories, the administration building, and the student union. The board of trustees also
considered a host of capital projects focused on growing the institution’s appeal, such as a more
extensive Greek Row or a bell tower in the quad area. And finally, the administration led the
faculty in adding three new professionally-based degree plans to the curriculum, one of which
became the most popular major at the institution within two years of being offered.
While the institution saw some success early on, continued pressures and the increased
tightening of financial resources created a progressively difficult situation. In addition to
struggling enrollment, the value of the endowment dropped significantly, the bank’s credit
regulations stiffened, and the Department of Education put additional stipulations on Title IV
funding for Vilma College. Thus, when the economy showed significant signs of weakening, the
board began discussing, as a precaution, what the ramifications of closing the institution might
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be. At that time, the institution was in significant debt and, to any potential buyer, was a financial
liability more than an asset. Most agreed that the future did not look promising. The president at
the time recalled that the big donors and big gifts had already been solicited and the economy
was worsening, creating even more pressure on fundraising and enrollment. Neither picture
showed enough of a significant improvement to sustain long-term hope. The board discussed
partnership, merger, and buyout opportunities along with continued discussions on how to best
independently operate the institution into the future.
Accreditation. One issue that was centrally important to any future option for the
institution, whether it was to sell the college or continue operating it, was continued
accreditation. Coincidentally, the institution’s 10-year self-report and accreditation visit occurred
during the first two years of the recession. During and after the recession, from 2008-2011, the
institution was reviewed, the accreditation entity visited the campus, and the college was put on a
one-year probationary status. And although the institution received a one-year extension,
accreditation was eventually revoked even after an appeal in federal court. The institution closed
shortly after losing its accreditation, but not before graduating two final accredited classes of
students in 2011. During the four-year accreditation process, the college had three presidents,
one of which was an interim; the board changed leadership; and there were numerous turnovers
in the cabinet. During one accreditation campus visit in particular, a board of trustees member
noted that the institution had no president and had just experienced the exit of several vice
presidents and two board of trustees members. He said:
We didn’t have a president, without a vice president, or I guess the acting president was
also the acting dean and we had no development officer and we had a new CFO. We
essentially had a two-person cabinet. You just can’t fake it. And we are projecting a
seven million dollar deficit as we are sitting there that day for the school year.
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According to the institutional review report provided by the accreditation entity, the
college failed to comply with 18 accreditation criteria, including institutional effectiveness,
financial stability, credentials of faculty and staff, assessment of learning outcomes and
performance, control of athletics, physical and learning resources, and distinction between
administrative and board functions (Report of the reaffirmation committee, 2008). Most
participants recalled the financial status and the role of the board of trustees members as
particularly important to the accreditation process. A board of trustees member described the
board participation as “too small” with two trustees “dictating what was happening.”
Additionally, a cabinet member described the board’s interference, in the context of
accreditation, this way:
One of the things that we took a hit on with [the accreditation entity] in the
reaccreditation process was those two board of trustees members’ over involvement in
the day-to-day running of the university to the point where the president was crippled
from making any type of substantive decisions.
It was noteworthy that the accreditation entity had absolutely no complaint or concern regarding
the nature or level of the curriculum or the education provided by Vilma College.
Financial decline. As mentioned, simultaneous to the accreditation process, the
institution continued to suffer financially. Due to its probationary status, the institution’s
accreditation entity prohibited the college from starting any new programs, which Vilma
College’s administration had originally projected as a potential new revenue generator.
Additionally, the two primary donors on the board of trustees eventually resigned as a result of
conflict with the administration and took millions of promised dollars with them. The institution
sold real estate to make payroll, which created a onetime surge of funds, but also led to a loss of
recurring rental income. Finally, the institution failed to meet faculty and staff payroll on time
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for two summer terms and almost the entire last semester of operation. The budgets for the final
two years of operations at Vilma College showed multi-million dollars shortfalls.
A 2009 report from the chair of the financial and investment committee of the board of
trustees, presented at the end of the recession and less than two years before the institution
closed, indicated serious concerns about the status of the institution. The report stated that the
institution was “deeply in the red” with an annual shortfall of more 4 million dollars (Financial
and investment committee report, 2009, p. 1). At this point, the institution was on probation and
was the focus of negative media coverage both locally and statewide. The report also pointed to
the fact that three of five top administrative positions were vacant or filled by interims. Student
enrollment was down and the athletics program was described as a “persistent challenge”
(Financial and investment committee report, 2009, p. 4).
Further, the report detailed a relatively new challenge as a result of the economic
recession:
There are two bad new items about our modest endowment. First, the value declined by a
half million dollars in the stock market crash. Second, the surviving funds, which are
almost totally pledged against our debts with the bank were pulled, at the bank’s
insistence, from the stock market near the bottom of the recession and put in fixedincome instruments with very low returns. We plunged down with the market; we are not
participating in the upswing. (pp. 4-5)
Although the recession played a role in a number of issues included in the 2009 committee
report, the report also stated that the problems were longstanding by saying: “We are in serious
jeopardy as we enter the new year. We have consistently failed to match our expenses with our
tuition-based income. And our other attempts to raise new money and forge external partnerships
have not been sufficient” (Financial and Investment Committee Report, 2009, p. 1).
Potential buyers. With the institution becoming a growing liability and the economic
recession pressuring it more and more, selected members of the board and the president
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discussed a potential sale of the institution to other organizations associated with higher
education. They quickly discovered that as important as accreditation was to the interest of
potential buyers, it also appeared that potential buyer interest was also particularly important to
the accreditation process. As a six-month follow-up to the institution’s probation ruling, the
accreditation entity re-evaluated Vilma College and granted it a one-year extension to work
towards meeting accreditation criteria. Participants recalled that the institution’s accreditation
extension was, in large part, due to the fact that the institution presented the accreditation entity
with a letter of intent demonstrating external interest in a possible partnership, merger, or buyout
deal. But initial interest did not materialize and when the institution could not show a viable plan
for recovery, its accreditation was ultimately revoked. With no accreditation, most potential
buyers scattered.
The institution appealed the accreditation ruling in federal court. While the courts
considered the appeal, the institution was allowed to continue offering an accredited education to
its students, which ultimately enabled them to graduate two more classes in 2011. Additionally,
during this time the institution developed a teach-out plan and transfer agreements with seven
other institutions before losing its accreditation and closing its doors in 2011. More than one
participant regarded the education and successful transition of every student at Vilma College as
the institution’s biggest success during this recession period. One president described the
institution’s success during its final years this way: “We stayed open. We educated students who
graduated two years after we shouldn’t have. And we operated with dignity and prayer and
respect and love. In a sense, I was there to facilitate death with dignity.”
During that time, the board chairman also negotiated the sale of the institution to a fourentity local partnership group for 80% of the institution’s total debt. Participants stated that the
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partnership, made up of four large companies and service providers in the local community,
became interested in purchasing the institution when it was apparent that the campus could be
vacated, leaving an abandoned hole in the center of a community surrounded by a neighborhood
that was not the "choosiest." Once the partnership bought the institution, it immediately gifted it
to the state, which allocated the campus to an existing in-state public higher education entity.
Ironically, one of the first programs the in-state public entity added to the former Vilma College
campus was nursing. The state school operated on the former Vilma College campus at the time
of the current study’s fieldwork and several participants commented on the graceful nature of the
merger and regarded the outcome as positive for both institutions and the community.
Participants described the community partnership that purchased the institution as a “hero” and
“absolute saviors,” and described the merger as “fantastic” and a “good marriage” for the
community. One faculty member described the unprecedented process of transition by saying, “I
would venture to say that nothing like this has happened in any other case.”
Analysis of Themes
Once I developed an individual case record for each institution, I identified the themes of
the current study through transcription, review, and coding of participant interview data,
document analysis, and observational notes. These themes are presented in the context of the
current study’s research questions and are illustrated in Table 4. In terms of external
environmental pressures influencing liberal arts colleges, the case institutions identified the
following: (a) exposure of established institutional practices, (b) endowment loss, and (c)
enrollment pressures. In terms of adaptive strategies employed to respond to these pressures, the
case institutions identified (a) fiscal management adjustments, (b) academic adjustments, (c)
athletic adjustments, (d) personnel adjustments, (e) fundraising adjustments, and (f) enrollment
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adjustments. These adaptive strategies employed by each institution affected operations in three
areas: (a) role of the board, (b) administrative approach to leadership and decision-making, and
(c) negotiation of faculty involvement. Finally, in terms of how institutional constituents
perceived these adaptive strategies, two main themes emerged from the data: (a) reflection of
leadership and (b) issues of identity. Each theme was best understood within the context of one
of the current study’s research questions. Therefore, I present the remainder of the current
study’s findings as the overarching themes of the study as they related to each research question.
Table 4
Summary of Research Questions and Themes
Research Question One: What external environmental pressures influenced the liberal arts
colleges during the Great Recession of 2007?
Theme

Subtheme

Exposure of established institutional practices
Endowment loss
Enrollment pressures

Regional challenges

Research Question Two: What adaptive strategies did the liberal arts colleges employ to respond
to the external environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007?
Theme

Subtheme

Fiscal management adjustments
Academic adjustments

Curriculum changes
Online education

Athletic adjustments
Personnel adjustments

Layoffs and pay adjustments
Retirement contribution cuts

Fundraising adjustments
Enrollment adjustments

Recruitment strategies
Increased tuition
Discount rate adjustments
Campus renewal projects
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Research Question Three: How did the adaptive strategies employed by the liberal arts colleges
to respond to the external environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007 affect
their operations?
Theme

Subtheme

Role of the board
Administrative approach to leadership and decision-making

Personnel turnover
Strategic plan

Negotiation of faculty involvement
Research Question Four: How did institutional constituents perceive the adaptive strategies
employed by the liberal arts colleges to respond to the external environmental pressures during
the Great Recession of 2007?
Theme

Subthemes

Reflection of leadership

Lack of transparency

Issues of identity
Research Question One: What external environmental pressures influenced the liberal arts
colleges during the Great Recession of 2007?
External environmental pressures influenced the case institutions during the recession in
three primary ways. First, all three institutions regarded the recession as exposing existing
institutional practices. In a general sense, the recession made all three institutions more
vulnerable; however, the degree to which they were weakened or exposed was reflective of the
institution’s existing practices in pre-recession times. Additionally, endowment losses and
enrollment pressures were two universal symptoms of the 2007 market crash and subsequent
recession and affected all three case institutions.
Exposure of established institutional practices. Participants from all three institutions
described the recession as an event that illuminated their college’s reality at that specific point in
time. Each school’s pre-recession practices and overall situation directly contributed to the
nature of the environment pressures it faced and the adaptive strategies it implemented during the
recession.
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Colston College experienced record growth in enrollment and revenue immediately
before the recession as a result of its nationally recognized innovative engaged learning program,
and therefore had great momentum going into the recession. Its positive momentum continued to
fuel its growth even after the market crash; the institution experienced its highest enrollment in
2010-2011, immediately following the depths of the Great Recession of 2007. Additionally,
while the institution did experience a higher than normal retention drop in 2008, the drop was
short-lived and the institution remained on an upward trajectory. In short, new program
additions, a strong revenue stream, and enrollment increases in pre-recession times contributed to
the institution’s stability during the recession. As a result, the recession highlighted Colston
College’s growth patterns, and the institution’s prior success greatly mitigated the effect of the
recession on its operations.
The Great Recession of 2007 also exposed Payton College’s pre-recessional practices and
operations. For more than a decade leading up to the recession, Payton College operated with a
deficit and overly depended on record high gains from its endowment. The excessive endowment
gains cushioned the institution’s annual budget and disguised weaknesses in other revenue areas,
most notably, in tuition revenue. A board of trustees member recalled how the market exposed
an institution that, in good times, had gotten “carried away” with its spending practices:
We are all guilty of this to some extent, we were carried away by the great ‘90s that we
had, we all had other things to worry about, and we didn’t recognize that the market
performance was masking weaknesses in the system that we should have paid more
attention to.
Consequently, participants acknowledged that the recession, through causing significant
endowment losses, eliminated the institution’s ability to keep up its unsustainable spending
practices. One cabinet member talked about the recession and how it revealed the institution’s
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pre-recession practices by saying the recession “eliminated all of our flexibility to keep pushing
along with things that we probably shouldn’t have been pushing along with.”
Finally, participants at Vilma College similarly acknowledged that the recession
pressured their institution by further exposing and exaggerating its sustained pattern of
operations before the market crash. The vice president for business affairs described the
recession’s exposure of institutional practices this way:
It highlighted the problems that they were already experiencing with reducing enrollment
and growing budget demands. So by not doing some of the things that would have helped
them grow, it slowed them down at a time of increasing financial difficulties.
Mores specifically, the recession further stressed already constrained Vilma College’s revenue
streams. The institution already struggled to recruit and enroll paying students before the
recession and private gift resources were largely tapped by 2006. When asked to describe the
effects of the recession, participants said the recession compounded the already dire
circumstances and metaphorically referred to it as “the straw that broke the camel’s back” and
the “additional weight that just took down the ship.”
In a general sense, the more stable a case institution was before the recession, the more
stable it remained throughout the recession. The pressures the institution faced in pre-recessional
times were simply exaggerated by the economic downturn. Unsustainable financial practices
became more unsustainable, revenue pressures became stronger, expenses did not decrease, and
safety nets were erased, leaving little room for error at each college. Therefore, the institution
that grew and established new and stable revenue streams in pre-recession times did not feel the
effects of the recession as much as the institutions that lived close to the edge and outspent their
means in good times.
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Endowment loss. Participants from all three institutions noted the damage the recession
had on their institutional endowments. Both Colston College and Payton College had nine-figure
endowments and experienced huge corpus and spending losses, which created significant
reductions in operational revenue. Colston College participants recalled that its 30% endowment
loss led to an immediate multi-million dollar reduction in the budget, which noticeably impacted
college operations. However, since Colston College remained within an acceptable spent rate up
until the recession, the impacts of its endowment losses were lessened by its ability to
incrementally increase its draw rate, which allowed the institution to mitigate some of its losses.
Colston College’s chief financial officer described the institution’s situation this way:
Our endowment draw has probably averaged between 6.5% and 7% over the last five to
seven years. We felt that the endowment, as it was setup around 2000 with the safety net,
had served us well in periods of normal increases and decreases of value. But I do think
the sustained economic challenges and roller coaster have now caused us to challenge
that safety band. [We] have come to the conclusion that we really don’t want to expose
ourselves to continued levels around the 7% plateau.
Essentially, this flexibility in spend rate allowed the institution to ease the effects of the revenue
cuts on the institution for a few years. However, the institution hit its peak draw limit in 20082009, which then required it to decrease its spend rate.
Payton College, on the other hand, was already outside the acceptable spending rate
before the recession began, drawing more off of its endowment than best investment practices
recommended. Payton College’s board of trustees member described the impact of the
endowment losses on the institution during the recession by illustrating the impact of a booming
market followed by a significant crash:
From 2000-2010, the stock market went up zero. And if you add a 10-year stretch at zero
and a 10-year stretch at 20% in the 1990s, you get 10%. Now that’s a little too cute, but
it’s true, and over long periods of time, that numbers seems to hold up pretty well. In any
10-year period you can have some zeros. So what 2008 did, again it happened in 2001 but
the market recovered, our 100 million dollar endowment went to an 80 million dollar

	
  

162	
  

endowment. So if we are spending 6%, 7%, 8% of the 80 million dollars, we’re now at 72
million dollars, and suddenly you’ve now had a 30% drop in your market in one year. So
you say okay if the market doesn’t go up or keeps going down, in two more years we are
pushing down to 50%. It’s not just that we don’t have the revenue anymore; we’re living
on borrowed time. How many years can you go before you run out?
Essentially, since the spend rate at Payton College during the decade before the recession was
more than double and almost triple than what was recommended, the stock market crash doubly
impacted the institution. First, it was forced to lower its spend rate, and second, the market did
not produce the record gains it produced during the previous 10 years, on which the institution
was now dependent. Rather, during the recession, the institution quickly discovered that its
overall endowment level decreased and it “almost had no cash to spend.”
Participants from Vilma College also indicated that the loss of endowment, as a result of
the market crash, played a role in the pressures exerted on the institution by the recession.
Although Vilma College had a significantly lower endowment with barely a 10 million dollar
corpus, the institution’s fragile financial situation required that it tied its lines of credit and its
Department of Education Title IV funding, which was described as a “life source of the school,”
to its endowment as a form of collateral. As an additional blow, at one of the lowest points in the
market, the institution was viewed as such a growing liability that its banks required the
institution to move their endowment fund to fixed income and assets. As a result, Vilma
College’s endowment rode the market down during the crash, but did not benefit at all from the
gains in 2009 and 2010. Rather, as a result of the pressures facing the institution’s banks and the
Department of Education during the recession, these entities tightened their financial regulations,
which caused increased financial distress to Vilma College during an already volatile time. As a
Vilma College’s board of trustees member recalled, “We caught it all; everything was at the bad
time.”
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Enrollment pressures. Despite the differing pre-recession situations of the three case
institutions, participants from each institution admitted that enrollment pressures, and more
specifically, the pressure to enroll students who were able to contribute to the cost of their
education, increased across the board as a result of the recession. While institutions varied in
their ability to overcome those pressures based on their established practices, the increased
pressure nonetheless affected all three institutions.
Even though Colston College reached its peak enrollment in 2010-2011, the institution
eventually felt enrollment pressures in the immediate years following the recession. Participants
described an unexpected six-percentage point retention drop in 2008 and enrollment plateaus in
recent years as the main enrollment pressures that faced the institution. Colston College pointed
to the prolonged nature of the recession as its biggest challenge. The dean of students at Colston
College described it this way:
Part of the downturn in our enrollment was directly linked to cost and debt and worries of
families because the recession drug on. And worries about what will the future look like
if my son or daughter graduate from the school and the job market hasn’t rebounded. So,
that increased the reluctance for families to take on debt, that affects their ability to
commit to the educational model that is fairly high costs, but also worth it from the
standpoint that its high quality.
In an overarching sense, participants at Colston College articulated that the length of the
recession caused families to reevaluate students’ futures through the lens of the recession as a
long-term situation instead of a temporary downturn. Additionally, the length of the recession
caused families to deplete reserve resources by the second and third years of the recession, which
especially affected retention.
Participants from Payton College and Vilma College also noted significant challenges in
attracting and enrolling students who were capable and willing to pay the cost of tuition. The
vice president for enrollment management at Payton College stated that had the institution been
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in a position to continually provide a significant level of aid to prospective students, it would
have been capable of immediately filling its incoming classes. He said, “If I could give it away, I
could fill a class in a couple of weeks. And we gave it away for a long time, for many years, and
now we are seeing that we have to pace ourselves.” As an example, in the fall of 2008, the
institution filled its class by providing a nearly 70% discount rate. However, such a high discount
rate was unsustainable for an institution that required a steady stream of net tuition revenue to
balance its budget. While the institution was able to compensate for high discount rates in the
past through an overdependence on endowment earnings, those earnings were nonexistent in
recession times. Similarly, the vice president for enrollment management at Vilma College also
indicated that the recession caused parents and students to closely examine the cost of education
when “comparison shopping with other institutions.” She stated that often Vilma College was not
able to “meet parents’ expectations on reducing the cost of education” and consequently lost
students to cheaper educational options.
In a general sense, the recession was a heightened time of student financial need caused
by limited household income and reluctance to incur debt. Yet, especially for Payton College and
Vilma College, the recession was also a heightened time of institutional stress that limited the
institution’s ability to provide students with the level of aid that they needed to enroll. In this
sense, the challenges of increased student need caused by the recession were compounded by the
institution’s increased need to generate revenue through discount rate reductions and tuition
increases, which were also caused by the recession.
Regional challenges. As a subtheme of enrollment pressures facing these institutions
during the recession, all three institutions’ participants noted the added disadvantage of their
institutions’ geographic location on its recruitment efforts. Participants across the board echoed
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concerns that their institutions existed in markets that lacked an understanding of and value for
liberal arts education in their respective states and areas. When compared to other areas in the
country, participants felt that their southern location presented an additional challenge to
recruiting enough paying students to sustain the institutions’ operations. The vice president for
enrollment at Colston College noted that she did not “completely understand the lack of
appreciation for higher education in this state” before she joined the administration at Colston
College. A participant at Payton College complained that the institution had “no one helping us
make the case for private selective higher education in our region.” He followed up his statement
by adding, “So, it really does change that conversation some. If we had a marketplace that
understood private education better, it wouldn’t change the way we market ourselves, but we’d
have a better-informed community. And we just don’t have that here.” Finally, at Vilma College,
a vice president for development and university relations framed the geographic challenge as the
south not having “the heritage, the tradition of sending kids to small liberal arts colleges like you
do in the northeast and the Midwest.” As a result of this, he said:
A person may not see, even if they are fairly well to do, any difference in going to a
[liberal arts college] and [a state university]. They are both good schools, which they are,
but they would say there is no real difference in education and that’s really not the case.
Research Question Two: What adaptive strategies did the liberal arts colleges employ to
respond to the external environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007?
In an effort to respond to the pressures created by the recession, which were primarily
financial and enrollment related, the three case institutions in the current study identified several
adaptive strategies that were employed in ways specific to their institutional situation. Yet, in a
general sense, many of these strategies were quite similar. The six most common adaptive
strategies identified across institutions were fiscal management adjustments, academic
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adjustments, athletic adjustments, personnel adjustments, fundraising adjustments, and
enrollment adjustments.
Fiscal management adjustments. In terms of adaptive strategies employed at each
institution to combat pressures caused by the recession, participants first discussed their
institutions’ overall fiscal management approach to dealing with the financial burdens of the
recession. This theme was especially noteworthy because each institution adopted a different
approach to bad times.
Colston College defined its overall approach to the recession as a “balanced approach”
focused on aggressive investment with an eye on expenses. A faculty member characterized this
approach, and the president’s leadership, as bold and positive. He said:
The president’s approach to bad times is take advantage of them and push things that will
be more attractive and will attract more people and therefore work its way out. So, how
have we dealt with it? We’ve dealt with it by sort of being bold. You know, bad times
means invest, get more things going as opposed to how do we best survive it so we can
come out and then move. That approach about times are hard [so] let’s really reach out to
grab people and do something worthwhile in the process has been a positive thing that the
institution has done.
Since Colston College was in a relatively strong and stable position going into the recession, it
had more leverage to invest in additional programs and capital during the recession. The chief
financial officer at Colston College defined this balanced approach as “growing the revenue
side” while “calling more attention to the expense levels” with a continued emphasis on “the
quality of the product we offer.”
Payton College implemented an appreciably different approach than Colston College that
was defined almost exclusively by expenditure and budget cuts. Due to the college’s habitual
overspending, cumulative debt, and endowment losses, the institution’s new president
immediately implemented 3 million dollars of budget cuts when he arrived at the end of the
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recession. While the institution implemented strategies to generate revenue, the cost-cutting
measures were so significant and emotional that they defined the institutional approach to
recession adaptation. Participants recalled that the administration cut “massive amounts” and had
to do some “draconian” things to balance the budget. Significantly cutting the budget during
recession times was a doubly negative blow to the institution that was already experiencing stress
as a result of external factors. The president recalled the sweeping nature of the budget cuts and
the effect so much cutting had on the institution and his presidency.
From my seat, you go to athletics [and cut], and all the Division I advocates and the
alumni and the athletes and the coaches, they don’t like you, but you get “attaboys” from
a bunch of other people. Then you turn to the administration [and cut], and the staff are
upset, but you get a lot of “attaboys” from the people who are left. Then you go to
academics [and cut], and these other people are still mad at you, no one’s giving you
“attaboys”, then you go to academics and the people who are giving you “attaboys” are
very few. It’s just this cascade as people start realizing this is a systemic problem. It
wasn’t an athletics problem, it wasn’t an academics problem, it wasn’t a blow to the
administration problem. It was all of those. It was everything.
Perhaps more difficult than the one-time massive cuts was the development of disciplined
spending habits during difficult times at an institution with a short-term history categorized by
overspending during booming times. Several participants, including the president, acknowledged
that the adjustment to this new reality was one of the institution’s most difficult and prolonged
adaptations to the recession. The president of Payton College described financial stability this
way:
Financial stability is not a destination; it’s a discipline. It’s not like you get there. You
just keep doing the same things over and over. So you have to focus in on what your
commitments are. And the hardest thing is to stay true to that when the pressures grow to
abandon that.
Finally, Vilma College, the most fiscally unstable of the three institutions, attempted to
adjust to the recession by generating more revenue through any source available, but found it
nearly impossible to cut costs or grow revenue. Described as “lean” and “spend thrift,”
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participants acknowledged that the institution had “very little room to cut.” Instead, the
institution had a revenue stream problem that did not increase because “there was not enough
going on” at the institution to draw the net tuition revenue stream it needed to sustain operations.
The vice president for enrollment management noted the institutional stale mate by saying:
Things just needed to pop somewhere and we just needed to find a financial stream
coming in that we just weren’t able to find at the time. And all the while we are looking
at cost figures. Again, there was just not much you could do. In the traditional way of
managing, in tough times is you cut everything and that would be the end, and that was
the end basically.
In essence, Vilma College was unable to execute any type of significant fiscal maneuver to avoid
the pressures of the recession.
Academics adjustments. All three colleges also attempted to make academic
adjustments to combat the challenges they faced during the recession; these areas of adjustment
focused specifically on curriculum additions or eliminations and the wrestling with online
education as an expanded educational platform at the institutions. Each institution made these
academic modifications with the aim of increasing its competitive edge or distinctiveness either
through generating more enrollment and net tuition revenue or containing costs through limiting
expenditures on personnel and course offerings. In a general sense, Payton College made
massive cuts to the curriculum placing a renewed focus on traditional liberal arts while Colston
College and Vilma College implemented new programs that were defined as more popular and
professional. While no institution made transformational changes to its online education
approach, the conversation about expanded distance opportunities occurred at all three
institutions and was a debatable issue among these liberal arts colleges.
Curriculum changes. During the recession, Colston College focused mainly on adding
majors to the curriculum that expanded both it liberal arts program and its professional offerings.
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The institution added majors in biochemistry, Chinese, molecular biology, film studies,
environmental studies, and as noted in a 2008 presidential memorandum to the campus
community, a consortium program with a local medical school in public health. A faculty
member at Colston College stated that the institution’s curricular additions indicated that the
institution made “a move towards what is more popular, what is trendy, that we used to avoid
somewhat.”
Rather differently, in an effort to combat the pressures caused by Payton College’s
sustained overspending that were exaggerated by the recession, the institution’s board mandated
that the administration and faculty reduce the number of academic offerings as one aspect of a
comprehensive cost reduction plan. The curriculum reduction was also aimed at providing fewer,
higher quality academic programs. As a result, the president gave consideration to
recommendations made through a confidential process by an ad hoc faculty committee and cut
the number of majors the institution offered in half. The process was implemented through a
phased-in approach that allowed teachers and students already at the institution to finish their
programs before the programs were eliminated.
Additionally, the institution reorganized its core requirements around a set of courses that
presented traditional disciplines in the context of one of three twenty-first century challenges as
defined by the faculty. In conjunction with the core revamp, three life-learning communities
were established in the campus’ residence halls that focused on these same twenty-first century
challenges. The institution also attempted to transition from an hour system to a course system,
which required students to complete a specific number of 4-hour courses for graduation as
opposed to attaining a certain number of credit hours. This transition, according to the provost
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and a faculty member, was meant to provide more depth in course material, but the transition
process only partially occurred due to faculty resistance. One participant described it this way:
The situation that I came to was a fairly innovative vision that the president expressed
with some resistance on the part of the faculty to go all in on that vision, and so we’ve
moved the needle, but probably not as much as we needed to. So, the newness of what we
are doing really isn’t all that new.
Like Colston College, Vilma College also added new programs during recession times in
an effort to increase its attractiveness among prospective students. Participants noted and
admissions publications indicated that the institution added a degree in entertainment music
industry studies, social work, and a teacher certification program in speech therapy. The
entertainment music industry studies major was particularly popular and became one of the
strongest academic recruitment tools within a few years of its inception. At one point, the
program enrolled nearly 10% of the school’s total enrollment. Participants attributed the
program’s success to the recruitment of a high-quality faculty leader and the institution’s
geographic location, which was in close proximity to two major metropolitan areas with large
music industries. One president recalled that the faculty member…
…became the Bon Jovi of the music department. He looked the part, young man, played
a great rock guitar lead. So we got him to come set up this program and we started
recruiting the hell out of it. And it was a success almost overnight. Kids loved it.
Additionally, the program in social work was established as the result of a grant
opportunity with a local hospital. The president stated that the hospital was interested in
providing financial support to the institution as long as the institution produced graduates that
contributed to the health care industry. In a general sense, the president and the vice president for
academic affairs both indicated that they shepherded the additions of these programs to the
curriculum and proactively presented curriculum proposals to the faculty for approval since the
faculty were not motivated to develop new programs organically and did not understand the
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urgency with which the institution needed to adapt. The vice president for academic affairs
recalled the necessity of his preemptive approach this way:
I talked about the new programs. I initiated them because I knew the faculty were not
going to initiate them and that’s when I got the sense that I needed to push with a sense of
urgency, I needed to drive them with a sense of persuasion.
Online education. Participants also discussed how the adaptive strategy of online education was
considered or discussed during recession times at their respective institutions. Participants at
Colston College indicated that online education was seriously considered as an adaptive strategy
to expand learning opportunities that would create an added level of distinction to the institution
and alleviate the need for adjunct appointments. Online education was discussed within the
framework of offering cooperative classes taught by faculty at consortium or national schools or
classes by Colston College’s faculty who were actively engaged in research or professional
opportunities off campus.
The chief information officer offered a particularly novel example of one preliminary
implementation of online education at Colston College:
We are always looking at ways [that] will enable us to offer unique learning experiences
by virtue of being able to leverage technology in ways that you haven’t been able to do in
the past. For example, one of our faculty members was at the democratic national
convention this past summer as a delegate from [the state]. So being able to teach a class
at the DNC was a very unique learning experience.
The only criterion to online education at Colston College was that it be a “product that really fits
the mission of [Colston College].”
Additionally, as noted above, the institution established a cabinet level position in 2011
responsible for information technology. The addition of a senior level position indicated the
institution’s priority to expanding its technology-based operations including online education.

	
  

172	
  

Oppositely of Colston College, Payton College did not engage in online education. While
the vice president of finance and administration noted that the institution discussed online
education offerings, he said that they did not seriously investigate or move towards adopting
strategies that implemented an online platform into the curriculum. He addressed the lack of
movement in pursuing online education adaptive strategies at Payton College when he stated:
I wonder if we’ve missed opportunities with online learning. It’s been batted around.
Even the Ivy League schools are doing online learning. I know there are, if you are
around here, there are a lot of ads, a lot of colleges on TV with commercials, and they are
pushing online activities, online learning, and various things. So, maybe we missed some
of that, maybe we didn’t. Sometimes I wonder why we didn’t at least give that a strong
effort, but maybe we felt like our traditional liberal arts style was good enough.
Further, the vice president for enrollment management indicated that the institution was quite
restrictive in the amount and type of online education courses it accepted as transfer credits,
indicating the institution’s overall philosophy towards online education. This limited transfer
policy, according to Payton College’s vice president for enrollment management, greatly
constrained recruitment because students could enroll in other institutions that would transfer
existing coursework completed through distance platforms.
Finally, Vilma College’s participants indicated that the institution mimicked Payton
College with regard to the college’s approach to adopting distance methods into the pedagogy of
the institution. While the institution discussed ways to implement online opportunities into the
curriculum, the administration lacked institutional buy-in and did not have the support to
investigate or apply it. One former administrator at Vilma College stated that the faculty did not
support the idea, but in hindsight, the administration should have worked to move forward with
the approach since it could have led to significant revenue increases. She described it this way:
The other thing that we wanted to try and really had a lot of discussions was online
classes, but we had a hard time trying to sell that to the faculty. They were the traditional
faculty who believed the classroom. Face-to-face was the best way to receive an
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education and so when we would try to say let’s try to do this as an online class, they
would back away from it. The administration should have pushed a little harder on the
faculty and say hey we are trying to save this university we are going to have to come up
with some various ways to do this.
Athletics adjustments. The debate regarding the role of athletics within the organization
and the priority of expenditures on athletics activities during the recession emerged as a theme at
all three case institutions. Again, despite the universal nature of the challenges facing these
institutions, each institution still varied in the ways it adapted its athletic programs to respond to
the pressures caused by the recession. Colston College added two new athletic programs as
recruitment tools with the aim of generating a bigger revenue stream, while Payton College and
Vilma College sought to change divisions with Payton College changing to cut costs and Vilma
College changing to generate enrollment and revenue. In some ways, the way each institution
adapted its athletic programs mimicked its overall adaptive approach to the recession: Colston
College invested, Payton College cut, and Vilma College justified increased costs by projecting
future revenue.
In the middle of the recession, as Colston College’s president and board considered
additional ways to increase enrollment, especially in the male population, they established a
committee to investigate the feasibility of reinstituting men’s football. After review of the
information, they ultimately decided to reinstate the sport, which was cut from athletics more
than 60 years before, and add women’s lacrosse. One cabinet member described the positive
effect of the addition this way:
Football in and of itself, along with the women’s lacrosse offering on the ladies’ side,
was an effort for us to take, in a short period of time, advantage of an opportunity which
would allow us to increase our enrollment in a way that no other initiative could have
provided. We are Division III so non-scholarship student-athletes. We established a new
recruiting goal of basically 72 student-athletes related to these two new sports the first
year and then 30 new students over time each year. That would stabilize out to about 100
additional students and at that level, the sports would more than pay for themselves. Not
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through ticket sales, but just with the additional tuition and room and board contributions.
In short, the purpose of adding these sports was two-fold; first, the institution’s lack of a football
program was a significant disadvantage within its athletics conference, and second, the
institution believed these two sports were effective recruiting tools.
While Colston College added athletic programs to its roster, Payton College, as part of its
overall budget reduction approach to adapt to pressures of the recession, shifted its program from
NCAA Division I athletics to NCAA Division III athletics through a phased-in approach.
Switching divisions created significant cost savings through salary reductions and lowered travel
costs and division fees. This issue was particularly divisive and contentious among board of
trustees members and alumni. Many individuals believed part of the school’s distinction was in
its identity as a Division I institution. While the issue was met with fierce debate, participants in
the current study unanimously acknowledged the prudence of the decision. The vice president for
advancement said directly, “We moved from Division I to Division III. By any objective view,
Division I was mis-positioned at this institution. And we changed the whole approach to
athletics.”
Similarly, with respect to misaligned athletic programs, participants at Vilma College
indicated that the institution attempted to move from NAIA Division I to NCAA Division II
during the recession period as the result of two influential board of trustees members’ interest in
developing a top-level athletics institution. A cabinet member described the process like this:
One of the board of trustees members who was actually a large donor, he thought the way
to boost enrollment was to raise the profile and the way to raise the profile was to have a
successful athletic program. And he wanted us to move from NAIA to NCAA Division
II. We really didn’t have the financial stability to go that route [and] we didn’t have the
facilities they demanded, so this would have really been a huge investment. We would
have not been allowed to play our home football games on campus. We would have had
to rent a stadium. So, this was a huge undertaking. And I thought it was unviable. It was
brought to the board and I would say the board was fairly passive. And they voted to
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move in the direction, to investigate this Division II, to open negotiations with
conferences. We needed a conference to sponsor that move, so basically, the board made
that decision to explore it with the intention of doing it. I believe they voted to go to
NCAA Division II in the spring of 2008.
Several participants described this adaptive strategy negatively, and said it was “a point of
contention” that presented “ethical issues.” These two trustees, without objection from the rest of
the board, aggressively pursued feasibility studies and capital project plans, hired athletic staff
and paid them off the books with their own private funds, and contributed millions of dollars
towards the development of an elite program.
Additionally, as the institution’s enrollment continued to struggle, these trustees, along
with top administrators, agreed to fill empty enrollment slots with athletes who received high
tuition discounts. The vice president for student development recalled having as many as 170
football players enrolled at one time. As the athlete population grew, net tuition revenue
suffered, and the institution’s culture changed towards a more athletic-focused institution.
Personnel adjustments. All three institutions employed traditional organizational costcutting adjustment strategies in terms of personnel changes, although some were more severe
than others. Participants from all three institutions noted layoffs, pay cuts or delays in pay, and
cuts in retirement contributions during and after the recession.
Layoffs and pay adjustments. At Colston College, the dean of students noted that layoffs
were emotionally difficult to implement and, along with no raises in several years and increased
benefit costs, damaged the morale of employees who remained on staff. Still, Colston College
indicated that the institution minimized the layoffs of staff as much as possible through early and
phased-in retirements and hiring freezes. Additionally, no participant mentioned a reduction in
faculty labor at Colston College. Yet, a prolonged salary freeze, according to one faculty
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member, led campus stakeholders, especially faculty, to question institutional priorities. He
stated:
We can go out and establish a program or raise money but not for salaries. And you know
they phrase it as look at the other institutions we’re being compared to and look where we
are, and you know, it’s not satisfying honestly, when you are trying to pay bills at home.
Payton College employed the most severe layoff strategy of the three case institutions. As
part of its overall budget reduction plan that was dictated by the board and implemented by the
president, Payton College eliminated 1 million dollars from its administrative arm and additional
funds from its academic arm by laying off 35 people, including tenured faculty positions.
Participants described this process as “painful by any definition,” “brutal,” and “damaging.”
Finally, Vilma College implemented this adaptive strategy in a very sporadic and
unsystematic way. The institution had a reputation for underpaying personnel for decades. A past
accreditation report, according to participants, described the faculty as “missionaries,” referring
to their outrageously low salaries. However, during the initial years of the recession and amidst
severe financial distress, the institution’s president advised the vice president for business affairs
to give all staff and faculty a raise, promising to fundraise private dollars to support the increased
budget expenditure. A 4% raise was documented in the 2006-2007 projected budget, which was
submitted for board of trustees’ approval and recorded in board of trustees meeting minutes from
2006, and was also confirmed in participants’ data. One cabinet member described the instance
as indicative of a larger picture when he said:
So we started the year with a salary increase and we didn’t raise the money to cover it.
Just another decision of how we did things that cost us down the road. We were not able
to cover the cost of that.
This round of raises, the last round the institution ever saw, was never fully covered through
additional private funds and was later judged by its accreditation entity as an ill-advised move.
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Eventually, within the next two years, the institution’s financial situation became so dire
that it failed to meet payroll for two entire summer terms and most of its entire final semester of
operation. Faculty and staff members eventually received approximately 75% to 80% of their
owed salary after the institution’s bankruptcy case was settled several months later.
Retirement contribution cuts. In addition to reducing workforces and freezing salaries to
control institutional expenditures, all three institutions lowered their contributions to employee
retirement accounts, a benefit that was often advertised as a uniquely generous benefit provided
by higher education institutions. Colston College cut their contribution in half while Payton
College and Vilma College also made significant decreases. This reduction in benefit was
especially meaningful for employees close to retirement age. The vice president for finance and
administration at Payton College noted that the reduction “was big hit on people’s retirements,
and people, especially those approaching retirement, would like to see it higher.”
Fundraising adjustments. The pressures of the economic recession also led all three
institutions to turn to private fundraising as a mechanism for generating revenue for the
institution. In a general sense, regardless of the state of the economy, small liberal arts colleges
like these case institutions historically relied on private funding to supplement their operational
budget and contribute to fixed program and capital costs. However, during the economic
recession, the dependency on private giving grew as a result of strained net tuition and
endowment revenue resources. All three institutions engaged in capital campaigns with
operational funding needs wrapped into their comprehensive goals.
Of the three institutions, Colston College was the only institution that completed a
capital campaign during the recession and met its goal, which led to the completion of the
institution’s newest capital gems – the student life and technology center and the wellness center
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– and endowed several aspects of the institution’s premier engaged learning program. Still, the
interim president and dean for institutional advancement acknowledged a brief period when the
institution did not ask for major gifts because the recession environment was so negative. The
result of this quiet period, however, as described by the institution’s interim president and dean
for institutional advancement, was especially noteworthy. He said:
There was a period of time when I pulled everybody together, because it was so bad, it
was so ugly, that we made the conscious decision that we weren’t going to ask anybody
for a major gift for a period of time, for several months. But I said this is the time we’re
supposed to be in front of people. And what we found was, it was amazing to me, was
that time we spent in front of people was the most transparent time in those people’s lives
for us.
Payton College also engaged in a comprehensive campaign aimed at overcoming their
heavy dependence on gifts for operating dollars, but ultimately encountered challenges that led to
the unsuccessful completion of the campaign. After experiencing a lag in progress, the campaign
was called off shortly after a new administration took office in 2009. According to 2010 board of
trustees meeting minutes, the campaign raised just over 40% of its goal by that point, which
marked the midway point of the campaign’s timeline. Additionally, the institution suffered
another major fundraising setback when, because of the institution’s limited operational funds,
the college was forced to ask past donors who gave restricted gifts to the institution to lift the
restrictions on their gifts. The president noted that the gifts were
sitting on the restricted side of the books and we got his permission to use it in an
unrestricted way and that was huge in making the difference in terms of what [the
accreditation entity] was looking at in terms of unrestricted assets.
After lifting gift restrictions, the university used funds to support its necessary operating costs
and demonstrated to its accrediting agency that it possessed an adequate level of unrestricted net
assets.
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Finally, Vilma College also experienced challenges with their comprehensive campaign
during the recession. More specifically, the institution ran into significant pushback from
prospects who were not satisfied with the state of the institution and refused to support a
struggling operation. The institution’s final president recalled the difficulty in securing private
gifts at the institution’s most desperate moments. He said, “Probably the thing that stands out
most in my mind is really this concept that it is very difficult for people to give to something that
is failing and not healthy. And people said it straight to my face.”
In a general sense, Colston College and Vilma College also noted the challenge of limited
alumni pools facing their institutions. Vilma College participants described the historical mission
of the institution to train “minsters and teachers” who “don’t make any money” as a limitation to
fundraising. Also, Vilma College’s business program, one president noted, was less than 20
years old and had not seen the philanthropic maturation of its alumni. Additionally, the interim
president and dean for institutional advancement at Colston College indicated that the alumni
were typically considered top prospects belonged to the institution’s oldest and smallest classes
of graduates. Therefore, the most capable group of donors was also the smallest group.
Finally, all three institutions noted their overdependence on private fundraising for annual
operational support. Colston College’s interim president and dean for institutional advancement
noted that the institution’s annual fund supported a larger percentage of its operating budget than
it should and was at the higher end of its peer group. Similarly, while Payton College increased it
alumni participation in private giving over the past years, it grew its annual fund beyond an ideal
size to supplement revenue deficits in net tuition revenue and endowment earnings. One cabinet
member described the recent success as mixed with challenges that still needed to be addressed
by saying:
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[Payton College], in the past, on its annual fund has typically been in the 3 million-dollar
range, which is good, probably higher than some other institutions. Good from that
standpoint, but not good because you are having to really tap the local donor base
wherever you can find the donors. You know when you start to rely on that annual giving
that much, there begins to be the signs that we are a little bit out of balance, which means
are we spending too much, what is causing us to have to go out and do this? Last year,
they raised over 5.2 million dollars or 5.3 million dollars, but that again tells us that there
is stress in that area. You can only spread that so wide. We are giving less to endowments
to some degree. Overall, gifts are higher, but there is a little bit of shift from endowments
to annual fund.
Enrollment adjustments. Further, with enrollment challenges as one of the most
prominent themes in terms of external pressures facing these institutions as a result of the
economic recession, all three institutions implemented strategies to overcome the squeeze on
new enrollment and retention. These strategies focused on recruitment, increased tuition, and
discount rate adjustments.
Recruitment strategies. Colston College adapted to enrollment pressures by revamping
their campus tours in a way that provided a more interactive and comprehensive campus
experience and created a more engaging recruitment experience. The institution also held
multiple admissions meetings with the institution’s entire staff and demonstrated that “everyone
[was] part of the admissions process,” especially when prospective students were on campus and
experienced the college atmosphere. Payton College increased their efforts by “simply start[ing]
with a bigger pool” and limited enrollment to those who “can make a reasonable contribution” to
their education. They focused on casting a wider net and recruiting financially capable students.
While Vilma College also attempted to widen its pool and recruit out-of-state students to
increase revenue, a vice president for enrollment management admitted that the strategy really
didn’t work. She said, “The different things we tried in recruitment, everyone was trying,
because you know there are certain ways you do things.”
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Increased tuition. In addition to widening the net and creating a more engaging
recruitment experience, the three case institutions all increased their tuition rates during the
recession as an adaptive strategy with the aim of increasing net tuition revenue to the institution.
While Vilma College kept its increases below 10% annually, Payton College raised their tuition
as much as 15% in one year, but rolled its fees into a one-package price. And even though
Colston College underwent a significant value realignment before the recession and increased its
tuition significantly at that time, it continued to increase its tuition throughout the recession in
excess of 5%.
Discount rate adjustments. Perhaps more telling than the institution’s tuition increases
were the strategies implemented at each case institution regarding the institutional discount rate.
In a continued effort to generate more revenue, Payton College and Vilma College both worked
to reduce their discount rate during the recession. In fact, a reduced discount rate was a primary
indicator of financial health at both institutions. At Payton College, participants even regarded
reduced discount rate as more important, at least temporarily, than increased enrollment
numbers. The vice president for advancement at Payton College described the nature of the
situation this way:
The most critical thing is we were discounting at 71% in 2008. We’re discounting in the
mid 50% range today. And while the reaction to the market shifts at a lot of institutions
has been to begin to let their discount rates migrate up a little bit, Payton College was
bringing in less than 3 dollars out of 10 for prospective students, and it was not
financially feasible to continue that. What we’ve learned in experience is when you
change the discount rate; you are going to have more students who bring in more cash.
One of the things we’re struggling to get folks to do right now is to get folks off of the
notion that the only way to advance the college is by having an enrollment of 1000. We
could get to 1000 students if we wanted to go to an 80% discount rate, but that doesn’t
really advance the college, that doesn’t really create what we need. So some of that really
is changing the conversation.
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Somewhat oppositely, Colston College actually increased the discount rate during the
recession. Additionally, the institution established an ad hoc committee to review extenuating
cases and provided a supplemental measure of support to especially needy students who were
affected by the recession. The vice president for enrollment described the process this way:
For the students who have some really high needs, some unusual things happen, I’ll call
that group together occasionally to hear some special cases and we respond. We can’t
give them the world, we’re not here to fix all their problems, but I do have the support of
my colleagues to provide additional resources to those students. Case-by-case review in
that sense.
The institution was able to incur the additional costs of an added tuition discount and ad hoc aid,
in part, because it significantly increased its tuition before the recession.
Campus renewal projects. Finally, all three institutions referred to capital improvements
on campus as an additional way that each institution sought to make itself more appealing to
students with the aim of increasing new enrollment and retention. Of the three institutions,
Colston College saw the most transformational change in terms of capital projects. Colston
College saw significant improvements during the 2000s decade, adding a 26 million dollar
student life and technology center, affectionately referred to as the “campus living room,” a 20
million dollar wellness center, and a multi-million dollar urban village that included both student
housing and retail space. I observed that all three of these capital projects gave the very
traditional, but well-kept campus a modern architectural flare and were the most popular
congregating spaces on campus. One faculty member noted that the commitment to capital
improvement “has cost money, but it’s made it more attractive to a lot of people.” Additionally,
Payton College spent 5 million dollars updating buildings with more maintenance-level
enhancements like heating, ventilation, and air conditioning work, new carpeting, and new paint.
The institution also developed a plan to convert one of its dormitories into a more apartment-like
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complex with full-sized stoves and refrigerators. Still, I observed several signs of deferred
maintenance in and on buildings at Payton College including peeling paint and interior cracks
and rust stains on the exterior of several brick buildings. Finally, Vilma College renovated
residence halls, the chapel, areas of the student union, and the third floor of the administration
building, which housed the business school, one of the college’s most popular programs. The
capital projects at all three institutions were financed through a combination of private funds,
bond issues, and revenue generated from refinancing existing long-term debt.
Research Question Three: How did the adaptive strategies employed by the liberal arts
colleges to respond to the external environmental pressures during the Great Recession of
2007 affect their operations?
The adaptive strategies employed by the three liberal arts colleges in the current study
affected three specific areas of these institutions’ operations. Although institutions diverged in
how these areas were affected, the role of the board, the administrative leadership and decisionmaking approach, and the negotiation of faculty involvement were all themes in the current study
when discussing operations influenced by the strategies employed to combat the pressures of the
recession.
Role of the board. In terms of how the strategies mentioned above affected the
operations of the institution, Payton College and Vilma College noted significant departures
from the traditional role of the board in response to the pressures of the economic recession with
Vilma College’s board taking an especially dramatic and prolonged shift from its traditional role.
Colston College did not note the board’s role as meaningfully different during the recession, but
participants did comment on the board’s typical role in institutional adjustments and how that
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role was maintained throughout the recession. The limited role of Colston College’s board was
possibly the result of the institution’s fairly stable position even during the recession.
Aside from approving the general direction of the institution and the institution’s strategic
plan, participants at Colston College described a board that was involved but conservative and
overseeing in nature. Participants discussed how the board worked with the president in 2002
and 2003 to examine market research and identify threats to the college. The vice president for
enrollment described the process as the “president [getting] the support [from the board] to do
market research that allowed him to start to move things forward.” This process ultimately led to
the development of the institution’s engaged learning program. Additionally, another participant
described the board’s role as giving “feedback and input” regarding the faculty and
administration’s recommendations for the next strategic plan. In general, however, these
practices were not identified as new or different as a result of adaptive strategies employed by
the institution.
The role of the board at Payton College, however, did change as a result of the recession.
In an effort to respond to the market crash and subsequent economic recession and to
compensate for the institution’s pattern of overspending, the board of trustees at Payton College
issued a five-point board resolution identifying specific targets for the institution over a five-year
period. The resolution was specific and direct, mandating new priorities, new positions, reduced
programing, increased enrollment, a lower spend rate, and a balanced budget. When asked if the
board had ever taken steps of this nature in the past to correct an institutional issue, a board of
trustee member, who served on the board for more than 15 years, said “In my experience, the
board had never done anything that radical.” Additionally, a faculty member described the
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stimulus for institutional change through these identified initiatives as “largely a board-driven
process.”
And in the most extreme departure for its normal operations, participants at Vilma
College described the role of the board as increasingly intrusive, disruptive, and unhealthy
throughout the recession. The nature of the board’s role changed at Vilma College when a
president appointed two specific donors, one parent and one alumnus, to the board of trustees.
Both members were invited to join the board by virtue of their philanthropy to the institution and
their known future capacity. Ironically, participants described the two trustees as both
responsible for “running the institution” and eventually for “shutting it down.” One participant
described the situation this way:
Between him and the other guy, over the course of their time while I was there, I would
say they gave between, rough estimate, between 7.5 and 10 million dollars, more money
than anybody had ever given. And they’d sort of match each other. It was a very costly
relationship.
In short, the president’s approach was to use the funding provided by these two trustees to fund
the institution’s operations until they could recover and generate a steady flow of revenue again.
However, the approach became complicated when, as the vice president for academic affairs
noted, “as a result of them giving money, [the board of trustees members] wanted to see things
done now” and they became “more and more involved in day-to-day affairs.” The two board of
trustees members “felt like they had more influence because they were putting more into it.”
Several participants noted the growing influence these board of trustees members gained
over institutional operations, priorities, and personnel. They were involved in hiring and firing
people, often at their pleasure and on a moment’s notice. They were “partially floating the
school” and paying for aspects of the operations off the books such as the salaries of the football
coach and athletic director. One of the trustees’ daughters, upon graduating from the institution,

	
  

186	
  

was given a job in the admissions office and then promptly promoted ahead of other longer-term
employees. And at one point, one of the board of trustees members took out his own ad in The
Chronicle for Higher Education soliciting applications for a new president. Four participants
noted that these individuals habitually and obsessively called the president as many as “six or
seven times a day” for “two or three hours” at a time to advise him on aspects of the institution’s
operations. One cabinet member went as far as saying she didn’t readily recall a meeting that she
had with the president that was not interrupted by a call from one of these two board of trustees
members.
The board of trustees members were described as “very controlling,” “arrogant,”
“unreasonable,” and as individuals who “[ran] completely against the grain of anything having to
do with the liberal arts.” Interestingly, two of the last three presidents at Vilma College
commented on the complexity of the predicament of firing these board of trustees members:
My question was how do I fire somebody that’s writing million dollar checks that is
keeping us going. People would say, “You have to find a way to lessen his influence.” I
said absolutely; help me find that way because anybody else I talked to doesn’t have
anywhere close to the resources they are committing.
The second president echoed those same ideas, admitting that revenue, despite its source, had to
be the focus in order to sustain the institution. He said:
Quite frankly if they would have written me a check I probably would have taken it, and
I’m not proud to say that, but because I had people who weren’t getting paid and my
heart was breaking. I said if the Colombian drug lords pulled up and dropped off bags of
100-dollar bills, I’d take it too. I used this metaphor: if I’m drowning and there’s a boat
going by, I’m going to jump in and pray it’s a bunch of nuns and not Nazis. I don’t have a
choice at this point in time.
Yet, participants almost unanimously agreed that the board of trustees members mentioned here
“made it difficult to operate the institution.” Additionally, participants described a larger board
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that was passive and a president that allowed these members to remain active in the institution’s
business.
Administrative approach to leadership and decision-making. In addition to the
changing nature of the board, participants from each institution commented on the nature of the
institution’s administrative approach to leadership and decision-making during the recession
period and how it differed from earlier times. All three institutions had relatively new presidents
during the recession so their administrative approach to leadership and decision-making was
largely defined as an operation that was distinctive during the recession. The approaches, as
defined by participants, resembled participants’ perceptions of faculty involvement, which
follows this section as a separate theme, but also indicated more comprehensive methods that
went beyond the level of faculty input. Generally speaking, Colston College noted the
consensual nature of the decision-making process, Payton College defined a more directive
approach to leadership, and Vilma College defined an even more exclusive decision-making
process. As part of this discussion, participants at all three institutions noted the institutions’ use
of strategic plans, and participants at Payton College and Vilma College noted personnel
turnover, as subthemes of the administrations’ approach and the effects of organizational
adaptive strategies on the institution.
Colston College’s participants described an institution that was constantly brainstorming
and implementing new ideas and planning for future innovation regardless of the nature of the
external environment. One faculty member discussed this process as refusing to “rest on your
laurels” and “keeping ahead of the curve if you can.” Additionally, he indicated the process of
innovation was everyone’s responsibility at the institution and that the institution embraced a
consensus approach. He then stated, “Everything we do just about involves faculty, and students,

	
  

188	
  

and administration.” While this level of consensus building appeared to lead to greater buy-in for
institutional adaptive strategies such as the engaged learning program and the strategic plan, it
also came with the sacrifice of a slower process of change. One cabinet member described that
slower process this way:
The culture in academia is consensus and committee compared to the speed of a startup
for example, where you really can do things overnight. You just can’t turn the ship that
quickly in higher education. [Colston College] is a school like a lot of other schools in
that you really have to have a lot of conversations and a lot of coalition building.
Still, in a general sense, participants at Colston College perceived this consensual process as
adaptive and productive.
Payton College took a somewhat different approach to leadership and decision-making
than Colston College did. According to interviews with the president and cabinet of Payton
College, the leadership approach of the institution focused more on commitment to directive
action than to consensus building. One cabinet member described this approach as “having the
adult conversation.” Another cabinet member described the institution’s leadership approach
succinctly by saying:
What we need to do is take principled positions with the best information available and
then stay the course. And then evaluate. Follow our talk with actually doing it. I’ve seen
it before, administrations take positions and then when they get negative feedback, they
get cold feet and they run away. [The president] is, if anything, irritatingly consistent.
And that raises his esteem in my eyes because that’s what you have to have in a CEO.
You need someone who is willing to stick to their guns.
Finally, participants at Vilma College indicated an administrative leadership approach
that became exclusive, passive, and ambivalent as the recession progressed and the institution
tried to adapt. One former cabinet member described the progression this way:
In the first year when I was on the senior team, I would take it directly to the president
almost without fail. That was really how we operated. Later on, a lot of the decisions had
moved completely to the back room. It had become very good ole boys, which was the
point at which I felt I needed to move on. I couldn’t get an audience when I needed it.
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And I worked so hard. And that did not sit well with me.
Additionally, a faculty member described the uncertainty of who truly possessed the power to
make decisions at the institution.
I honestly don’t know [who had power to make decision]. Of course, the president did,
but I think he was influenced by other elements, possibly members on the board of
trustees, possibly off the board of trustees. There were names floating around. There were
a couple of people who came to a faculty meeting, large donors, donated a lot of money
and who we believed with good reason were having an undue influence on how the
college was being run. Our accreditation agency had requirements like shared governance
and those sorts of things, and we were realizing that we were not being involved in any
decisions.
In a general sense, the overall process was judged largely by the progressive influence of two
overly involved board of trustees members and the impact they had on the president and the
nature of administrative leadership and decision-making at the institution during the recession.
Personnel turnover. As a subtheme of the administrative leadership and decision-making
approach, two institutions, Payton College and Vilma College, noted the increased turnover in
the president’s executive administration or cabinet. Participants from both institutions indicated
that the increased turnover was a symptom of the nature of the administrative leadership and
decision-making approaches during recession times as the institutions tried to implement
adaptive strategies. Payton College participants described the cabinet as “incredibly volatile and
unstable” and the turnover as “tremendous” and “a real challenge.” More specifically, a faculty
member indicated that the turnover was “incredibly detrimental to morale and faith in the
institution.” Participants at Vilma College echoed the same types of comments by noting that the
cabinet “had very little consistency” and “no stability.” A cabinet member gave a descriptive
account of how the turnover allowed the institution to assign responsibility for institutional
failures to specific position holders. She said, “We were in such a cycle of blaming whoever left
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and putting the next person on the pedestal as the one who will fix it. They were simultaneously
the scapegoats and the saviors.”
Strategic plan. Additionally, participants from all three institutions indicated that the
implementation of a strategic plan was a central aspect of the administrative leadership and
decision-making approaches during recession times. Colston College’s strategic plan was
developed in pre-recession times and guided the maturation of the engaged learning program and
capital improvements during the recession. As early as 2008, a presidential memorandum found
on the institution’s website mandated the senior staff to address consultant recommendations for
new long-term initiatives related to the 2012 strategic plan that projected goals until 2022. The
institution also established a cabinet-level position charged with oversight of strategic initiatives
that, according to the position holder, included “working with colleagues on the senior leadership
team to formulate a new strategic plan that will move the college forward for the next 10 years.”
The new strategic plan was developed by several subcommittees and, at the time of the current
study’s fieldwork, was slated for board approval in 2013. The plan’s purpose was to guide the
institution’s work until 2022. Somewhat oppositely, one faculty member at Payton College
indicated that the college did not have an active strategic plan, but recently activated a committee
charged to look at the last strategic plan, established in 2007 before the recession, and determine
“where we stand on that and what do we need to do to move forward.” The institution’s website
also indicated that its last strategic plan was published in 2007 and was still publicly available
online. Additionally, when asked about long-term projections at Payton College, participants
indicated that most people were more concerned with present times than projecting future goals
and figures. And finally, participants at Vilma College indicated that the lack of strategic plan
contributed to the ambiguous nature of the institution’s operation and vision. One cabinet
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member articulately communicated this challenge:
We were just trying to go almost from day to day. There was no idea where we’d be in
three years or four years other than this magic we want to have 1000 students, but no way
of how we were going to get there.
Additionally, one faculty member described it this way: “The goal was sort of let’s just go raise
money and let’s get enrollment up without a real strategic plan in place. That really ended up
being a problem.” The chief student affairs officer noted that the institution lacked a coherent
plan and a “specific person whose job it was to execute it.” Instead of a plan, the institution had
broad targets, but did not define ways to achieve its goals, which created difficulty in
implementing sustained change.
Negotiation of faculty involvement. Finally, participants at all three institutions noted
shifts in faculty involvement as a result of the institution’s adjustments to the pressures of the
recession. With a strong emphasis placed on shared governance and an extensive faculty
committee structure at all three institutions, this theme was a prominent theme in the study and
participants offered divergent viewpoints at all three institutions. Through coding, it appeared
that participants at Colston College were generally satisfied with the nature of faculty
involvement whereas participants at Payton College and Vilma College were more dissatisfied.
In a general sense, participants’ data focused on the role faculty had in decision-making and the
level at which faculty were aware of the institution’s general operations.
At Colston College, participants’ comments regarding level of faculty involvement
indicated that the faculty were involved in transformational changes like the development and
implementation of the engaged learning program, the reinstitution of football, and the formation
of the strategic plan. Several participants noted the prominence of the faculty’s role in
developing the direction and core of the engaged learning program. A faculty member, who
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served as chair of the faculty committee charged with developing the program, spoke highly of
his colleagues who worked alongside him to establish the new curriculum. Further, he indicated
that buy-in into the idea developed over time through deliberate discussions. He described the
process this way:
We established the committee on experiential learning. We had a lot of really good
people on there from the faculty and they were well respected by their peers. And when
you have a group of well-respected faculty that worked really hard, and we tried to make
sure that it was something that was developing organically within the institution. There
were good people involved, there were good ideas, and there was buy-in to the idea that
we had to do something. The buy-in came in from two years of deliberate work and
frequent report and discussions with the faculty as a whole. And gathering information
from the student body and keeping the trustees informed.
While the implementation of the engaged learning program actually took place before the
recession, participants pointed to that process as indicative of institutional practice during the
recession. Participants also discussed how decisions such as the reinstitution of football and the
development of the strategic plan both gave priority to faculty involvement in the discussion
phases of the decision. And while most faculty members were “disinclined to the reinstitution of
football,” the decision-making process was still described as deliberate and consensus-focused in
nature. Additionally, a relatively new cabinet member indicated that it was made clear to him
that keeping the faculty well informed was an institutional priority. More specifically, he said:
From the day I came in the door, it was emphasized to me, that transparency is important
and I guess that I can say that it is an evolving process at [Colston College]. I would say
that the faculty know a lot about what’s going on and they know more and more each
month. We have committees that are charged with serving as avenues of communication
from the administration to the faculty and even though I don’t think we are to the point
that we want to call a resting point, we have a very strong process in place that is
continually improving communication about the business of the college. And I really
think it is necessary. It is necessary that the faculty understand why we have to make
really tough decisions.
While Payton College also involved faculty in its adaptive strategies to respond to the
pressures of the recession, participants diverged in their perceptions of level and value of faculty
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involvement in the processes. As part of the budget restructuring process, the president consulted
with the leading faculty committee regarding how to involve faculty in the academic curriculum
restructuring process. According to participants, institutional constituencies made the decision to
establish an ad hoc committee made up of faculty chairs of existing committees as well as faculty
members chosen at large from select divisions. The community agreed that the process of
deciding which academic programs would be eliminated needed to be a confidential committee
process. The committee made recommendations to the president, who had ultimate authority on
academic cuts and modifications to programs. The ad hoc committee wrote two letters to the
president during this process; the first acknowledged that the process was “consultative” and the
second requested that the recommendations not be vetted through faculty committees, but instead
taken straight to the board for approval. Before presenting his recommendations to the board, the
president presented his recommendations to the entire faculty at a regularly scheduled faculty
meeting. When given an opportunity to comment on the changes or ask questions, the president
recalled that the room was quiet and not one faculty member offered a question, comment, or
motion. The entire faculty never voted on the academic changes.
Several aspects of faculty involvement were commented on throughout interviews at
Payton College. First, in a general sense, a faculty member discussed why faculty involvement
was so important at the institution by saying:
It’s that service piece to the college, I mean the actual running of the institution and the
mechanisms of the college and participating in the running of the mechanisms of the
college, that is incredibly important in a small liberal arts college and is certainly central
to faculty life at [Payton College]. So we spend a lot of time doing that, and because of
that we are highly invested.
Service to the college was second only to teaching for faculty members at Payton College.
Therefore, it was a highly valued and protected process by faculty members. Yet, participant
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comments indicated that the faculty’s perception of what their role ought to be at Payton College
was not completely appreciated. One cabinet member noted that the faculty had the “most
unbelievable onerous committee structure” he had ever seen. Another participant noted that the
faculty, although they liked to discuss issues, did not embrace decision-making, which made
implementing change difficult at the institution. He described his frustration this way:
Their subcommittee was given full discretion over who comprised the nine-member
committee and the recommendations to restructure the academic structure. The trouble
with many faculty is that they want to deliberate but they don’t want to take the heat.
They don’t want to say yes or no, and that’s very hard. It’s not fun, but at the end of the
day you’ve got to make decisions, and they are almost never perfect, but you either make
a decision or you don’t, and you try to make decisions that are a whole lot better than not
making decisions. It’s an imperfect world and we were trying to deal with the survival of
the institution not wear everybody out fighting battles.
The divergence of perception of what the faculty’s role was and ought to be at Payton
College was reiterated through varied participant comments. One faculty member described the
ambiguous nature of the president’s relationship with faculty and said that when it came to
including faculty in the process of institutional decision-making, “sometimes he does, sometimes
he doesn’t.” But, another cabinet member said, “faculty has a larger stake in shared governance
than any other place” he knew. Still, another member of the cabinet conceded that the adaptive
strategies implemented during the recession were implemented with less faculty involvement
than in previous times.
I would suspect that some of our faculty would certainly say that their role in determining
all of the elements of the college may have decreased somewhat. And I don’t want to be
too defensive about that, but I think you have administrators to administer, you have
faculty to teach. And their role is very important, but I don’t go into the biology
department and say, “You know if you taught this a little bit differently, and if you ran
this lab a little differently...” but I think the tradition here had been, probably under at
least the last two and maybe three presidents, that the faculty had a little bit more control.
And I think that contributed to the financial situation that [the president] inherited.
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Participants at Payton College also noted that the adaptive strategies employed to combat
the pressures of the recession were sweeping and swift and impacted the quality of the
administration’s relationship with the faculty. According to participants, the administrative,
academic, and athletic realignments, and the way by which they were implemented were
“extraordinarily painful” and “gave [the faculty] a certain level of distrust.” They indicated that
this distrust led to limited buy-in into the president’s vision, and one participant described the
effect of limited buy-in of institutional constituents this way:
A fairly innovative vision that the president expressed with some resistance on the part of
the faculty to go all in on that vision, and so we’ve moved the needle, but probably not as
much as we needed to. So, the newness of what we are doing really isn’t all that new.
In short, one participant frankly noted that, as a researcher, I was “not going to find universal
satisfaction with the approach the college has taken” when interviewing his colleagues.
While Vilma College’s faculty handbook established policies and procedures for shared
governance, faculty involvement in decision-making was described as extremely limited during
the recession times. In fact, the accreditation entity cited the institution for issues of shared
governance and administrative control throughout its reaccreditation process from 2008 to 2011
(Report of the reaffirmation committee, 2008). During the recession, decisions largely occurred
at the institution’s board and executive committee level instead of through a process of shared
governance. One faculty member recalled the lack of faculty involvement in making institutional
shifts regarding athletics. He said:
There was one point we had a faculty meeting where the president announced we would
be focusing very strongly on our athletic teams particularly the football team and the
basketball team and that would bring students to [Vilma College]. We would put all this
money and all this time into renovating and all of this sort of stuff and we’d have a really
good football team and other students would see that we had a really good football team
and would want to come. And I stood up and said to the president, “Forgive me, but we
are social scientists and we make decisions based on evidence, and I’d like to know if
there is any evidence anywhere that this is actually going to happen.” And he said, “No,
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we just think it’s going to happen.” And my colleagues said this is not right, this is not
acceptable, there is no evidence, this is not acceptable, we hadn’t had raises in years and
years and years and how can this be. And that was it. And they did it.
Beyond even the actual decision-making processes, participants indicated that the level of
general information sharing with faculty about the institution was extremely limited. A faculty
member noted, “faculty knew next to nothing” and were “constantly questioning” the
administration and “challenged what they were doing and how they were doing it.” As a result,
some faculty perceived administration to devalue the faculty’s role as institutional constituents.
More specifically, the same faculty member described it this way:
I constantly got the feeling that I was not respected for being able to make those
decisions. I think we were ignored from the very beginning by board of trustees and
administration. We were just faculty. We weren’t anything else. That was a mistake. And
that’s why shared governance is really important. It was always kind of about us without
us. And they were committed and sincere, they just didn’t have enough to get it done and
never talked to us about it.
Research Question Four: How did institutional constituents perceive the adaptive strategies
employed by the liberal arts colleges to respond to the external environmental pressures
during the Great Recession of 2007?
Participants’ perceptions of the strategies employed to overcome the external
environmental pressures during the recession at the three liberal arts colleges in the current study
centered on two themes. Participants discussed their perceptions of these strategies, framing
them as reflections of the institutions’ leadership and as guides for the institutions’ identities.
Reflection of leadership. Participants throughout the study pointed to the nature of the
adjustments employed at all three institutions to combat the pressures of the recession as a
reflection of the institution’s leadership. Colston College and Payton College focused on the
leadership of the institutions’ presidents while Vilma College pointed to the role of the board and
the president in institutional changes during recession times. For better or worse, constituents
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perceived the adaptive strategies employed as a reflection of the quality of the institutions’
leadership who employed them. Perhaps not surprisingly, participants at Colston College, the
institution that remained the most stable during the recession, reviewed their president most
favorably; participants at Vilma College, the institution that closed, strongly critiqued the board
and the presidents’ leadership; and participants at Payton College, the institution that made
massive cuts in an effort to balance their budget, were cautious in their assessment of its
leadership, noting past successes but stating significant concern about the future.
While Colston College participants acknowledged the collaborative nature of the
implementation of the engaged learning program and the investment in the campus and its
programs during the recession, multiple participants indicated that the institution’s successes
were, in large part, due to the nature and vision of the president’s leadership. Several participants
reflected on times when the president delivered persuasive speeches in faculty and staff meetings
that convinced constituents of the need to innovate. The dean of students described it this way:
I thought the president did a good job at just saying this is what we are facing and we
want to make it so that we all get through this together. It was very much a rallying. Like
we’re going to do the best we can to adjust to this.
Participants also described him as “very ambitious” in implementing change and possessing the
“understanding that they had to innovate and be different.”
A few participants from Payton College also described their president’s leadership as
visionary, although perceptions diverged more at this institution than they did at Colston
College. While a visionary, participants also indicated that the president assumed an authoritative
role as well and said that he “was collaborative to an extent, but there is no doubt who has the
final say on the direction of the college.” Consequently, one faculty member described the
challenges associated with this type of leadership at a small, private liberal arts institution:
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The difficulty when you are a leader and you’re in a situation like this when you have to
make a number of decisions really quickly and you have to right a ship really quickly is
that you don’t necessarily feel like you have time to thoroughly vet every substantial
decision that is being made and if you don’t thoroughly vet those key decisions, it
produces other additional problems. It has other ramifications because you don’t
necessarily have buy-in because the decision is made without people feeling fully
informed and like they were able to fully contribute to the situation. I think that’s an
issue. I think for anyone facing this, it’s a rock and a hard place, but you have to figure
out how to negotiate having to make decisions quickly and nonetheless how to make your
various constituencies feel like they are being consulted and they are being listened to
and that there is collaborations and compromise on how the decisions are made and what
decisions are made so you have that buy-in. And that will slow things down. And so you
have to make decisions about what will cost more. What are the ramifications of creating
that kind of socio-political environment because it doesn’t just go away.
In this sense, Payton College’s leadership was perceived as limitedly collaborative.
Finally, Vilma College participants perceived the inability to sustain adaptation in
recession times as a reflection of the dysfunctional leadership at the presidential and board
levels. While the institution’s president was perceived to be strong leader in fundraising and
public relations, participants judged the administrative and fiscal leadership as lacking and
characterized the presidency as one with a “limited vision.” Additionally, participants discussed
the institution as an organization that “suffered from a lot of administrative mismanagement” and
one that was “hungry for leadership.” In an effort to be everything to everyone, participants
stated that the leadership’s inability to say no to specific constituents and drive the institution in a
focused and purposeful direction ultimately caused confusion and undermined the authority of
the senior-level staff. One cabinet member described it this way:
[The president] had a trait in trying to please everybody and he had difficulty in saying
no. It undermined all the vice presidents. A department head would say we need a new
faculty member. The faculty member would go to the president and the president would
say yes. The same thing was going on in business; the same thing was going on in student
life. A student would get fined for drinking in the dorms; the dean of students would fine
them. They would go and appeal to the president; the president would rescind the fine. It
was undermining everyone’s authority.
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Additionally, the president’s commitment to being directed almost entirely by an overreaching
board of trustees limited the level of empowerment his senior staff and faculty felt. One faculty
member defined it this way:
He was very susceptible to other influences, other people’s influences, like board of
trustee influences especially because he needed money. He knew how much in debt we
were. And anytime somebody said we’ll donate this money if you do this and this, he
would just do it and not tell anybody.
Cabinet members noted that the president “wasn’t listening to the individuals he was relying on”
and “was not looking to his staff for direction, he was looking for his staff to support him.”
Finally, Vilma College participants also held the board accountable for the way adaptive
strategies were implemented during the recession, indicating that their oversight was minimal,
misguided, and unethical at times. One cabinet member characterized the board as “overly active
and should have been controlled” and another noted that the board was not “vigilant enough
about what was going on.” When asked what the institution’s biggest shortcoming was, a faculty
member responded this way:
A board of trustees who did not recognize what an institution - a private liberal arts
institution like this - could be and had to be. Did not realize it. Did not have the complete
commitment to making this do what it could have done. Definitely individuals, but not
complete. They made bad decisions all around.
In short, participants perceived the board to be an ineffective group that was “simply glad to be
chosen,” was not attentive, and was not able to hire effective presidents. Eventually, the passivity
of the board and the president allowed two ambitious and aggressive board of trustees members
with high financial capacity to “run the place.”
Lack of transparency. As a subtheme of participants’ perceptions of leadership as it was
reflected in institutional adaptation, participants at two institutions, Payton College and Vilma
College, also commented on issues of transparency during the adaptation process and the
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challenges associated with a lack of information sharing during institutional adaptation. One
cabinet member at Payton College noted that the “guardedness of information” by the institution
was “strange" to him while a faculty member described the confidential nature of the faculty
committee’s work on the institution’s academic restructuring as an “incredibly difficult and
damaging process.” Similarly, participants at Vilma College who reflected on the institution’s
dire financial and administrative challenges noted that ”had [there] been more transparency
people would have reacted better to it. They would have been more engaged…” Participants
indicated that Vilma College had no transparency or disclosure and operated in a world of
“secrecy” regarding institutional and financial operations. When the interim president finally
disclosed to campus constituents the depth of the institution’s issues less than two years before it
closed, people were surprised and shocked. A vice president for enrollment management noted,
“I really felt like we were a day late and a dollar short on [telling people].”
Perhaps most telling, a member of the board of trustees at Vilma College stated that he
did not “really have a clear picture [of the institution’s situation] until [he] came on the executive
committee.” He served on the board for more than two years before moving to the executive
committee and, until that point, did not truly understand the institution’s situation. He described
the larger group of board of trustees as a group that included several position holders in the
church and community, and said that the nature of the board did not present a situation where the
board could “get a lot of accomplished.” Instead, “most of the decision-making was done within
the executive committee of the board of trustees.”
Issues of identity. Finally, participants’ perceptions about the institutions’ adaptive
strategies employed as a result of environmental pressures caused by the recession were related
to how participants saw those strategies contribute to the identity of the institutions. Participants
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also discussed the importance of institutional identity in future adaptation in the post-recession
world. Examining the institutions broadly, Colston College branded itself with an identity based
on its engaged learning program, Payton College had yet to solidify its new identity, and Vilma
College, according to some participants, never quite mastered branding its institution.
Colston College judged the engaged learning program and its continued priority on the
program as a positive adaptive strategy at the institution largely because it allowed the institution
to redefine itself as a nationally innovative institution focused on experiential opportunities,
which were already “authentic” to the institution. Additionally, participants at Colston College
noted that the institution needed to continue redefining or more clearly defining its identity
through new adaptive strategies. The interim president and dean for institutional advancement
described it this way:
Every institution has to find a niche, if you will, that defines them. And [Colston College]
was able to do that with the engaged learning program. And this next thing we are
looking at now has the potential to give us an additional level of distinction.
In this way, Colston College viewed the continual adaptation of the institution as a process that
led to a more clearly established identity.
Payton College, which underwent significant restructuring, most notably through drastic
cuts of programs and personnel, noted its continued negotiation of identity as a concern.
Additionally, participants stated that its branding issues were reflective of the challenges that
faced the institution as a result of the ways the institution adapted to recessional pressures. One
faculty member noted that the inconsistency of branding was truly misleading because the
product the institution offered for more than a decade remained virtually the same. More
specifically, the faculty member described it this way:
In terms of marketing itself, [Payton College], over the period that I’ve been here, has
tried to rebrand itself at least twice and maybe three times, and that I think, it’s too much,
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too quickly. The opportunity to be consistent so that you build on that branding; I think
that opportunity has been missed. I don’t think that in the whole period I’ve been here, I
don’t feel like what we have to offer on the market economy has changed that much, but
if you look at the branding, it looks like it’s all over the place. I don’t think the
educational experience has changed that much.
Additionally, the president also discussed the challenge of naming and embracing the
institution’s identity as an ongoing issue facing the institution.
My call to the community was we can’t come out of this just being a smaller, more
limited version of ourselves. We have to see this as a way of concentrating on our
strengths that will allow us to flourish as we go forward, but we need to come out of this
on the other side of this different than what we went into it.
In an overall sense, participants were most concerned with the institution’s need to establish
some level of consistency in its branding and “clarity in the marketplace.”
Lastly, participants discussed issues of branding at Vilma College as one of the most
difficult and long-term challenges that faced the institution. Vilma College’s inability to
effectively define, market, and embrace its identity led to an institution that everyone perceived
differently and valued differently. Participants admitted that the institution did not have “a
compelling story” and could not find a way to “redefine ourselves” and “be attractive to have
students want to come.” Consequently, the institution never articulated their value or their
product in a way that sustained a critical mass of paying students to support its existence.
Chapter Summary
The findings of the current study were presented in a two-part analysis through an
institutional profile of each case institution and through a comprehensive overview of themes
across all three institutions. The themes were presented in the context of the current study’s four
research questions.
All three institutions were similar in several ways. All three institutions were affiliated
with the same Protestant denomination and were small, private, residential liberal arts colleges in
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the south. All three institutions were relatively similar in size of enrollment, faculty, staff, and
boards. All three institutions maintained athletic programs that led to contentious decisions at
times. All three institutions had several student life programs. All three put a priority on the level
of academic rigor and value of faculty academic advising and mentorship. And finally, all three
institutions depended on a financial revenue formula made up of net tuition, private gifts, and
endowment earnings.
Yet, while all three institutions had a strong, shared history, each institution was in a very
different financial and operational situation before the market crash and recession of 2007. Vilma
College was in especially precarious financial shape with a nominal endowment. Although
Payton College had the security of a larger endowment, institutional practice did not protect the
endowment’s corpus and its revenue streams did not work to create sustainable future. Finally,
Colston College saw record enrollment and revenue numbers before and during the recession,
however its participants still acknowledged challenges in maintaining spending practices within
financially recommended parameters.
While each institution responded to its individual pressures in a way specific to its
institutional history and culture, this study drew broad themes among all three institutions
regarding the adaptive strategies employed to overcome specific external pressures during the
Great Recession of 2007. Additionally, the study examined how these adaptive strategies
influenced the operations of the colleges and how organizational constituencies perceived them.
Understanding these common themes as well as the differences among each institution is
important in furthering research on the organizational adaptation of liberal arts colleges in the
twenty-first century and in informing practice and policy in these institutions.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The advances of the 20th and the twenty-first centuries led to significant economic and
societal shifts and created new challenges for the liberal arts college model in American higher
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education. More specifically, in the wake of the Great Recession of 2007, many liberal arts
colleges struggled to remain operational due to increased financial and enrollment pressures and
sought ways to adapt to the external context while also abiding by their institutional missions and
established functions (Chabotar, 2010). Yet, there was limited scholarly research examining how
liberal arts colleges, especially the smaller and more financially vulnerable schools that were
most affected by significant endowment losses and recruitment and retention strains, adapted to
recent changing external circumstances (Chabotar, 2010). The lack of scholarly research focused
on these colleges’ adaptation processes creates a huge gap of knowledge in both higher education
and organizational research arenas. Examining the adaptation of the small, private liberal arts
college during the 2007 recession in this study serves two primary purposes. First, it provides the
next chapter of literature in the survival story of America’s oldest educational entity, and second,
it expands the organizational research base, which serves to inform modern institutional practice.
This chapter provides a contextualized understanding of the findings presented in Chapter
IV. In this chapter, I broadly review the findings first, within the framework of the current
study’s research questions, and second, with the lens of the existing literature and Cameron’s
(1984) organizational adaptation theoretical model. Additionally, this chapter concludes with a
discussion of the current’s study’s limitations and recommendations for future research and
practice and policy.
Overview of the Study
After examining the existing research related to the adaptive nature and history of liberal
arts colleges, and after conducting an analysis of Cameron’s (1984) organizational adaptation
theoretical framework, the current study sought to understand how private liberal arts colleges
adapted during the Great Recession of 2007 by examining institutional changes at three private

	
  

206	
  

liberal arts colleges and their effects on the institutions’ operations. The current study’s purpose
was accomplished by addressing four specific research questions:
1. What external environmental pressures influenced the liberal arts colleges during the
Great Recession of 2007?
2. What adaptive strategies did the liberal arts colleges employ to respond to the external
environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007?
3. How did the adaptive strategies employed by the liberal arts colleges to respond to the
external environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007 affect their
operations?
4. How did institutional constituents perceive the adaptive strategies employed by the
liberal arts colleges to respond to the external environmental pressures during the Great
Recession of 2007?
I employed a qualitative multiple-case study approach to answer the established research
questions. This type of research approach is most fitting when investigating process-focused
questions in units of analysis that are embedded within multiple contexts (Denzin & Lincoln,
1997; Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2009). Additionally, the current study produced more powerful and
valid findings by examining multiple cases instead of a single case, which enabled me to rely on
a diversified database and interpret findings both within and across cases (Merriam, 2009; Stake,
2000; Yin, 2009).
To ensure a diversified database, I collected data from three different information sources
at three liberal arts colleges that varied in their adaptation during the last decade; data sources
included participant interview data, historical document analysis, and observational field notes.
More specifically, document data were collected during a 10-month period while interview and
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observational data were collected during a three-month phase in early 2013. In all, I conducted
31 participant interviews that consisted of participants from the three case institutions, however
one participant later withdrew from the study citing confidentiality concerns. Participants
included a combination of board of trustees members, presidents, cabinet members, and faculty
members who served in leadership roles within the faculty governing body. Interviews were
semi-structured and open-ended in nature.
In addition to collecting and analyzing data from 30 participant interviews, I collected
and analyzed documents associated with all three case institutions throughout the current study.
These documents included both public and private documents that were acquired through library
or online resources or provided to me by participants in the current study. Finally, I spent
multiple days on each case institution’s campus and observed informal constituent interactions
and operations. During the observation portion of the fieldwork, I used the campus’ facilities and
explored the institution, but maintained a nonparticipant role. My observational field notes
served to corroborate participants’ data and document analysis. Together, these three diverse data
sources - participant interviews, document analysis, and observational field notes - provided raw
material for in-depth analysis in the current study.
Following data transcription and coding, I conducted data analysis at two equally
important levels; first, I developed a holistic case profile or case record for each institution, and
second, I examined all three cases together and analyzed the data in a comparative fashion. At
both levels, I worked through the descriptive phase of analysis followed by the interpretative
phase of analysis. To adequately represent these two processes, Chapter IV first presented an
individual case record of each case institution and then gave a comparative overview of common
themes among all three institutions within the context of the established research questions
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(Merriam, 2009; Stake, 2000). This approach ensured that the study gave attention to both the
descriptive focus of each individual entity as well as a comparative analysis across cases.
Conclusions
Both a holistic understanding of the individual nature and operations of each case
institution and identification of broad themes that crossed over all three liberal arts colleges
informed the current study’s conclusions and contributed to the overall assessment of how these
institutions were pressured by the economic recession of 2007, how they employed adaptive
strategies, how those strategies affected their operations, and how institutional constituents
perceived those adaptive strategies.
Research Question One: What external environmental pressures influenced the liberal arts
colleges during the Great Recession of 2007?
I identified three primary ways the economic recession of 2007 pressured the case
institutions. First, the recession eliminated institutions’ financial flexibility and cushion and
served as an impetus to address and rectify unsustainable fiscal practices. In short, the recession
forced institutions to align their operations within their financial means. Consequently, Colston
College fared better than Payton College and Vilma College throughout the recession because it
benefited from growing enrollment and tuition revenue associated with its recently established
innovative engaged learning program. Impressively, Colston College attracted more students and
more revenue during the recession than at any other time in its history. Even with the pressure of
the recession, the institution largely maintained its momentum and maintained a healthy
operational level of self-sufficiency, addressing only incidental issues caused by the recession.
Oppositely, Payton College and Vilma College operated with unbalanced budgets prior to the
recession, either as a result of overspending or dwindling revenue. Both depended largely on
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irregular sources of income like large private gifts or record high endowment earnings to sustain
their operations even before the market crashed in 2007. In both cases, the economic recession of
2007 eliminated their ability to operate in a lopsided way and the institutions felt the double blow
of having to adjust its unsustainable internal practices during bad economic times.
In a more specific sense, the recession challenged all three case institutions in two major
ways; first, they experienced tremendous endowment losses, and second, they saw growing
enrollment pressures during this time. As a second theme of the current study’s findings, all three
institutions saw significant endowment losses in spendable earnings and corpuses during the
recession. Participants’ interviews at Colston College and Payton College indicated that these
two institutions lost as much as 30% of their nine-figure endowments within a few short years.
Additionally, Vilma College’s endowment, although significantly smaller in size, was also
negatively affected by increased financial regulations brought on by the economic recession.
These increased regulations implemented by Vilma College’s banks and the Department of
Education severely limited the institution’s ability to use its endowment as collateral for longterm loans and federal aid. Therefore, in a general sense, endowment losses created a sudden jolt
to the case institutions’ annual operating budgets, which were supplemented by endowment
earnings, as well as darkened the institutions’ overall asset pictures. While this drop in assets was
temporary to some degree for Colston College and Payton College, whose endowments have
almost completely recovered their losses from the recession, the depletion of Vilma College’s
endowment resources ultimately contributed to its closure in 2011.
Lastly, all three institutions disclosed that the economic recession affected their
enrollment picture, either through new recruitment or retention, since students and parents were
more financially limited during bad economic times. Additionally, the competition of cheaper,
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in-state, public schools also challenged all three institutions, especially when prospective
students were eligible for state scholarship programs that offered practically free-of-charge
educational opportunities. As a somewhat divergent theme, Colston College was the only
institution that indicated the it faced retention issues from students who were financially
vulnerable during the recession. It was possible that Payton College and Vilma College also
faced retention issues, but did not disclose them because significant new enrollment pressures
overshadowed retention challenges. And finally, as an interesting subtheme of enrollment
pressures, participants from all three institutions noted that their geographic location in the
United States, “the south,” was considered an added burden on recruitment efforts.
Research Question Two: What adaptive strategies did the liberal arts colleges employ to
respond to the external environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007?
Participant and document data indicated that the case institutions employed virtually any
adjustment that seemed plausible during the economic recession, including fiscal management
adjustments, academic adjustments, athletics adjustments, personnel adjustments, fundraising
adjustments, and enrollment adjustments. The sheer number of strategies these institutions
implemented indicated that liberal arts institutions faced unprecedented times during the Great
Recession of 2007.
Perhaps most interestingly, each institution attempted to adopt a new fiscal management
plan during the recession. Colston College used a balanced approach, investing heavily in capital
and programs during difficult times while controlling spending; Payton College aggressively
slashed its budget, stripping away more than 30 positions and eliminating half its majors; and
Vilma College peeled away its expenditures until there was nothing else to cut, at which point
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they supplemented significant private gift revenue for tuition revenue in the face of decreased
enrollment.
All three schools also made adjustments to their curriculum, either with the aim of
increasing enrollment power or net tuition revenue or with the aim of significantly decreasing
program and teaching expenditures. Colston College and Vilma College implemented new
curriculums in professional areas such as music management, social work, and environmental
studies while Payton College renewed its liberal arts focus and eliminated half of its majors,
many of which were in professionalized areas like health and exercise science and accounting.
All three institutions also negotiated the role of online education in the twenty-first century
liberal arts college.
Perhaps more so than any other topic, athletics adjustments proved to be a hotly debated
adaptive strategy at all three institutions. Ultimately, each institution adopted a different plan for
its athletics program during the recession. Colston College added both men’s and women’s
sports to better market itself in its conference and among prospective students, Payton College
changed divisions and significantly cut athletics-related expenditures, and Vilma College
invested heavily in athletic programs and sought to change divisions to increase its reputation
and recruitment efforts.
All three institutions also implemented traditional organizational cost-cutting personnel
measures during the recession, which included administrative layoffs and hiring freezes,
retirement benefit cuts, and salary freezes, although Vilma College departed from the norm and
raised faculty and staff salaries by 4% in one of its last years of operation. In terms of
fundraising, all three institutions attempted to run capital campaigns throughout the recession;
one institution met its goal, but the other two institutions never came within 50% of their goals.
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Additionally, all three institutions increased recruitment efforts and negotiated raising tuition
while striving to provide enough financial aid to hit target numbers. Finally, as part of their
recruitment efforts, all three institutions also completed campus renewal projects during the
recession with the aim of making their campuses more appealing to prospective students.
Research Question Three: How did the adaptive strategies employed by the liberal arts
colleges to respond to the external environmental pressures during the Great Recession of
2007 affect their operations?
The themes related to the current study’s third research question centered on the
governance structure of the institutions, and specifically addressed how decisions were made and
who had and ought to have had information, input, and power or authority in the process. As the
first major theme related to the institutions’ governance structure, participants primarily
associated with Payton College and Vilma College discussed the changing nature of the role of
the board of trustees in post-recession times. Participants described the role of the board of
trustees during the economic recession as a significant departure from its traditional role at the
institutions. As an example, at Payton College, the board of trustees issued a resolution in the
midst of the recession with five very specific institutional targets and charged the president to
work with the faculty to ensure that the targets were met within five years. Even more atypically,
Vilma College’s accreditation entity cited the institution for board of trustees’ activity that
included too much involvement in day-to-day operations of the institution during the recession
(Report of the reaffirmation committee, 2008). Essentially, during the recession, a small
subgroup of Vilma College’s board was highly engaged in hiring and firing of administration, in
privately funding multi-million-dollar institutional projects, and ultimately, in dictating the
direction of the institution without input from faculty or administration. Finally, while Colston
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College’s role of the board of trustees was mentioned in participants’ interviews, the context was
more peripheral with participants not noting any significant departure from pre-recession times.
Rather, they described the board’s role in a general sense as helpful and supportive of the
president and as overseeing the established direction of the institution.
Administrative approach to leadership and decision-making also emerged as a theme in
the current study as participants discussed the ways in which each board of trustees, president,
and cabinet ran the institution and implemented adjustment strategies during the recession.
Again, these approaches varied; Colston College participants described a deliberate and
sometimes slow-moving consensus-building process that involved all constituent types including
students; Payton College described a more directive approach that involved committee input, but
essentially rested on a strong commitment to aggressively move presidential decisions forward;
and Vilma College participants described an exclusive and sometimes covert decision-making
process at the presidential and board subcommittee level. As subthemes of administrative
leadership and decision-making approach, participants pointed to the turnover of top-level
administrators and the existence of a strategic plan as symbols of the approaches utilized at each
institution.
Finally, participants at all three institutions discussed the changing nature of faculty
involvement at these colleges and how it shifted during the most recent economic recession. In a
general sense, participants pointed to both a decrease in information sharing with faculty and a
decrease in faculty input in the decision-making process during the recession. Although
participant comments somewhat diverged, Colston College’s general assessment regarding the
nature of faculty involvement was positive while participants at Payton College and Vilma
College were more tentative in their assessments, and sometimes even negative, when reflecting
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on the level of information sharing with and empowerment of faculty to contribute to the
decision-making at the institutional level.
Research Question Four: How did institutional constituents perceive the adaptive strategies
employed by the liberal arts colleges to respond to the external environmental pressures
during the Great Recession of 2007?
Two major themes emerged with regard to institutional constituencies’ perceptions about
the adaptive strategies that these three liberal arts colleges employed to combat the effects of the
recession. First, participants consistently perceived the nature of the adaptive strategies as a
reflection of the institution’s leadership. Colston College and Payton College focused their
reflection of leadership on the president and top-level administrators whereas Vilma College
focused their reflection of leadership on the presidents and the board of trustees. In a general
sense, participants held leaders responsible for the success or failure of the changes implemented
to combat the economic pressures of the late 2000s more so than they attributed the success or
failures to the turbulent external environment. Interestingly, more emphasis was placed on the
role of internal factors, mainly leadership and decision-making approach, than on the
significantly negative economic factors created by the 2007 market crash and subsequent
recession. Perhaps not unexpectedly, participants at Colston College, the institution that
remained most stable during the recession, reviewed their president most positively; participants
associated with the institution that closed, Vilma College, extensively criticized the board and
the presidents’ leadership; and participants at Payton College, the institution that made massive
cuts, were cautious and sometimes critical in their assessment of the institution’s leadership,
acknowledging past successes related to balancing the budget, but communicating anxiety about
future progress in developing the institution into a thriving learning community. Finally, as a
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subtheme of leadership, the priority to and level of transparency that leadership figures endorsed
was a factor in how these adaptive strategies were perceived. Participants’ data indicated that
participants were most satisfied with open communication and free information flow among
constituencies at the institution regardless of participant role.
Finally, issues of institutional identity emerged as a second theme related to participants’
perceptions of adaptive change at these three case institutions. Participants across institutions
discussed how the identified adaptive strategies of each institution affected the organization’s
identity, either by more clearly defining who and what the institution was or by confusing the
brand and creating ambiguity about the institution’s place in the market. Again, it appeared that
the more the participant perceived the institution to have a clear sense of what it was, the more
the participant perceived the adaptive strategy to be useful to the institution in overcoming the
pressures of the recession.
Discussion
In many ways, the findings of the current study reflected and expanded on the previous
research focused on the historical challenges and adaptive strategies of liberal arts colleges
presented in Chapter II. Additionally, the current study’s institutions were affected by the Great
Recession of 2007 in many of the same ways that Chabotar’s (2009) research indicated it
affected other higher education institutions - through poor performing endowments, constrained
finances, and enrollment hardships highlighted by a greater dependence on tuition. However, the
current study’s findings supplemented existing literature by demonstrating the distinctive nature
of the challenges facing liberal arts colleges as they adapted to a combination of pressures caused
by gradual shifts in the higher education and wider sociopolitical landscapes and by the abrupt
changes caused by the 2007 market crash and the ensuing two-year recession.
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Twenty-First Century Liberal Arts Colleges Challenges
Nearly two decades ago, Breneman’s (1994) mixed methods study, reviewed in Chapter
II, examined the adaptation of liberal arts colleges and identified eight emergent themes related
to how institutions were preparing for the future: enrollments and students, management and
finance, faculty, academic programs, development, planning, trustees, and government policies.
These themes emerged in the current study as well, but findings indicated that many of the
challenges related to these themes were even more exacerbated than in previous times.
Institutional wealth. First, in an institutional sense, Breneman’s (1994) findings
concluded that wealthy schools were generally better positioned to acquire more wealth and
acquire it at a quicker rate than less wealthy institutions. The current study’s findings reflected
Breneman’s (1994) conclusions and further indicated the importance of established institutional
wealth in recessional times. While the recession affected every case institution’s endowment,
Colston College and Payton College benefited from the security of a nine-figure endowment and
held an advantage over institutions like Vilma College, whose endowment corpus was less than
10% of Colston College and Payton College’s. Additionally, Colston College and Payton
College netted more revenue and operated with significantly larger budgets than Vilma College.
So, while Colston College and Payton College’s hundred-million endowments suffered
tremendous losses during the recession, they have since almost fully recovered, while the
financial pressure exerted on Vilma College’s endowment was ultimately a factor that sealed it
closure. Even more illustratively, because Colston College significantly increased its power to
generate annual wealth in pre-recession times through its engaged learning program and
increased enrollment and net tuition revenue, it was able to more easily adapt to the pressures of
the recession and maintained its wealth acquisition momentum. Oppositely, Payton College,
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although it had a nine-figure endowment, experienced greater difficulty acquiring wealth during
the recession because its endowment wealth was not matched with its power to generate annual
wealth through net tuition and private gift funding.
Enrollment challenges. From an enrollment perspective, Breneman’s (1994) study noted
that liberal arts colleges, at the end of the 20th century, experienced challenges meeting
enrollment goals, overcoming price resistance from parents and students, and recruiting
minorities and nontraditional students at institutionally targeted rates. Additionally, Lapovsky
and Hubbell (2003) indicated that the biggest enrollment challenge that faced liberal arts colleges
at the turn of the century was the institutional practice of increasing financial aid faster than
tuition, which led to negative revenue growth.
The current study’s findings indicated that every one of these challenges identified by
Breneman (1994) and Lapovsky and Hubbell (2003) became more significant as a result of the
Great Recession of 2007. In a general sense, all three institutions discussed both the struggle to
secure a critical mass of students at an appropriate tuition rate that maintained a balanced budget
and the approaches they employed to overcome these enrollment challenges. More specifically,
Vilma College’s approach demonstrated the catastrophic ramifications that Lapovsky’s (2003)
research pointed to regarding the fragility of using institutional aid to boost enrollment. In short,
Vilma College’s approach consisted of giving students increasingly high levels of institutional
aid without increasing tuition in an effort to build enrollment. The approach created an accessible
liberal arts education for students, but also created an unsustainable business model. Both
operating case institutions, Colston College and Payton College, departed from this approach and
employed more innovative strategies. Colston College restructured its entire pricing framework
and rebranded itself as a more expensive and elite school, which Lapovsky’s (2005) research
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indicated increases an institution’s perceived value. As a result, Colston College raised both its
tuition and its institutional financial aid rates, which participants indicated was a win-win for the
institution and its students. Finally, Payton College acknowledged that, at least temporarily, the
institution was more focused on recruiting students capable of contributing to the cost of their
education rather than simply increasing enrollment numbers and filling the campus with students
who demanded larger amounts of financial assistance. However, as some participants noted,
aiming to educate a small group of financially capable students had additional concerning
ramifications related to the accessibility of a liberal arts education, especially in an
educationally-deprived southern state.
Perception challenges. Participants at all three institutions agreed that manipulating the
price of education was not a universal answer to the challenge of persuading students to buy-in to
a liberal arts college experience. In fact, in some ways, pricing strategies only touched on one
symptom of a much larger issue of perception. Several participants indicated that the challenge
of communicating the value and application of a liberal arts degree remained central to
enrollment success. As Hersh’s (1997) research showed, public attitudes towards higher
education were focused on the need for college to prepare students for careers more so than to
provide learning opportunities for learning’s sake. As a result, several participants reiterated
Hersh’s (1997) conclusions and conceded that liberal arts colleges needed to more effectively
persuade prospective students and parents that a liberal arts college experience provided superior
career and life preparation. Additionally, liberal arts colleges needed to make a solid case for the
added financial investment their educational experience required (Breneman, 1994; Gilbert,
1995).
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Fiscal challenges. Breneman’s (1994) research also indicated that most of the liberal arts
colleges included in his case study operated with a deficit as a result of enrollment and
perception challenges bleeding into the fiscal situation of the institution by way of decreased net
tuition revenue and decreased private giving revenue. Additionally, he indicated that most
institutions during that time period approaching fiscal distress from a cost-cutting approach,
eliminating personnel and programs to balance their budgets. Yet, as Breneman (1994) noted two
decades ago and as the current study’s findings reiterated, many of these liberal arts colleges
already had small and sometimes bare-boned operations. Consequently, many of them had little
opportunity to cut anything without sabotaging their competitive edge in the market.
Additionally, when cost-cutting opportunities were available, such as utilizing adjuncts,
increasing class sizes, and cutting residential programming, they often conflicted with the
mission of the institution.
The fiscal challenges addressed by the current study’s case institutions reflected several
aspects of Breneman’s (1994) and Lapovsky’s (2005) earlier research, most notably the struggle
to generate enough net tuition revenue to create a balanced budget. In order to ensure a
sustainable balance between costs and revenues, Colston College addressed its fiscal challenges
by boldly investing in programs and capital during booming times while upholding reasonably
conservative spending practices throughout the recession. Somewhat oppositely, Payton College
took a more traditional approach to bad times and addressed its fiscal challenges, which were
significantly exacerbated by the recession, by slashing budgets and implementing massive costcutting measures across the institution. Finally, Vilma College’s fiscal challenges proved to be
too great to overcome during the recession, in part, because the institution had responded to
previously challenging times by cutting the operation back to the bone and by failing to generate
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sustained revenue streams. As a result, the institution could neither implement additional cuts
and remain operational nor generate sustainable new income streams. In short, the current
study’s findings, within the context of Breneman’s (1994) past research, indicated that many
liberal arts colleges can no longer afford to exclusively employ cost-cutting strategies to
overcome economic pressures; many of them have cut everything they can cut. Rather, these
institutions must succeed in generating more revenue in order to survive.
Liberal Arts Colleges Adaptive Strategies and Considerations
In addition to past research addressing the challenges facing liberal arts colleges,
especially in economically repressive times, researchers also focused on adaptive strategies used
to combat these challenges. In particular, I reviewed literature in Chapter II that examined the
role of mission, curriculum and technology, and identity in organizational adaptation, which all
proved to be especially applicable to the current study’s findings.
Mission compromise. Delucchi’s (2000) research focused on the extent to which liberal
arts colleges decoupled their mission and operations as an adaptive strategy. He argued that this
tactic allowed institutions to maintain an established liberal arts college reputation while also
expanding its niche by offering areas of study outside the traditional liberal arts curriculum. He
found that nearly 70% of the institutions he studied utilized this strategy and decoupled their
missions and major field of degrees. However, his research also indicated that if a school was
located in the northeast, had a large enrollment, had a large endowment, or was not affiliated
with a religious denomination, its likelihood of decoupling decreased. In short, Delucchi (2000)
argued that organizational survival was dependent on responding to the immediate needs of the
environment unless the organization was able to rely on a specific internal strength, like larger
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endowment or geographic location, which cushioned the institution from environmental
pressures.
Indeed, the negotiation of mission was an important theme at all three case institutions in
the current study. According to Delucchi’s (2000) research, all three institutions had a high
likelihood of decoupling their mission and operations. To some degree, Colston College and
Vilma College employed this adaptive strategy by implementing new professionally-based
curriculum during the recession in an effort to increase enrollment, although the majority of their
degrees were still awarded in liberal arts. However, Payton College took the entirely opposite
approach, solidifying its coupled commitment to liberal arts by eliminating half of its majors,
many of which were professionally-based. Its renewed commitment to liberal arts, participants
noted, was both refreshing and frightening since the organization had not managed to establish
momentum in terms of distinctive curriculum offerings since the recession and subsequent
academic restructuring at the institution.
Technology in education. Nearly 20 years ago, Kanigel (1986) argued that liberal arts
colleges needed to adjust to the changing needs of the external environment by embracing
technology as an adaptive academic strategy. He noted that if a liberal arts college was to prepare
an individual to be an active participant in society and the marketplace, it needed to embrace
technology as an educational tool. The current study’s findings indicated that Kanigel’s (1986)
research and conclusions permeated the liberal arts college during the last two decades, although
at different levels across institutions. While all three institutions’ participants stated that their
colleges discussed the use of online education and other technology-based platforms, only
Colston College implemented substantial strokes towards integrating technology as a meaningful
component into educational delivery at its institution. Most visibly, Colston College did this by
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establishing classes with consortium institutions and with professors who travelled abroad and
engaged in off-campus research or fieldwork. Colston College also appointed a cabinet level
position to oversee information technology, indicating the institution’s long-term commitment to
adapting through the use of technology in education.
Branding of identity. Finally, in a general sense, Stimpert (2004) argued that regardless
of the specific adaptive strategy employed, the main adaptive priority for the liberal arts college
was to succinctly define itself. In fact, he characterized the most successful liberal arts colleges
as the ones that developed a “compelling identity that communicates in just one or a few
sentences what it is, what it aspires to be, and what distinguishes it from many other competing
institutions" (p. 44). According to Stimpert (2004), this identity then served as a force for the
institution and focused its priorities and strategic plan.
The theme of institutional identity was one of the current study’s most prevalent topics.
Participants at Vilma College referred to the institution’s inability to define itself and align its
operations with a strategic plan as two of its critical failures whereas participants at Colston
College collectively described the institution’s identity by pointing to its engaged learning
program and discussed how the strategic objectives for the next 10 years built on the program
and the institution’s established identity. Finally, Payton College’s participants acknowledged
that, although the institution saw transformational change during recession times, those changes
focused mostly on operational measures and on cutting budgets rather than growing programs
and curriculum. This approach led to a somewhat ambiguous institutional identity and a
perceived lack of distinctiveness among the organization’s members. Additionally, Payton
College, at the time of the current study’s fieldwork, did not have an active strategic plan.
Importance and Power of Leadership
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Past research also indicated the significance of the role of leadership in small liberal arts
colleges, especially amidst transformational change and increased economic pressures.
Breneman (1994), Chaffee (1984), and Puglisi (2011) all pointed to the prominence of the
institution’s internal factors, especially its presidential leadership, when examining effective
organizational adaptation. Breneman (1994) argued that liberal arts colleges’ small size served as
an advantage in times of change because it allowed the institutions to quickly change directions,
implement new plans, and adapt. Essentially, he argued, the smaller the ship, the easier it was to
turn. Additionally, Chaffee (1984), after examining the strategic changes employed by leaders at
private colleges that experienced significant decline in the 1970s, concluded that the institution’s
president were particularly prominent and served as the organization’s most important figure:
“…for small private colleges in trouble, finding an able and dedicated leader is a matter of life or
death” (Chaffee, 1984, p. 2). Finally, Puglisi (2011) identified a few specific requirements of a
successful president: he needed to address the roots of financial problems and he needed a good
team that operated with trust and acted in an advisory role. He also described successful
presidents as positive, poised, and patient in solving problems that likely took years to create.
Finally, Puglisi (2011) pointed to the president’s role as one that cultivated culture and morale
with communication remaining central to a president’s ability to create adaptation. “To the extent
possible and prudent, be open, honest, and transparent” (Puglisi, 2011, p. 88).
The current study’s findings highlighted themes in the nature of administrative leadership
and decision-making, negotiation of faculty involvement, and lack of transparency. These three
themes all reflected aspects of Breneman’s (1994), Chaffee’s (1984), and Puglisi’s (2011)
research. When participants from all three institutions discussed their perceptions of institutional
leadership, they discussed how levels of information sharing, consensus building, trust, and
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vision played a role in the institution’s leadership approach and how these aspects affected the
implementation of change. In a general sense, participants highlighted the importance of
transparency and input in the decision-making process and linked the level and frequency of
communication among constituent groups with the ability to trust and buy-in to the leadership’s
vision. Additionally, the current study expanded the established research by indicating how
leadership approaches varied based on institutional and environmental circumstances. The
current study’s findings indicated that the more distress an institution was in, the more exclusive
and directive its leadership was perceived. Additionally, while a directive approach to leadership
seemed compatible with decision-making that focused on cutting, eliminating, and consolidating
operations, that leadership approach did not resonate as effectively as consensus-based
leadership did when institutions engaged in decision-making that focused on curriculum
development and branding.
In the Context of the Study’s Theoretical Framework
Cameron’s (1984) research recognized four models of organizational adaptation that each
differentially prioritized the role of the external environment and internal organization factors in
an organization’s ability to respond to external pressures. Further, Cameron (1984) argued that
liberal arts colleges needed to employ all four approaches to successfully adapt and survive in
the post-modern economic environment. Examining the current study’s findings presented in
Chapter IV in the context of each of these theoretical models yielded more informed findings and
provided a more in-depth analysis of the nature of organizational adaptation at Colston College,
Payton College, and Vilma College.
Population ecology model. The population ecology model, conceptualized by Aldrich
(1979), worked from the standpoint that organizational adaptation was almost wholly dependent
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on environmental factors. Aldrich (1979) argued that an organization’s survival depended on its
ability to respond to external environmental pressures. In essence, organizations worked to align
themselves with their environment despite whether or not such an alignment was compatible
with the organization’s mission or established purpose. Though organizations worked towards
environmental fitness, they were significantly limited in their ability to adapt due to the
pervasive nature of the external environment and the organization’s own internal and embedded
structural constraints. As a result, organizations had little power to significantly adjust their
operations. Yet, organizations, though limited in their adaptation capabilities, were required to
become fit for the external environment in order to survive. With a robust external perspective,
the population ecology model highlighted the charge to meet environmental needs as the
organization’s primary challenge and goal in adaptation.
In the context of the current study, this population-level model of organizational
adaptation raised the question: do small, private, residential liberal arts colleges like Colston
College, Payton College, and Vilma College, as a population of organizations, fill an
environmental niche? Practically speaking, the model tested the notion that there was enough
interest in the experience of a liberal arts education at a liberal arts college to enable institutions
like the current study’s case institutions to survive. The population ecology model asserted that
as long as these institutions met the needs of the environment and supported a niche, they would
survive. However, in the instance that the liberal arts college no longer met the needs of the
environment, the population ecology model postulated that its survival then depended on its
ability to become more environmentally fit, which questioned the college’s ability to adapt based
on its organizational constraints and in a way that aligned with its established mission and
purpose.
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Participants from all three case institutions discussed their concerns of having a niche to
serve. Participants cited the rapidly changing nature of higher education, including the
advancement of professional education, online education, and scholarship support for public
education as indications that the environmental needs have shifted and may not deem a niche for
the number of liberal arts colleges that exist today. Additionally, participants from all three
institutions cited their geographic location as an additional factor worth considering when
defining the environmental niche. They described their immediate market as a market that did
not understand or value a liberal arts college experience, especially when weighed against
practically free, in-state public education. Interestingly, Colston College acknowledged this
limited in-state niche several years ago, and as a result, implemented an out-of-state recruitment
plan and pricing restructure plan to adapt and align itself with an out-of-state market. Colston
College transitioned from enrolling a majority of in-state students to enrolling a majority of outof-state students in less than ten years. For Colston College, expanding its niche allowed it to
gain more attention and more students. Consequently, from an organizational adaptation
standpoint, it appeared to be in a better position to survive.
In the context of achieving environmental fitness, participants also discussed how their
institutions became or failed to become environmentally fit through curriculum adjustments and
gave particular focus to the addition of a more professionalized curriculum and the employment
of technology-based learning strategies. Colston College adopted more technology-friendly
programs and added both professional and liberal arts degrees during recession times. While
Vilma College did add a few professional programs during the recession, several participants at
Vilma College attributed the institution’s ultimate failure to its long-term inability to
programmatically adapt citing instances when the faculty and administration rejected
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professional programs like nursing and health and exercise science as well as instances when
they eliminated nontraditional programs and adult learner classes after hours. And finally, and
perhaps most interestingly, Payton College adapted its curriculum during the recession, but
actually became more restrictive in terms of offering professional programming. The college
eliminated its more professionalized majors and chose to become even more traditionally liberal
arts focused than it was in the years prior to the recession. Some participants showed concern
about the significant slimming down of the curriculum while others pointed to it as an especially
innovative strategy that set up the institution to be more distinctive in the long run, and
consequently, better serve a very specific niche.
Life cycles model. This model, or group of models, identified four stages of
organizational adaptation: the entrepreneurial stage, the collectivity stage, the formalization and
control stage, and the structure elaboration and adaptation stage. According to the model, an
organization’s movement through these stages was contingent on internal factors, which include
its understanding of and response to external pressures. Each stage was characterized by the
nature and type of organizational behaviors utilized in adaptation. In the entrepreneurial stage,
organizations worked through highly informal and creative interactions to create a specific niche.
In the collectivity stage, organizations garnered support for their purpose by developing rapport
with internal members primarily through a heightened level of communication. In formalization
and control, organizations institutionalized adaptation and established it as the norm. And finally
in elaboration and adaptation, organizations decentralized the adaptive strategy and sought to
create new ways to grow or change. Much like the population ecology model, the primary focus
of organizational adaptation within the life cycles model was adapting to the environmental
challenges. However, unlike the population ecology model, this framework acknowledged the
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organization’s role in understanding the environmental changes and controlling its adaptive
strategies.
In the context of the current study’s findings, the life cycles model informed the findings
related to the ways in which each case institution employed adaptive strategies to respond to the
pressures of the economic recession and how successful each strategy was in aiding the
institution in adapting. The life cycles model defined successful organizational adaptation as
change that followed the identified four-stage process. Participants discussed several adaptive
strategies employed at each institution: curriculum was restructured, personnel was reduced,
budgets were realigned, athletics were repositioned, and new enrollment and fundraising
strategies were used to generate new revenue streams. Some processes were described by
participants as moving through these life cycles stages in a meaningful way while other
processes were described in a more streamlined, direct way that did not necessarily work through
the life cycles stages.
The adaptive strategy presented in the current study’s findings that most closely aligned
with the life cycles model was the implementation of Colston College’s engaged learning
program. In its initial stages, participants described a president who had a vision that was
supported by the board. The president took the idea to faculty and asked them to create a plan
and give the vision what it needed to work at the institution. As a result, a committee of faculty
members, in consultation with students, other faculty, and outside professionals created a plan
that “codified” something that was already in the “fabric and fiber” of the institution. The
committee process was described as innovative and thoughtful. Eventually, the plan was
formalized and adopted by the institution at which point budget dollars were allocated to the
program, fundraising priorities were developed around its future, marketing branded the
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program, faculty signed up to be advisors, and enrollment management used the program as their
primary recruitment platform. In short, it became the institutional focus. Because Colston
College developed this program and adapted to its environment before the recession, the
institution formalized its new innovation by the time the economic downfall pressured the
institution, and as a result, was cushioned from environmental pressures to a greater extent than
other institutions. Finally, at the time of the current study, Colston College participants discussed
the need to take the next step and innovate more, indicating that Colston College was in the
elaboration and adaptation stage.
While the Colston College’s engaged learning program followed the life cycles model in
a comprehensive manner, adaptations at Payton College and Vilma College occurred in more
limited way. Payton College’s academic restructuring was, in part, committee-based. However,
the limited input of outside constituents, the confidential nature of the committee’s decisionmaking process, the president’s right to modify decisions, and the aggressive timeline of
deliberation limited the informal nature of the process as well as the level of idea sharing and
creativity. Additionally, participants’ interviews indicated that the institution faced significant
challenges in building unity and rapport among the organization’s constituencies around this
adaptive strategy. While the changes were formalized, participants’ interviews indicated that the
institution still did not fully embrace the changes, which provided challenges to normalizing the
adaptation and creating future innovation and growth. As far as Vilma College, the institution did
not, in a general sense, follow the pattern outlined by the life cycles model. Rather, participants’
interviews indicated that organizational adaptation was highly secretive, commanding, and
ambiguous in nature. One particularly important theme that informed this model was the
participants’ dissatisfaction with a lack of transparency by institutional leadership. In a general
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sense, the confidential nature of the administrations at Payton College and Vilma College were
perceived negatively by several participants across institutions and ultimately challenged the
level of investment among the organizations’ members.
Resource dependence model. The resource dependence model defined the essential
component of organizational adaptation and survival as the capability of the organization to
acquire, maintain, and control the distribution of resources it needed to operate. In this way, the
resource dependence model acknowledged an organization’s internal factors as more influential
than the external environment in organizational adaptation. However, several external pressures
served to create strains on organizational adaptation, including increased competition for
resources caused by either increased demand or decreased supply. In a general sense, Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978) conceptualized the resource dependence model as a model that defined
organizational adaptation by an organization’s ability to secure resources in its environment.
The premise of the resource dependence model spoke directly to the themes related to the
current study’s first research question. The economic recession pressured the case institutions by
limiting their resources, or in a more practical sense, their revenue. Resource limitation primarily
occurred through loss of endowment revenue and loss of net tuition revenue, which were both
addressed in the current study’s first research question.
For the benefit of understanding the current study’s findings within the context of
multiple theoretical frameworks, it was important to understand the difference between the focus
on enrollment in the context of the resource dependence model and in the context of the
population ecology model. The resource dependence model framed student as resource that
contributed revenue to the institution. The population ecology model, on the other hand, framed
enrollment as an indicator of environmental need, or a niche, that the organization met.
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Therefore, in a practical sense, these two models blended and created a more practical question
that faced many institutions: were there enough interested students (environmental need) who
were also capable of contributing revenue to the institution (resource)?
The current study’s findings indicated that an institution’s ability to secure resources was
indeed paramount to its adaptation and survival. During the recession, Colston College secured
record- level resources by significantly increasing its enrollment and net tuition revenue and by
successfully completing a comprehensive private giving campaign. These resources offset the
significant decrease of its endowment earnings resource during the recession. Payton College
struggled to adapt during the recession primarily because the economic recession directly limited
the resource - endowment earnings - upon which the institution was overly dependent. Finally,
Vilma College, while it was successful securing one resource - private gift revenue - for a period
of time, it ultimately failed when it could not secure other resources like net tuition revenue at a
meaningful level.
The findings regarding Vilma College within the context of the resource dependence
model pointed to a particularly interesting implication. In the face of a significantly limited
resource (net tuition revenue), Vilma College attempted to compensate by increasing the level of
another resource (private gift revenue). However, an overdependence on private gift support
concentrated among a small group of trustees created significant distress to the institution, which
some believed led to its ultimate demise. The implications suggest that successful organizational
adaptation depends not only on the acquisition of resources, but also on a balanced contribution
of diverse resources.
Like the population ecology model, the resource dependence model also accepted the
premise that organizational effectiveness was impacted by several external environmental
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realities. Typically, an organization operated under specific constraints, which restricted an
organization’s range of possible behaviors and potentially inhibited its ability to adapt. Pfeffer
and Salancik (1978) identified one organizational constraint as “physical realities” (p. 15).
Therefore, this model, like the population ecology model, acknowledged the power of
geographic location on the existence of an organization. Again participants pointed to the
institutions’ southern location within the United States as a constraint that further challenged
both enrollment and net tuition revenue, or in the context of the resource dependence model, as
an organizational physical reality that limited resource acquisition.
Symbolic action model. The last of Cameron’s (1984) models, the symbolic action
model, framed organizational adaptation as an organization’s ability to create, maintain, and
change shared meaning. Cameron (1984) stated that shared meaning was developed through
symbolic actions, which included language and culture. Through shared meaning, leadership
clearly defined and explained organizational activity and cultivated commitment and investment
from the organization’s members. While the symbolic action model accepted the premise that
organizations operated under specific constraints, it also postulated that members worked to
limited those constraints. Finally this model, as a departure from others, argued that share
meaning was more relevant in terms of the nature and success of organizational adaptation than
the specific actions or strategies employed.
In the context of this study, the symbolic action model addressed the themes associated
with the third and fourth research questions of the current study. While participants discussed the
pressures caused by the economic recession and the concrete ways in which their institutions
employed adaptive strategies in great depth, the participants also discussed how they perceived
these strategies and the ways in which they were implemented at each case institution. During
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many interviews, a substantial amount of time was spent on participants describing their
perceptions of how things occurred more so than what actually occurred in terms of
organizational adaptation. Participants’ perceptions of adaptation, decision-making, and
leadership were dominant themes in the study.
Participants at Colston College indicated that their institution promoted an environment
of transparency and prioritized decision-making processes that included diverse constituencies
on campus. They perceived their leadership to be visionary and ambitious. Participants at Payton
College indicated that their institution had changed in dramatic ways in a short time, some of
which was uncomfortable to participants. They described a somewhat chaotic and unpredictable
decision-making process that, at times, was streamlined and rushed and involved limited input
from its constituencies. Additionally, some participants indicated that the bureaucratic nature of
the institution’s committee structure was an impediment to effective decision-making.
Participants described the leadership as ambitious, focused, direct, consistent, and managerial in
nature. Finally, participants at Vilma College described a decision-making process that was
exclusive, volatile, and unhealthy. Vilma College’s leadership was described as weak, constantly
changing, and misaligned with the mission and purpose of the institution.
Many participants linked their perceptions of both the decision-making process and the
leadership of the organization with their assessment of the organization’s performance and their
contributions as organizational members as well as their satisfaction with the overall work of the
organization. Participants at Colston College spoke highly of the progress the institution made
and the process by which it made it, especially with regard to the implementation of its engaged
learning program. Participants at Payton College acknowledged the administrative success of the
organization, specifically in balancing the budget, but were concerned about the future vision
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and growth of the institution. And participants at Vilma College noted limited successes,
especially during its last years, and noted their severely limited ability to help the organization
adapt as a result of its organizational processes.
The nature by which each institution made decisions and led change directly influenced
the symbolic meaning members of the organization derived from the institution’s adaptation.
And while it appeared that the more dire the situation the institution was in, the more the
situation called for swift and direct action, it was apparent through participants’ interviews that
swift and direct action also had ramifications and worked to limit shared meaning in the
organization when members did not fully understand the process or did not believe they were
part of it. This had especially serious ramifications in these three case institutions that were
founded on principles of shared governance. Additionally, the presence of an active strategic
plan, the consistency of top-level administration, the level of transparency, and the role of the
board were all factors mentioned when a participant discussed his or her level of shared meaning
in the organization and his or her perception of the organization’s adaptation.
Cybernetics model. Birnbaum’s (1988) cybernetics model asserted that organizations
adapted by remaining vigilant to self-monitoring signals that alerted the organization when
performance measures fell below established levels. This process was largely dependent on an
organization having a clearly defined set of subunits, organized by rules of operation, and
prioritized goals. When external pressures threatened the organization, adaptation took place at
the subunit level. The extent to which subunit adaptation affected other subunits defined the level
of coupling within the organization, which likely determined the impact of an external threat.
Thus, leadership in Birnbaum’s model (1988) focused on detecting the level of coupling in an
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organization and possible external threats and maintaining a healthy level of stability by allowing
subunits to do their established jobs while facilitating only minor changes to the organization
In the context of the theoretical framework, Birnbaum’s (1988) cybernetics model
provides a better understanding of how organizations’ level of coupling affects operations. All
three organizations, by nature of their specific mission and approach to higher education, were
defined as tightly coupled institutions. The level of their coupling increased the impact of the
economic recession and institutional adaptive strategies because changes to one subunit directly
affected changes to another. Therefore, in a general sense, no change was small at these
institutions and every subunit felt the effects of adjustments, even if they were largely academic,
or athletic, or administrative. So, for instance, Payton College administrative layoffs affected the
entire morale of the institution, even in offices that did not directly lose employees. Additionally,
Colston College' engaged learning program changed every aspect of the institution, including
finance, admissions, fundraising, and student life.
Additionally, Birnbaum’s model (1988) informed the current study’s findings on
leadership. While all three institutions’ presidents, by virtue of leading their colleges through the
Great Recession, qualified for one of Birnbaum’s two exceptions to facilitator-based leadership
and were justified to implement a more commanding approach, the degree and duration that each
assumed this directive role is important. Colston College, though a visionary, assumed a
commanding role for a short time in 2003 when he rallied the faculty and staff to develop its new
engaged-learning program. Participants articulated that he assumed a more directive role when
he detected external threats, but quickly persuaded the faculty to move forward. Somewhat
differently, the presidents at Payton College and Vilma College maintained a more commanding
approach for the duration of their leadership and did not find a way to transition into adjusting
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the organization in subtle ways, allowing the organization’s subunits to achieve their designed
purposes. Birnbaum’s (1988) caution that administrators must not “overcorrect” is particularly
applicable to these institutions, both of which had presidents who implemented enormous
change, but lacked widespread buy-in and investment from other organizational members.
Conclusion. Cameron (1984) argued that employing all four approaches – population
ecology, life cycles, resource dependence, and symbolic action - was necessary for institutions to
achieve a level of adaptation that met the demands of the external environment. Additionally,
Birnbaum (1988) argued that even within higher education, universities and colleges must define
their operations and constraints and respond to the environment in a way that fits their
organizational structure. In short, for institutions of higher education to survive, especially small
liberal arts colleges, they must continue to meet an established environmental need, innovate and
change, secure necessary resources, and operate with a singular sense of shared meaning and
purpose. The findings of this study demonstrated the challenges facing each of the three case
institutions related to meeting these demands. While the economic recession affected these
liberal arts colleges’ ability to secure resources and forced them to innovate in significant ways,
participants’ perceptions of institutional adaptation were as much a focus in this study as the
actual ways in which the institutions sought to adapt.
Limitations
The research design employed in the current study and presented in depth in Chapter III
limited the current study in several ways. The sample included 30 purposefully selected
individuals. However, while appropriate for in-depth qualitative study, this sample size still does
not allow for broadly transferrable results. Though the findings of this study serve to inform
other institutions and practitioners about the nature of organizational adaptation at liberal arts
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colleges, the results may not be widely generalizable to all liberal arts colleges that faced
challenges in the wake of the recession.
There were several other limitations in regard to data collection in this study. Interviews
were time limited, lasting 65 minutes on average, which constrained the amount of data
collection possible for analysis and limited the opportunity for follow-up questions related to
topics outside the established questions. Also, at the time of the current study’s fieldwork,
participants at Colston College and Payton College were employed at their respective case
institutions while participants at Vilma College were several years removed from their
experience at their case institution. In both cases, participants’ perceptions and statements were
vulnerable to potential social desirability bias, limited disclosure, and lack of detail. Further, the
length of participants’ employment at their respective case institutions varied and some were
only able to give a limited view of the institution’s process of adaptation during the recession due
to their short employment history. In addition, I was unable to interview a board of trustees
member and the president at Colston College and the vice president of student development at
Payton College, as I originally intended, either because the position was vacant at the time of the
current study’s fieldwork or because the constituent was unavailable to participate in the study.
Finally, I conducted seven interviews by phone instead of in person and I did not digitally record
one interview as a result of a device error.
Additionally, the study was limited to the analysis of public documents and private
documents provided by the case institutions’ representatives or other participants in the study.
Participants associated with Vilma College provided several documents for analysis while
participants from Colston College and Payton College provided a more limited collection of
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documents. As a result, document analysis was limited based on the availability and
completeness of information provided by case institutions and available through public sources.
Finally, the study’s findings were reported in a manner that balanced the need to be richly
descriptive and absolutely accurate with the need to protect the identity of participants and
institutions. As a result, I referred to participants by affiliated institution and position; however,
at times, I did not disclose which participants contributed which quotations. I considered it my
obligation as a researcher to protect participant confidentiality.
Recommendations for Future Research
The findings in the current study and the subsequent discussion provided in this chapter
lead to several opportunities for future research. Because of the nature of the design, the current
study yielded broad and comprehensive findings about the liberal arts colleges’ adaptation during
the 2007 economic recession. In a general sense, future research that is more directed toward a
specific aspect of adaptation may supplement the existing base of knowledge by analyzing more
focused areas in greater depth. Additionally, increasing the sample size and breadth to include
more participants at more institutions in more geographically diverse areas will strengthen the
findings and allow results to be more generalizable.
More specifically, the following three areas are offered as recommendations for future
research: (a) study of similarities and differences in perceptions of adaptation as they relate to
specific roles within the institution, (b) analysis of the background, criteria, training, and
perceived purpose of the board of trustees at liberal arts colleges, and (c) investigation of the
similarities and differences of pressures that face geographically diverse liberal arts colleges.
Future research could potentially develop the knowledge base in these areas in a more in depth
and enlightening way.
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Given that the current study was a case study designed to focus on institutional analysis
and given the established right of each participant to remain confidential, it was appropriate, at
times, to present data in a manner that did not directly link participants to statements. However,
the masking of participant role in the findings of the study limited data analysis. As a
recommendation for future research, it is beneficial to consider how participants who occupy
different roles within the institution perceive organizational adaptation at liberal arts colleges
similarly and differently. For example, examining faculty perceptions or board perceptions
across institutions more specifically might yield a better understanding of how organizational
members perceive, create, and invest in change.
Furthermore, much of the current study’s focus centered on the board of trustees’ role in
organizational adaptation, especially in times of financial instability. For one case institution in
particular, the conversation focused on the intertwining of governance and private fundraising at
the board level. Additionally, several participants commented on the role of the board and the
way the board perceived its responsibilities as well as the ways in which it perceived the nature
and purpose of higher education and the liberal arts college. Given the significant role of the
board of trustees in making decisions regarding the continued mission, operations, and future of
these small, private liberal arts colleges, especially in unstable times, future research should
focus on the role of the board in the small, private liberal arts college including the background,
qualifications, and training of board of trustees members across institutions.
Finally, participants at each institution noted the distinct challenges facing liberal arts
colleges located in the southeastern region of the United States, most commonly referred to by
participants as “the south.” Many noted that these colleges operated in a market unfamiliar with
their value or their role in higher education. However, one cabinet member from Payton College
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diverged in his insight and stated that he would rather be associated with a liberal arts institution
in the south as opposed to one in the north where there was “a liberal arts college on every
corner.” So, while most participants spoke of the geographic location concern in terms of a lack
of demand for the product, this last participant framed a southern location as an advantage
because it kept these institutions outside a market that was saturated with supply. In either case,
future research might investigate how geographic location within the United States influences the
continued adaptation and survival of liberal arts colleges.
Recommendations for Practice and Policy
It was apparent through the current study’s findings and past research that small, tuitiondependent, private, residential liberal arts colleges are existing on the ragged edge of higher
education with little financial cushion and limited resources. For decades now, researchers have
hypothesized that these institutions will not survive for the long-term, especially given the recent
significant financial shifts in the economy. Yet, many of these regionally-based, faith-affiliated
colleges remain in existence. As the current study indicated, some operated more soundly than
others and some adapted in more significant ways than others. Understanding the modern
challenges these institutions face and the nature of adaptation employed by these organizations is
essential to practice and policy and, ultimately, to the continued existence of this small sector of
higher education.
The Advantage of Good Economic Times
In a general sense, all three institutions fared better in good economic times than they did
in bad economic times. However, the extent to which bad economic times affected each
institution varied, in part, based on how each college utilized and leveraged their resources in
good times. Colston College, at the height of the market boom, gave itself an institution-wide

	
  

241	
  

makeover and implemented new programs that transformed the brand, reputation, and value of
the college. On the other hand, Payton College and Vilma College used the added benefits of the
market boom to maintain their status quos and provided additional student aid instead of using
these resources to invest in long-term change that could have significantly grown their values.
As a recommendation for future practice and policy, higher education institutions,
especially small, vulnerable, tuition-dependent liberal arts colleges, should maximize the
resources and benefits of good economic times and prepare for future bad turns, which are an
absolute certainty. The American economy is grounded in the principle of upturns and
downturns, which means institutions should always consider how to prepare for the next
downturn during the current upturn and create the same kind of revenue, enrollment, and
program momentum evidenced in Colston College’s engaged learning program.
Shared Governance
The small liberal arts colleges’ shared governance model was tested over the last several
years and during the recession and will continue to be challenged in significant ways. Due to
their small economies of scale, liberal arts colleges remain among the most financially and
operationally vulnerable institutions in higher education. As a result, they must operate in a
fashion that allows them to quickly adapt and navigate pressures in a flexible and fluid way.
However, the shared governance model in place at many of these institutions highlights the
importance of consensus decision-making and the role of the entire faculty in the institution’s
business. As a result of the consensual approach, decision-making is often a much slower and
more deliberative process when shared governance is truly enacted. As a result, many institutions
try to do both – make quick executive decisions and honor the process of shared governance.
Several participants in the current study indicated that institutional decisions were often made
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among a very exclusive group of administrators or a subcommittee of the board of trustees while
administrators gave courtesy reports to faculty, staff, and the general board at open meetings. As
a result, this shortcut process of executive decision-making was often times communicated as a
devaluing of faculty involvement and perceived as the dismantling of shared governance as the
institution knew it.
As a recommendation for future practice and policy, small liberal arts colleges must align
their policies and practices regarding shared governance. While all three case institutions had
established processes of shared governance as official policies, many participants indicated the
policies were not indicative of practice. To supplement that point, liberal arts colleges must
clearly define the role of their institutional leaders – the board of trustees, the president, cabinet
members, and faculty – and should develop a clearly communicated system of checks and
balances for these roles as well criteria for the holders of these positions. Developing clearly
defined roles and position criteria is especially important with regard to the board of trustees,
which is the most powerful of all the institutional constituencies yet the most varied in terms of
constituents’ qualifications and training, as evidenced by participants’ data in the current study.
Further, the current study’s findings indicated that when a decision-making process was
regarded as inclusive, deliberative, and proactive, constituencies across the board regarded it as a
positive process and credited the leadership for their administration and management of
institutional operations. Alternately, in cases when decisions were made hurriedly, in either a
confidential or non-transparent manner, or by an exclusive few individuals, most constituencies
regarded the process as dysfunctional and damaging. As a recommendation for future practice,
administrations at small liberal arts colleges must develop inclusive decision-making processes
that include a diversity of institutional constituencies. Additionally, given the fragility of small
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liberal arts colleges, administrations must keep their entire faculty and staff informed about the
interrelated aspects of the institution’s business, including enrollment, fundraising, endowment
performance, curriculum, and athletics. Administrations must develop legitimate communication
avenues to discuss the holistic picture of the institution beyond sound bites that are easily
manipulated at faculty and board of trustees meetings. In a general sense, more legitimate
communication and information sharing among constituencies will foster a greater level of
investment in the decision-making process, which will cultivate buy-in in the institutional vision
and future.
As a final note, the current study’s findings indicated that board of trustees members,
presidents, and cabinets regarded the level of faculty involvement as a subordinate issue in
organizational adaptation. Transformational leadership at small liberal arts colleges is not
possible without the investment and support of the faculty, especially those members who hold
tenure. Therefore, all institutional constituencies should consider faculty involvement as a
prerequisite to every function at the college, especially issues of change and adaptation.
Mission and Branding
The current study’s findings also indicated that issues of mission, identity, and branding
were central to a liberal arts college’s ability to adapt. In order for small liberal arts colleges to
effectively adapt, they must be able to, in a unified voice, articulate their distinctiveness, their
value, and their relevance. The institution that adapted most effectively in the current study’s
findings branded its identity with an institutional-wide engaged learning program. More
importantly, this identity was reflected throughout the entire fabric of the institution. Practically
every publication, including the institution’s home webpage, was branded with the program.
Additionally, the institution focused its budget and its private giving campaign on enhancing this
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program. This sort of focused institutional commitment to being something specific and relevant
is essential to small liberal arts colleges. It is not enough to simply be a traditional liberal arts
college in the twenty-first century; these colleges must become distinctive in the eyes of their
prospective students and institutional constituents.
Enrollment and Accessibility
The current study’s findings indicated that sustaining a small liberal arts college in “the
south” is a significant challenge. Enrollment challenges facing these institutions will likely
become even more exaggerated in the coming decades with the proliferation of online education,
the rising costs of education, and the increases in minority population not typically wellrepresented in liberal arts college enrollments. Consequently, liberal arts colleges must redefine
themselves in the market and employ strategies that leverage their institutional aid. Additionally,
as tuition increases and institutional aid decreases, small liberal arts colleges essentially define,
to a large extent, the specific demographic capable of attending their institutions. As a
recommendation for future practice, liberal arts institutions must seek to establish a balance
between reaching net tuition revenue targets and offering an accessible liberal arts education that
protects diversity in education. A sole focus on maximizing revenue will lead to limited diversity
inside the walls of liberal arts colleges, betraying the liberal arts mission, and will eliminate
significant numbers of students in applicant pools, especially in the south. Additionally, liberal
arts colleges should seek to expand their markets beyond their state or immediate region, which
would allow these schools to develop a bigger applicant pool and a more nationally focused
brand.
A Balanced Approach
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Finally, it is important for liberal arts colleges to accept that simply cutting costs or
simply increasing private giving alone will not create a sustaining organizational structure. In
order for liberal arts colleges to survive, they must continue to juggle the importance of net
tuition revenue, private gift revenue, endowment earnings, and controlled-cost practices. An
institution cannot save or spend its way into prosperity nor can it rely exclusively on one type of
revenue to thrive. Rather, the institution must have active revenue streams and continually and
prudently invest in aspects of the institution that enhance the student experience while also
maintaining a fiscally responsible approach to spending and saving.
Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the findings of the current qualitative multiple-case study that
investigated how private liberal arts colleges adapted during the Great Recession of 2007 by
examining institutional changes at three private liberal arts colleges and their effects on the
institutions’ operations. Specifically, the study sought to understand how these institutions were
pressured, what strategies they employed to respond, how those strategies affected the
institutions’ operations, and how the strategies were perceived by organizational constituents.
The current study’s findings provided several opportunities for future research regarding
organizational adaptation in liberal arts colleges. Researchers will benefit from further
investigating the similarities and differences among different institutional constituencies’
perceptions regarding the nature and process of adaptation, including board of trustees members,
presidents, administrators, and faculty members; the role of the board of trustees in small,
private, liberal arts colleges; and the nature and process of adaptation at geographically diverse
liberal arts colleges. Additionally, practitioners in liberal arts colleges will benefit from giving
attention to the nature of shared governance, the role of institutional identity, balancing
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enrollment revenue and diversity needs, and adapting to environmental pressures with a balanced
fiscal approach. These recommendations for research and practice will serve to strengthen the
modern role of the liberal arts college and ensure its survival as America’s oldest form of higher
education.
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APPENDIX A
Email Seeking Institutional Participation
Liberal Arts Colleges During the Great Recession:
Examining Organizational Adaptation and Institutional Change
Principal Researcher: Ashlie Junot Hilbun
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Ketevan Mamiseishvili
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Ashlie Junot Hilbun
[DAY, MONTH XX, 2012]
[PARTICIPANT]
Institutional Participation in Adaptation Study

Dear [PARTICIPANT]:
I hope this email finds you well. We spoke earlier this summer about [CASE INSTIUTTION]
participating in a research study examining the adaptability and survivability of liberal arts
colleges as they attempt to remain relevant in the twenty-first century, and I want to follow up
with you regarding that conversation. I’m happy to report to you that I defended my dissertation
proposal and my committee approved me moving forward with the study as we discussed in July.
I’d like to schedule a two to three day visit on campus and seek your advice on timing. Please be
certain that my visit will not require accommodations of any sort outside scheduled appointments
and observations as outlined below.
Participant Interviews. I request a one-hour meeting with the following position holders. If you
provide me with the names of these folks, I’m happy to coordinate meetings.
• President
• Members of the president’s cabinet
• Two faculty members who hold leadership roles in the faculty governing body
• At least one board of trustees members
Documents. Additionally, I’d like access to the following documents with your approval:
• Budgets for FY06-FY13
• Strategic plans FY06-FY13
• Organizational charts FY06-FY13
• Meeting minutes – cabinet meeting and faculty meetings FY06-FY13
• Course catalogs FY06-FY13
• Official institutional survey or study results and reports FY06-FY13
• Admissions statistics and reports FY06-FY13
I’ve enclosed a case study protocol for your review so that you are aware of the details of the
study. I look forward to your feedback by email or phone. I will call you in the next few days to
follow up.
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My best,
Ashlie Junot Hilbun
University of Arkansas
Fayetteville, Arkansas
Email: ahilbun@uark.edu
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APPENDIX B
Case Study Protocol
Liberal Arts Colleges During the Great Recession:
Examining Organizational Adaptation and Institutional Change
Principal Researcher: Ashlie Junot Hilbun
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Ketevan Mamiseishvili
I.

Background
a. Purpose of Study: The current study’s purpose is to understand how private liberal
arts colleges adapted during the Great Recession of 2007 by examining institutional
changes at three private liberal arts colleges and their effects on the institutions’
operations.
b. Research Questions:
• What external environmental pressures influenced the liberal arts colleges
during the Great Recession of 2007?
• What adaptive strategies did the liberal arts colleges employ to respond to the
external environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007?
• How did the adaptive strategies employed by the liberal arts colleges to respond
to the external environmental pressures during the Great Recession of 2007
affect their operations?
• How did institutional constituents perceive the adaptive strategies employed by
the liberal arts colleges to respond to the external environmental pressures
during the Great Recession of 2007?

II.

Design: Qualitative Multiple-Case Study
a. Rationale: It is most appropriate to frame the current study as a qualitative,
multiple-case study approach. With little scholarly research focused on the
adaptation of liberal arts colleges in the twenty-first century, the purpose of the
current study and the nature of the present research questions are largely
exploratory, aiming to discover aspects of the process of change as well as how and
why these changes occurred. To better understand the central phenomenon of
adaptability in liberal arts colleges amidst changing external contexts in the twentyfirst century, the researcher will engage in an intensive study of three institutions
that accepts several contexts. The researcher will produce both an independent and
holistic description of each case as well as a comparative analysis of common
themes among all three cases (Merriam, 2009; Stake, 2000). This approach
guarantees both a descriptive and comparative focus in the study.
b. Sampling: The current study will employ “nonrandom, purposeful, and small”
sampling strategies on two levels: the case level and the participant level (Merriam,
2009, p. 8).

III.

Data Collection
a. Data collection sources:
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Participant interviews with president, members of president’s cabinet, two
faculty members who held leadership roles in the faculty governing body, and at
least one board of trustees member.
o On-campus, face-to-face, approximately 1 hour in duration.
o Will review and sign participant information and informed consent form.
• Direct and informal observation of campus happenings.
• Document analysis of organizational charts; strategic plans; board of trustee
meeting minutes; board of trustees resolutions; cabinet meeting minutes, faculty
meeting minutes; alumni board meeting minutes; course catalogs; opinion
survey results; official institutional publications and press releases; admissions
data; budgets and review of costs and revenues, and institutional profile and
statistics.
b. Data Collection Plan: In the current study, data collection will primarily occur
during intensive fieldwork, defined by Patton (2002) as the “circumstance of being
in or around an on-going social setting for the purpose of making a qualitative
analysis of that setting” (p. 262). To properly record, describe, and interpret data
collection during fieldwork, I will take field notes that contain participants’
observations and comments as well as my own reactions and reflections. As advised
by Merriam (2009) and Patton (2002), these two categories of notes will be kept
separate within all field notes document. Additionally, as suggested by Patton
(2002), I will aim to produce field notes that have “thick, deep, and rich
description” and “use quotations” as appropriate (p. 331). Finally, the researcher
will tape record interviews and observations as permitted by the study’s participants
(Patton, 2002).
c. Data Storage: Data will be stored on a secure computer and in a locked box during
the study, and available exclusively to the principal researcher and faculty advisor.
•

IV.

	
  

Analysis
a. Descriptive phase: In the descriptive phase, I will organize and transcribe interview,
observation, and document data. This process will necessitate that I first review the
data multiple times and cultivate an independent understanding of each case
(Merriam, 2009; Creswell, 2008; Patton, 2002). This process will be accomplished
by producing a written case record for each case institution, which is essentially an
organized compilation of all data collected during the study for the specific
institution (Patton, 2002). According to Creswell (2008), data collected can be
organized by source type, site, or a combination of both. Further, Merriam (2009)
stated the organization can be time or topic based. I will make a judgment about
organizational methods once data is initially reviewed. As Creswell (2008) advised,
I will keep duplicate copies of all forms of data. The process of coding data will
follow the process of organizing data and developing a case record. Merriam (2009)
defined coding as “assigning some sort of shorthand designation to various aspects
of your data so that you can easily retrieve specific pieces to the data” (p. 164).
Researchers develop these codes or categories on their own or from participant or
literature input. The codes should always mirror the study’s purpose, should be
mutually exclusive, and comprehensive (Merriam, 2009). However, as Creswell
(2008) and Patton (2002) described, the coding process is largely an interpretive
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one; coding and theme decisions are exclusively the researcher’s to make. In terms
of process, Creswell (2008) suggested coding the documents in the left-hand margin
and reserving the right margin for developing themes, the next step of the analysis
process.
b. Interpretative phase: In interpreting these themes, I will develop explanations
regarding the study’s research questions as well as explain data divergence that
might contradict the study’s patterns or themes (Patton, 2002). Additionally, I will
engage in pattern matching, described by Yin (2009), as “one of the most desirable
techniques” to use for case studies because it “compares an empirically based
pattern with a predicted one,” which here is based in the theoretical framework
outlined in the study (p. 136). Finally, in an effort to provide the most sophisticated
level of data analysis and interpretation, I will give attention to the extent in which
the study’s themes crossover multiple data sources or perspectives (Creswell,
2008). The study’s findings will also be interpreted with respect to past studies,
observations and reflections about the current study including the process and
potential limitations, and future need for study expansion. And as Patton (2002)
directed, I will address the strength and consistency of the study’s evidence, how it
informs the study’s purpose and research questions, and the extent in which the
findings are useful in light of a specific purpose.
V.

Research Trustworthiness
a. To ensure that the research findings are accurate and that I have reported a credible
explanation of these research findings, I will use multiple types of data sources to
develop interpretations, I will spend extended time in the field, and I will ask
participants to verify interview responses and records.
b. To ensure that the research findings can be transferred to other contexts, I will use
highly descriptive data and multiple cases of analysis.
c. To ensure that I, as the researcher, remain neutral and conduct the research study in
an objective manner, I will record my actions and reflections throughout my
fieldwork.
d. To ensure dependability of results, the study will be carried out in accordance with
study protocols; an audit trail will be well documented.

VI.

Ethical Considerations
a. Please refer to the participant information and informed consent form (Appendix E)
for a detailed outline of ethical considerations.

VII.

Limitations
a. The current study is inherently limited due to its qualitative design; limitations
include issues of researcher bias, transferability restrictions, and imperfect validity
and reliability of data sources and interpretation (Creswell, 2008; Merriam, 2009).

VIII.

Reporting
a. The final report of the research study will be submitted in accordance with the
dissertation guidelines of the Higher Education Doctoral Program at the University
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of Arkansas. Each case institution will be furnished with a complete and final copy
of the research study.
IX.

Schedule
a. January-February: Fieldwork and data collection; the researcher will work with
institutional contacts to setup a two to three day on-site visit at each case institution.
b. March-April: Data analysis and interpretation
c. April: Finalize report
d. May: Distribute complete and final copy of research study to each case institution.

X.

Contact Information:

This study was approved by Dr. Ketevan Mamiseishvili, faculty advisor, and Ro Windwalker,
institutional review board coordinator at the University of Arkansas. If you have any questions
regarding the current study or about your rights as a participant, or if you are concerned at any
time with regard to the current study, you may contact Dr. Mamiseishvili, Ms. Windwalker, or
myself.
Ashlie Junot Hilbun
Principal Researcher
ahilbun@uark.edu

Dr. Ketevan Mamiseishvili
Faculty Advisor
479-575-3781
kmamisei@uark.edu

Ro Windwalker, CIP
Institutional Review Board Coordinator
Research Compliance
University of Arkansas
120 Ozark Hall
Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701-1201
479-575-2208
irb@uark.edu
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APPENDIX C
Institutional Review Board Documentation
Liberal Arts Colleges During the Great Recession:
Examining Organizational Adaptation and Institutional Change
Principal Researcher: Ashlie Junot Hilbun
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Ketevan Mamiseishvili
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APPENDIX D
Participant Interview Protocol
Liberal Arts Colleges During the Great Recession:
Examining Organizational Adaptation and Institutional Change
Principal Researcher: Ashlie Junot Hilbun
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Ketevan Mamiseishvili
Time of Interview:
Date:
Place:
Interviewer:
Interviewee:
Position of Interviewee:
[Briefly introduce myself and thank the participant for attending the meeting. Give the
interviewee the Informed Consent Form (Appendix E) and direct the participant to follow along
as I review the information about the study, participant requirements, participant risk and rights,
contacts for the current study, and consent to participate. Ask the participant if they have any
questions. Instruct the participant to take as much time as he or she needs to review the document
and, if they consent, sign the document.]
[Turn on the tape recorder]
[Instruct the participant that the scope of the following interview questions is limited to the last
decade at [CASE INSTITUTION].]
Interview Questions: start with less controversial questions
1. Tell me about your relationship with [CASE INSTITUTION].
Probes: Graduate of [CASE INSTITUTION]?
Current position at [CASE INSTITUTION]?
If I shadowed you for a typical day, what would I observe you doing?
2. How would you describe [CASE INSTITUTION] to a prospective
student/employee/outsider?
Probes: Brief history…
College mission…
College vision…
Current tuition….
Current enrollment…
Number of faculty members…
Number of majors…
Distinctive because…
3. Describe if and how the Great Recession of 2007 affected [CASE INSTITUTION]?
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Probes: How was this different from pre-recession times?
How did these changes affect the mission, enrollment, culture, and operations?
How did these changes compare to pre-recession times?
4. How did [CASE INSTITUTION] respond to the changes you mentioned during and after
the recession?
Probes: Curriculum, admissions, alumni relations and fundraising, athletics…
How were these adjustments made? Walk me through the process…
5. What role did you have in making adjustments at [CASE INSTITUTION] during this
period?
Probes: Which adjustments were most difficult?
6. Who else had a role in making adjustments at [CASE INSTITUTION] during this
period?
Probes: President, faculty, administration, alumni…
Which adjustments were most controversial? Why?
7. How, if at all, was the mission at [CASE INSTITUTION] adjusted post-recession?
Probes: What purpose does [CASE INSTITUTION] now serve?
Is it the same purpose it served pre-recession?
8. What areas of [CASE INSTITUTION] were most transformed by the adjustments made
in response to the recession?
Probes: Describe the changes in priorities? Daily activities?
Does [CASE INSTITUTION] highlight different things in the press and
publications than it did pre-recession?
9. If the 2006 version of you were sitting here, what would most surprise you about the
institution’s current state?
10. How would you characterize the adjustments made at [CASE INSTITUTION] in
response to recession?
11. Describe the process of institutional decision-making at [CASE INSTITUTION] before,
during, and after the recession?
Probes: In your opinion, was the decision-making process effective?
Describe the culture of [CASE INSTITUTION}. Did it influence the adjustments
made during this period?
12. What were the biggest successes during these institutional adjustments?
13. What were the failures during these institutional adjustments?
14. Describe the current direction of the institution?
Probes: What is your opinion of the direction of [CASE INSTITUTION]?
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How do you picture [CASE INSTITUTION] in the 2022?
How do you think the institution will get there?
15. Is there anything else you would like to add to our discussion?
[Thank the interviewee for his or her participation. Reassure the participant of their rights and
my commitment to abiding by ethical practices throughout the research study. Give the
interviewee my contact information and encourage them to contact me anytime.]
Descriptive Reflective
Notes
Notes

Question
1. Tell me about your relationship with [CASE INSTITUTION].
Probes:
Graduate of [CASE INSTITUTION]?
Current position at [CASE INSTITUTION]?
If I shadowed you for a typical day, what would I observe you
doing?
2. How would you describe [CASE INSTITUTION] to a prospective
student/employee/outsider?
Probes:
Brief history…
College mission…
College vision…
Current tuition….
Current enrollment…
Number of faculty members…
Number of majors…
Distinctive because…
3. Describe if and how the Great recession of 2007 affected [CASE
INSTITUTION]?
Probes:
How was this different from pre-recession times?
How did these changes affect the mission, enrollment, culture,
and operations?
How did these changes compare to pre-recession times?
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4. How did [CASE INSTITUTION] respond to the changes you
mentioned during and after the recession?
Probes:
Curriculum, admissions, alumni relations and fundraising,
athletics…
How were these adjustments made? Walk me through the
process…
5. What role did you have in making changes at [CASE
INSTITUTION] during this period?
Probes:
Which changes were most difficult?
6. Who else had a role in making adjustments at [CASE
INSTITUTION] during this period?
Probes:
President, faculty, administration, alumni…
Which adjustments were most controversial? Why?
7. How, if at all, was the mission at [CASE INSTITUTION] adjusted
post-recession?
Probes:
What purpose does [CASE INSTITUTION] now serve?
Is it the same purpose it served pre-recession?
8. What areas of [CASE INSTITUTION] were most transformed by
the adjustments made in response to the recession?
Probes:
Describe the changes in priorities? Daily activities?
Does [CASE INSTITUTION] highlight different things in the
press and publications than it did pre-recession?
9. If the 2006 version of you were sitting here, what would most
surprise you about the institution’s current state?
10. How would you characterize the adjustments made at [CASE
INSTITUTION] in response to recession?
11. Describe the process of institutional decision-making at [CASE
INSTITUTION] before, during, and after the recession?
Probe:

	
  

266	
  

In your opinion, was the decision-making process effective?
Describe the culture of [CASE INSTITUTION}. Did it influence
the adjustments made during this period?
12. What were the biggest successes during these institutional
adjustments?
13. What were the failures during these institutional adjustments?
14. Describe the current direction of the institution?
Probes:
What is your opinion of the direction of [CASE INSTITUTION]?
How do you picture [CASE INSTITUTION] in the 2022?
How do you think the institution will get there?
15. Is there anything else you would like to add to our discussion?
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APPENDIX E
Consent to Participate in Research Study
Liberal Arts Colleges During the Great Recession:
Examining Organizational Adaptation and Institutional Change
Principal Researcher: Ashlie Junot Hilbun
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Ketevan Mamiseishvili
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE
I seek your participation in a research study examining how private liberal arts colleges have
adapted during the twenty-first century. The research study fulfills my dissertation requirement
in the higher education doctoral program at the University of Arkansas, in which I am currently
enrolled as a doctoral candidate. You participation in the study is useful by nature of the position
you hold at [CASE INSTITUTION] or by nature of your experience at [CASE INSTITUTION].
WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE RESEARCH STUDY
Principal Researcher
Ashlie Junot Hilbun
ahilbun@uark.edu

Faculty Advisor
Dr. Kate Mamiseishvili
479-575-3781
kmamisei@uark.edu

Purpose of the Study. The current study’s purpose is to understand how private liberal arts
colleges adapted during the Great Recession of 2007 by examining institutional changes at three
private liberal arts colleges and their effects on the institutions’ operations. The study has the
potential to inform other liberal arts colleges by describing the experiences of case institutions
under investigation. The contribution of this research to the understanding of organizational
adaptation research may be significant.
Participants in the Study. Three case institutions will participate in the study. Within each case
institution, five to10 institutional participants will be selected to participate in the study. The
study will be completed over a 6-week period with fieldwork at each case institution lasting
between two and three days.
Requirements for Participation. Your participation will require one semi-structured interview.
Interviews will be held on campus on [DATE]. Interview duration will be approximately 1 hour.
Interviews will be tape recorded for the exclusive use of the principal researcher. In addition, the
principal researcher will also take field notes during the interview. During the interview, the
participant will be asked several questions about [CASE INSTITUTION]. The participant will
also be asked to review to a draft of the interview record and provide his or her feedback within
30 days of the completion of the interview. Additionally, the participant may be asked to allow
the principal researcher to shadow the participant as a nonparticipant observer for one full day.
Potential Risks/Discomforts and Benefits of the Study. There are no anticipated
risks/discomforts associated with the current study. The results of the study will potentially
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contribute significantly to the existing body of research on liberal arts colleges and
organizational adaptation.
Monetary Costs and Benefits. There are no monetary costs or compensation associated with
your participation.
Option to Refuse to Participate. If you do not want to be in this study, you may refuse to
participate. Also, you may refuse to participate at any time during the study. Your relationship
with the university will not be affected in any way if you refuse to participate.
Protection of Confidentiality. All information will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by
applicable State and Federal law and University policy. The principal researcher and faculty
advisor will have exclusive access to research data, which will be securely stored electronically
and physically. Participant data will only be made available to other individuals if permitted in
writing by the participant. Additionally to ensure confidentiality, participants or the principal
researcher will choose a pseudonym for participants and institutions.
Right to Know the Study’s Results. At the conclusion of the study you will have the right to
request feedback about the results. You may contact the faculty advisor, Dr. Kate Mamiseishvili,
or Principal Researcher, Ashlie Junot Hilbun. You will receive a copy of this form for your files.
Questions About the Study. You have the right to contact the Principal Researcher or Faculty
Advisor as listed below for any concerns that you may have. You may also contact the
University of Arkansas Research Compliance office listed below if you have questions about
your rights as a participant, or to discuss any concerns about, or problems with the research.
Ashlie Junot Hilbun
Principal Researcher
ahilbun@uark.edu

Dr. Ketevan Mamiseishvili
Faculty Advisor
479-575-3781
kmamisei@uark.edu

Ro Windwalker, CIP
Institutional Review Board Coordinator
Research Compliance
University of Arkansas
120 Ozark Hall
Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701-1201
479-575-2208
irb@uark.edu

I have read the above statement and have been able to ask questions and express concerns, which
have been satisfactorily responded to by the investigator. I understand the purpose of the study as
well as the potential benefits and risks that are involved. I understand that participation is
voluntary. I understand that significant new findings developed during this research will be
shared with the participant. I understand that no rights have been waived by signing the consent
form. I have been given a copy of the consent form.

Participant Signature

Date

**Please retain the duplicate copy of this form for your records.
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APPENDIX F
Member Checking Email
Liberal Arts Colleges During the Great Recession:
Examining Organizational Adaptation and Institutional Change
Principal Researcher: Ashlie Junot Hilbun
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Ketevan Mamiseishvili
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

Ashlie Junot Hilbun
[DAY, MONTH XX, 2013]
[PARTICIPANT]
Verification of Interview Record

Dear [PARTICIPANT]:
On [DATE], you participated in an interview as part of a research study I conducted regarding
how private liberal arts colleges adapted during the Great Recession of 2007.
First, thank you for your participation. As anticipated, your participation yielded valuable
information that will help inform my research findings and contribute to the larger body of
research on organizational adaptation.
Second, I’ve attached a record of your interview. To ensure that research findings are as accurate
as possible, I request that you review the record and provide me with your feedback. Please mark
your comments on the document itself or attach a document with your comments. Please note
that your feedback is requested by [DATE], after which date I will assume you approve the
record as it is in its current form. Please remember that key identifying information will be
disguised or removed from the final research report.
I hope you’ll give the document your careful attention. Feel free to contact me as you review the
record if you have questions, comments, or concerns.
My best,
Ashlie Junot Hilbun
University of Arkansas
Fayetteville, Arkansas
Email: ahilbun@uark.edu
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APPENDIX G
Observational Protocol
Liberal Arts Colleges During the Great Recession:
Examining Organizational Adaptation and Institutional Change
Principal Researcher: Ashlie Junot Hilbun
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Ketevan Mamiseishvili
Observational Field Notes
Case Institution:
Description of Observation:
Length of Observation:
Date:
Time:
Role of Observer:
Description of Object
[TIME] [DESCRIPTION]

	
  

Reflective Notes
[REFLECTION]
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. Overview of participants and the duration of their service at their respective
institutions between 2006 and 2013.
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